


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AMERICA'S PART



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AMERICA'S PART

By

HENRY J. REILLY

Brigadier-General, O.R.C.



Cosmopolitan Book Corporation

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AMERICA'S PART

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Preface

The author is peculiarly well qualified to perform the task set him in writing this book. Both his training and his experience have fitted him to an exceptional degree.

The primary requisite for such a work as this is the ability to accumulate the pertinent facts, and the possession of a background of knowledge and experience such that the facts accumulated can be properly grouped together and analyzed to produce the truth. Such qualifications produce a good commanding officer in battle and good reporter in peace. General Reilly's record shows him to have been both.

He has seen war on three continents—North America, Asia, and Europe.

In 1913, while in Mexico as a newspaper correspondent, he saw various combats between the different factions. In the attack on Monterey he accompanied the attacking Carranzista infantry.

As a young cavalry lieutenant on leave from the Philippines, he saw something of the closing scenes of the Russo-Japanese War. As a newspaper correspondent in China in 1925, while on a campaign with a Chinese force, he was captured by the opposing cavalry in the closing phase of a two days' battle.

He arrived in France in 1914, just after the First Battle of the Marne. Between then and our entry into the war in 1917, he first drove an American ambulance on the British and French fronts and later as a war correspondent made numerous visits to various parts of the western front, and, during the summer of 1915, to the most vital parts of the German-Russian front.

He participated in all the combats of our famous Forty-second, or Rainbow, Infantry Division, first in command of a light artillery regiment and then of an infantry brigade. Besides the distinction of receiving this promotion in battle was the unusual fact of an artilleryman being given an infantry command.

In 1920, he accompanied the Polish army in two campaigns against the Bolsheviki: the first in the spring, in which the Poles took the offensive, finally capturing Kief; the second in the late summer, when the Poles, driven far back, finally stood on the Vistula, stopped the Bolsheviki, and then attacked, capturing such large numbers as practically to wipe the Bolsheviki army out of existence.

General Reilly began his newspaper career in 1912 writing articles on American foreign affairs for the Chicago Tribune. He continued this work until the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. From then until we declared war he was a war correspondent for the Chicago Tribune and part of the time for the New York Herald as well. Since his return to this country

with the Rainbow Division, from the Rhine in the summer of 1919, he has been at various times a special correspondent for the Chicago Tribune in Europe and for the Hearst papers in Eastern Asia, and editor of the Army and Navy Journal. Besides this, he has written for various magazines on foreign affairs and military subjects.

General Reilly's qualifications are not limited to participation as an actor in, or close spectator of, interesting events. Constant study of our international and military affairs has given him a background from which to judge what he has seen.

He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. Seven years after graduation he was sent back to that institution as an instructor in history. During the ten years prior to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, he not only saw but studied the organization, tactics, and connections with their civil governments of the French, German, British, Italian, Russian, Japanese, Peruvian, Bolivian, Chilean, Argentine and Mexican armies.

Since his return from the Rhine in the summer of 1919, he has on each of three trips to Europe talked with numerous Europeans who participated in the war on one side or the other besides bringing home with him more than a thousand books written since the war in various languages. He spent the greater part of 1927 in Europe, gathering additional material for this book.

The figures he uses are from American official sources; "Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire" (official); "Etude de Statistique Chirurgical, Guerre de 1914-18" (official); Colonel Pagnet, "La Défaite Militaire de l'Allemagne en 1918"; General Buat, "L'Armée Allemande pendant la Guerre de 1914-18"; "L'Effort Militaire des Alliés sur le front de France", from "Collection de Mémoires, Etudes et Documents pour servir à l'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale," and numerous other highly reliable sources.

The pertinent quotations which he has been able to obtain from distinguished leaders for this volume are a guaranty of his good standing as an active soldier, as well as a military critic, among men whose records guarantee that they speak with authority.

Marshal Foch, General Pershing, General Bliss, our representative on the Versailles Superior War Council; and General Summerall, the present chief of staff of the army, have all given him direct expressions of opinion on various questions brought up in the different chapters of this book.

J. G. HARBORD.

Major-General U. S. Army, Retired.

New York, July 10, 1928.

Introduction

What part did we take in the Great War?

Did we only lend money to our Allies, or did we really fight?

It is time we knew the truth, not only for purposes of history, but above all because the answer to this question vitally affects our relations with the other great Powers today, and particularly with Great Britain and her self-governing colonies, such as Canada, our nearest neighbor, and Australia, which is faced with the same problems in the Pacific as the United States.

The stay-at-home American, even though he but glances at his daily paper, must be surprised at the chorus of abuse and even of rage directed toward us each time not only the war debts but any other question in which we happen to differ with our associates in the Great War comes up.

The American who has traveled outside this country or, better yet, lived among Europeans, and particularly Britishers and British Colonials, be it in Europe, Asia, or the Americas, knows the origin of this feeling against us.

He knows that the average foreigner believes that we did little fighting, and that of no particular con-

sequence, in the war; our principal part being, to put it frankly, that of a usurer who loaned his friends money when they were in great trouble and simply had to have it, and now brazenly insists on repayment with no shame because of his failure to fight.

We even have some Americans who, adopting the same point of view, invariably take the side of the foreigner in any discussion on this subject. Thus, what fighting we really did in the Great War, and how far it affected its issue, is largely the foundation of our foreign relations today.

In addition to this, every veteran who knows that he and the other soldiers of his division risked their lives on the battle-field, has a natural curiosity to know just what effect the fights they were in had on the course of the war as a whole. Were they merely local engagements of no particular importance, or were they integral parts of the most dramatic event the world can produce—a decisive battle, an event which in a few days of great bloodshed and tremendous emotion determines the course, perhaps for centuries, not only of nations containing millions of people, but in a universal conflict such as the Great War, of the whole world?

Despite considerable search, I know of no book in the English language which frankly and fully discusses the questions of what the fighting we did in the war really amounted to.

Books on the war published in Britain, with few

exceptions, largely ignore our part in the conflict. The few exceptions have scattered through them a number of very interesting facts concerning what we did, but no summation of our part.

In this country, several books have been produced concerning our part. However, they have more to do with the work done by the nation to overcome its unpreparedness at the time we declared war than with the actual effect on the military situation of such combat as our troops engaged in.

In French, there are two books, both written by officers, giving not only a fair but even a generous summary of our military effort. Here and there throughout the tremendous number of French books on the war written since the Armistice there are frank statements that without America's man-power the tremendous blow suffered by the Allies when Russia dropped out of the war could never have been overcome. However, there has not yet been published a frank discussion as to the relative parts played by the different nations in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

Nothing is known of any book in Italian which goes into our part in the war.

The Germans, on the whole, frankly state that their plans were seriously upset by our entry into the war, just as they had disposed of Russia, one of their principal antagonists. However, as far as is known, the tremendous literature on the war which, as in France,

has appeared since the Armistice contains no definite summary of what effect was caused by the arrival on European battle-fields of the troops which we put in combat.

The purpose of this book is to set forth the best obtainable facts, without regard to national or international likes and dislikes, in answer to the question: did this nation really play an important part in beating Germany on the battle-fields of France, or did it merely send a few troops to show the flag to justify a usurious attitude later on?

The point of view, held by so many foreigners, is rapidly becoming crystallized into acceptance as an historical fact. It is the basis of the dislike of this country which exists among so many people today.

THE AUTHOR

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AMERICA'S PART

Prologue

THE AMERICAN LEGION IN PARIS

I HAVE come to say to you that the American people would hold it a great honor for our troops were they engaged in the present battle. I ask it of you, in my name, and in that of the American people. There is at this moment no other question than that of fighting. Infantry, artillery, aviation—all that we have—are yours to dispose of as you will. Others are coming who will be as numerous as may be necessary. I have come to say to you that the American people would be proud to be engaged in the greatest battle of history.”

As Marshal Foch finished quoting these words which General Pershing addressed to him on the 28th of March, 1918, when Ludendorff's first great blow was smashing through the British and separating them from the French, Americans and French ran up from all directions shouting, “Vive Pershing!” “Hurrah for Foch!” “Hurrah for Pershing!” “Vive Foch!” Some of the French carried the tricolor of France, heavily fringed with gold, covered with gold-embroidered wreaths and names of famous battles. The staffs, however, were surmounted with the gilded spearhead

of the Republic in place of the eagle which perched in this proud position when the great Napoleon's soldiers crowded around him carrying their battle flags and yelling, "Vive l'Empereur!"

This scene reminiscent of the days when chiefs sat on their horses, seeing and being seen by their troops, took place not on one of the battle-fields of the Great War, but in the Court of Honor of the Hôtel des Invalides during the visit of the American Legion to Paris in 1927.

Les Anciens Combattants de France (Former Combatants of France) were giving a banquet to the citizens of their sister Republic, who also had had the honor to risk their lives for their country on the battle-fields of the Great War. Four thousand French and Americans sat down together in the main courtyard of that immense building started by Louis XIV, the "Grand Monarch," as a home for his crippled and aged veteran soldiers.

About dusk, crowds of Americans with Legion caps and badges, and groups of French with the badges of Les Anciens Combattants, carrying their flags, had commenced to congregate in front of the high iron gates with a stone guard-house on either side, which, as every American tourist knows, marks the entrance to the outer yard of the Invalides. Passing through the gates and by the sentries at "present arms," they walked across the outer yard between two single ranks of the cavalry of the Garde Républicaine mounted on

beautiful and well-kept horses. Their saddles were covered by artistic blue saddle-cloths faced with red, hiding all leather, and ending in graceful points well down both flanks of their mounts. Their highly polished black-jack boots came above the knees of their white breeches. Their tunics were blue faced with red. Their sabers belonged to the age when "cutting an enemy down" was not a phrase, but a serious military problem met on every battle-field.

Their heads were crowned as well as protected by the magnificent steel helmet with its upright red pom-pom and flowing black horsehair plume, the appearance of which in the thundering ranks galloping behind Napoleon's great cavalry leader Murat gave notice to the enemy's infantry on many a field that their hour had struck.

Like a movie reel made up of cuttings from the many episodes of a long story, these cavalrymen brought to the minds of many passing American veterans flashes of the military prowess and the patriotic determination which made France into a country, and has kept her one despite her dangerous geographical position midway of most of the highways leading from any one extremity of Europe to another.

The medals on the breasts of the individual cavaliers of the guard were such as can be won only by facing danger in battle. They showed that the soldiers of this corps d'élite, entry into whose ranks can be secured only by long and honorable service, repre-

sented by their lives as well as their uniforms that indomitable French spirit which again and again in history, despite long odds, has saved their nation from defeat.

Passing under the heavy arches of the sally-port leading from the outer yard to the main courtyard we legionnaires, for I was one of them, followed the footsteps of the thousands of Americans who each year visit the French War Museum before passing on to the Tomb of Napoleon.

Instead of seeing the familiar large and bare courtyard with guns, tanks, and other war relics distributed around the walls, we were confronted with the blaze of thousands of electric lights. They outlined the graceful architecture of the building, the many-colored American and French, national, state, and city coats of arms fastened along the walls, and folds of canvas awnings draped above long vistas of tables.

These awnings glimmered white along the sides of the court, one of which houses the War Museum of Napoleon's day, the other that of the Great War. Hung from just below the windows of the third story, they were supported at the court end, beyond the tables, by white poles set at a pleasing angle, and capped by gilded spearheads.

The table of honor was on a dais at the upper end of the court below the heroic statue of Napoleon set above the gate leading to his tomb. The awning above the table of honor was draped like the canopy of a

throne. It was high enough both to permit the 4,000 to see the generals and statesmen at the table and to include within its graceful folds Napoleon's statue with the coat of arms of France on one side and that of the United States on the other, their colors blazing forth in the white light of the electric globes in which they were outlined.

The beauty of the scene involuntarily produced the thought that it must be a stage setting, it could not be real. The magnificence, the grace, almost convinced that by some Wells's "Time Traveler" magic, we had been moved back in time to a fête at Versailles in the days of the "Glorious Monarch."

What were Marshal Foch and General Pershing thinking as they stood side by side, directly under the heroic statue of Napoleon, smiling and waving their hands to the cheering French and American veterans?

Through the minds of both must have flashed the thought that when it comes to leadership in war "many are called but few are chosen."

The war had put both to the acid test of facing failure. In September, 1916, the fact that the then General Foch had reached the peace-time age of retirement of sixty-five years was used as an excuse to relieve him of his command.

Almost until the Armistice, General Pershing was the intended victim of a persistent effort to secure his relief because he insisted on organizing our troops

into an American army, instead of allowing them to be used as replacements for the armies of our Allies.

Were their personal escapes from going down in history as failures, however unwarranted such a fate, the sole or even the principal cause of their obvious emotion as they stood there facing the men whom they had commanded?

Was the final personal success of these two leaders the reason for the enthusiasm of the cheering men, some of whom still bore the marks of wounds received, and all of whom could remember comrades whose lives had been given in obeying the orders of these two chiefs?

Was the whole remarkable scene merely evidence of French hospitality and politeness to those who had loaned them money in time of need, and American appreciation?

Or did those deep emotions, unknown to such as have never faced battle, cause a mutual French and American spontaneous outpouring of admiration to the leaders whose steadfastness and vision brought success out of black uncertainty and abiding friendship to those whose comradeship during the passage through the dark valley of death helped bring the glorious sunrise of victory?

Chapter I

WHAT PERSHING FACED IN EUROPE

WHEN President Wilson on May 10, 1917, appointed General Pershing to command our Expeditionary Force in Europe what was the job which faced the general?

A question easily answered by anyone: to take the American troops sent to Europe, organize them into an army, and join the Allied armies in beating the German army.


In simple language this is what his written instructions, dated May 26, 1917, and signed by Secretary of War Baker, ordered him to do.

Yet he soon found that harder than overcoming the enormous difficulties resulting from our unpreparedness; harder than getting our millions across the Atlantic, supplying, equipping, moving, and feeding them—was to carry out these simple instructions.

First, because the British and the French wanted to use our men to fill the gaps in their own armies instead of having them formed into an American army.

Second, because at the time General Pershing landed in Europe the Allied strategy was not the purely mili-

tary one of doing what was best to beat the German army, but was tangled up with all sorts of politics rising from internal conditions in the different Allied



British traditional lines of defense of England, diagrammatic only, 1' around London, 2' along British coast, 3' in Northern France and Belgium. This shows how the British desire to capture Ostend and Zeebrugge and to concentrate their forces in the north, while bettering protection of England, tied down and overstretched the French army, which was holding much greater proportion of line.

countries and international political jealousies between them. Until almost ten months later, the last of March, 1918, when Marshal Foch, then a general, was appointed to supreme command, there was not even unity of military action—much less a sound military plan.

General Pershing's hardest fight and that carried on continuously was to see that our men were organized into, and fought as, an American army, instead of being used as replacements for the British and French armies. This struggle to use our men first as individual replacements and, failing that, by battalions and finally by divisions, was begun by the Allied missions which arrived in Washington shortly after our declaration of war. It continued until the Argonne battle closed with the Armistice.

Despite the danger, and at times almost the certainty, of his removal General Pershing never faltered until an American army, under the American flag, and led throughout by American officers, was at grips on the battle-field with the enemy.

General Pershing was summoned from the Mexican border to Washington to take command and begin to organize the American Expeditionary Force. He had just come from months in Mexico, where he had commanded the force sent to punish Sancho Villa for that bandit's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, and to see that no further raids were made upon any of our border towns.

What a contrast presented itself to him between the command of a few thousand troops in the sandy, desolate, unsettled wastes of northern Mexico, and that of the huge army which he must organize to fight in the highly cultivated, thickly settled, civilized terrain of northern Europe! What a contrast in the enemy to

be faced! What a tremendous difference between Villa's raiders—even the trained regular troops of Mexico, ostensibly sent to help him catch Villa but in reality ready to fight Pershing—and the German army, undoubtedly the most perfect war organization seen by the world to date!

This contrast must have brought to his mind the question of his own experience. Later in Europe, during the attempts to keep him from having an American army, the charge was repeatedly made that General Pershing's experience and knowledge was only of minor warfare, and, therefore, not sufficient to prepare him for handling the immense masses brought into action on the modern battle-field in grand warfare.

Upon graduating from West Point in 1886, Pershing chose the cavalry, undoubtedly because in those days the Indian fighting still going on gave the cavalry more fighting than the rest of the army put together, as had been true ever since the close of the Civil War. His first campaign was in the arid country just north of the Mexican border against the famous Apache chief Geronimo. It was against this same chief that General Leonard Wood, who recently died while Governor General of the Philippine Islands, had his first military experience. A young doctor, just out of medical school, Wood had been commissioned in the army. On his first campaign, while a good surgeon, he showed himself to be by instinct a combat soldier.

Pershing's Indian campaigns also included combat in the Dakotas with the Sioux, those Indians who were so advanced in warfare that they had real tactics, and who fourteen years before had outgeneraled General Custer, exterminating in battle that gallant soldier and the brave men of the five troops of the Seventh Cavalry who died with him to the last man.

In 1898, Captain Pershing fought in the San Juan Hill battle, which wrested the heights around the town and harbor of Santiago, Cuba, from the Spanish troops and forced Cervera's Spanish fleet to put to sea and face destruction by our fleet.

The Philippine Insurrection, which shortly followed our capture of Manila from the Spaniards, and the many years of constant fighting with the Mohammedan Moros of the southern Philippines, furnished Pershing with additional experience against a savage enemy. This time, as in Cuba, it was amidst the abundant foliage of tropical islands instead of the grassy, wind-swept, freezing plains of Dakota or the sandy broiling ones of Arizona and New Mexico.

However, Pershing's experience and knowledge were not all derived from minor warfare against Indians, Spaniards, Filipinos, and Mexicans. As a cadet at West Point, he had to study thoroughly the campaigns and battles not only of our American wars, but of the European ones as well.

The criticism is sometimes made, even in our army, that West Point teaches too much of the general's

business, and not enough of the second lieutenant's. Our leadership in the Mexican War, and that of both the Union and the Confederate armies in the Civil War, shows that this course at West Point firmly fixed in the minds of the embryo officers the principles of the art of war and practical examples of how to use them. In other words, it gives that thorough mental training in the art of war which, self-acquired by Napoleon when a young, unknown lieutenant, he always afterward emphatically indicated as the reason for his success.

In the last forty-five years, there has grown up in our army a complete system of schools for officers of all ranks and ages. They are designed to advance progressively the knowledge of officers not only as infantrymen, cavalrymen, and artillerymen, but as officers of the general staff and as commanding generals.

Pershing had passed through his share of these.

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Pershing, then a captain of cavalry, was our military attaché to Japan. His visits to Port Arthur and to the Japanese army at the front in Manchuria gave him the opportunity to see the practical application in war of the principles of grand warfare first learned by him as a cadet at West Point.

General Pershing is one of those men whom fortunately our army has never failed to produce in time of war, who, through their theoretical knowledge of

the art of war and their practice in the leadership of men gained in minor warfare, are splendidly fitted by knowledge and experience to command successfully large armies in the face of a modern, well-trained enemy.

As Pershing rode toward Washington on that long trip from Texas, the thought that he was a graduate of the same school of theory and practice which produced U. S. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and the majority of our great war-time leaders in battle, must have given him confidence.

Two questions undoubtedly presented themselves to his mind: how to transport an army overseas, and how to serve alongside the French and British as allies.

Neither of these was a new problem. There has never been a more successful or a more efficiently handled transport of a force by sea than that which took General Scott's army to Mexico. Dumped by the small boats of the transports on the beach near Vera Cruz, they first attacked and took that city. Then, using it as a base, they fought their way 7,000 feet up to the great central Mexican plateau and captured Mexico City, 200 miles away. Again and again during our Civil War, the Union moved large forces by sea to different points of attack along the southern coast.

Pershing himself, as a captain, had sailed with Shafter's expedition from Tampa, which left despite the fact that Cervera's Spanish fleet was supposed to

be at sea. It was on this expedition that he first met Theodore Roosevelt.

The American expedition which took the city of Manila from the Spaniards by force of arms, after Dewey had sunk the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, sailed 10,000 miles from our Pacific coast to the Philippine Islands. All the troops, horses, and supplies used in the several years' campaign against the Philippine insurrectos were transported that same distance. General Pershing, like the majority of our regular officers, sailed it a number of times on our army transports.

Every schoolboy knows that in the last stages of the Revolutionary War, our troops and the French fought together against the British. What is not so often remembered is that during the century and a half we were British colonists we, as colonial troops, frequently fought alongside British troops and under the command of their generals. We materially aided the British in their campaigns which gave them Canada and drove the French off the North American Continent. We even participated in actions against the Spanish.

The most famous was the attack in 1741 on the city of Cartagena, in the Spanish colony which to-day is the United States of Colombia. It failed with heavy losses from wounds and sickness. This was the expedition which a British officer said best illustrated cooperation between the army and the navy, as the

army blamed the navy because they did not batter down stone walls too thick for their cannon balls, and the navy blamed the army because they did not fly over the same stone walls.

In fact, we served so much as British colonial troops that to this day our military law, regulations, customs of the service, and some parts of our organization are still primarily British.

Calling a lieutenant "Mister," something the training-camp officers naturally objected to, is one of them.

Though General Pershing as a regular knew we were unprepared for war, as we always are, though we have averaged one war every twenty-five years, the condition of affairs he found when he arrived in Washington must have discouraged him. Despite the fact that Germany's increasing violations of our rights at sea had reached the point where they far surpassed the numerous transgressions of the Allies, making war a certainty, the Administration had done nothing to prepare. No plans had been made prior to our declaration of war. Such efforts as the general staff of the army and the general board of the navy had made to call attention to this necessity had been rebuffed by President Wilson. He seemed to share the feeling, common to so many Americans and Britishers, that a brave and patriotic people does not need to prepare for war.

When William Jennings Bryan talked of a million men springing to arms overnight, he only expressed

this widespread feeling which always results in an unnecessarily large butcher's bill in killed and wounded.

The chance to win given to Germany because Britain entered the war unprepared; the continuation of this opportunity because of the time it took Britain to prepare, had taught us, with the exception of our military people, nothing.

Another discouragement was the fact that Washington, like London, had a considerable number of statesmen unable to see that a war, like a prize fight, is won by fighting.

Enthusiastic supporters of every scheme involving furnishing money, food, munitions, supplies of all kinds, and ships, they could not see that men, and still more men, up to the very limit of the man-power of the nations involved, on the battle-field facing the Germans was the only way to win the war. They were ignorant of the struggle going on, and which had been unceasingly waged by the British generals to make their statesmen understand this. In justice to such men, it must be stated that probably the majority of the British and French missions, which hurried over here as soon as we declared war, encouraged this point of view.

General Tasker H. Bliss, who was our representative on the Supreme War Council at Versailles, on which Marshal Foch was the French representative until he was put in command of the Allied forces,

has shown this. In speaking of their activities in Washington, he said: "It became painfully evident that these missions represented the continued lack of unity that had been the costly bane of Allied efforts from the beginning. There was no common plan; there was no definite plan of any mission. Some individuals urged that what was wanted from the United States was not men, not an army, but money, food, munitions, supplies of all kinds. Others said men, trained or untrained, and send them quickly." He summed up the confusion arising from their disjointed activities by saying, "Then, if ever, what was needed was not Allied missions but a mission of the Allies."

That we should be unprepared, that some of our statesmen could not see that a fighting army is the only way to win a war, was not surprising to a man of General Pershing's experience and knowledge. What must have astonished him was to find that some of the military members of both the French and the British missions advanced plans which meant that our untrained men would be sent to fill the gaps in their armies.

General Harbord, who went to Europe as General Pershing's chief of staff, and who later commanded the Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood, says that the plan of General Nivelle, then commanding the French army, called primarily for laborers, railroad workers, carpenters, miners, chauffeurs; that such fighting troops as were to be sent were to be recruits to be fed

into the depleted battalions of the French army. He states that General Bridges of the British army expressed the same idea, except that he wished the British army to get its share of our men.

If General Pershing thought that, perhaps, the ideas of the members of these disjointed missions were not representative of their countries, he was disillusioned when he arrived in Europe. While the Allied military and political chiefs always agreed in principle that an American army should be formed, they were continuously advancing, one way or another, schemes, the practical effect of which would have been the use of our men as replacements in the armies of our Allies.

General Pershing more and more found his greatest difficulty to be the problem of insuring that while fighting on foreign battle-fields our men should risk their lives and limbs not under foreign officers and foreign flags, but under American officers and our own flag.

As 1917 drew to a close, the pressure became greater. The Allied spring offensive on the western front had failed. The Russian Revolution, which in the spring had appeared to promise a more active participation by Russia in the war, by fall fell into the hands of the Bolsheviki, who began peace negotiations with Germany. The German divisions from the Russian front were commencing to arrive on the French front. The Italians had suffered a heavy defeat at Caporetto, losing a quarter of a million men in casual-

ties and another quarter-million in prisoners. The Allies saw only the few divisions which we had up to that time landed in Europe. They did not see that the tremendous preparations we were making at home, once completed, would insure an overwhelming force of American troops reaching Europe, instead of dribbets as would have been the case had we tried to send them continuously from the declaration of war.

They did not take much stock in General Pershing's large-scale preparations to fit French ports, French railways, and territory assigned him back of the French front, for the arrival and practically immediate use in battle of a large army. Because of the rigid censorship to insure secrecy respecting our preparations, there was even widespread belief at home that we were not going ahead to win the war. It broke out in both houses of Congress and in the press.

General Pershing, who thoroughly knew our military history, knew that this was the mood which led to insistent demands for immediate action, regardless of conditions. He knew this was the state of mind which had led the public and the press to cry "On to Richmond" in 1861, when our hastily raised troops were not ready. He knew that at the beginning of the Civil War some wanted to put General Sherman in an insane asylum as crazy because he said it would last four years and wanted a large army. He knew that in 1914 Lord Kitchener had been violently criticized, not only by civilians but also in the British

regular army, because he insisted on planning for a large army and a long war instead of sending his newly raised men in dribblets to the front.

In the midst of this, General Sir William Robertson, the chief of the British General Staff, got Lloyd George, the prime minister, to agree to a demand that 150 individual battalions of American infantry be sent to Europe and put in British divisions. The British divisions, because of lack of men for the army, had recently been reduced from four to three battalions. Putting one American battalion in each would restore them to their original strength.

Mr. Lloyd George sent Lord Reading, the British ambassador to the United States, who was then in Europe, to Colonel House in Paris. Colonel House forwarded his request to Washington.

Mr. Garrison resigned as secretary of war in February, 1916, because his efforts to prepare us for war met with the disapproval of President Wilson. Mr. Baker was appointed in his place. Generally believed to be a pacifist, his appointment was taken to mean that President Wilson intended this country to make no war preparations. However, once war was declared, Mr. Baker showed himself a great secretary.

He had learned from his father, who had been a Confederate soldier in the Civil War, the evils of political interference with military affairs. He knew that Jefferson Davis, the Confederate president, had profited by his experience as a colonel of infantry in the

Mexican War and at a later date as United States Secretary of War. Therefore some weeks later, as president, he appointed as Confederate generals men of large military experience such as Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. Mr. Baker knew that the North in the Civil War suffered continuously from political interference with military affairs until Lincoln, profiting by his bitter experience, put Grant in command and backed him up.

As a consequence, Mr. Baker referred the British request to General Pershing. The British, with their typical bulldog determination, kept hammering at Pershing to get him to yield. Finding him equally determined, General Robertson, the chief of staff, and Sir Henry Wilson, the British military representative on the Supreme War Council at Versailles, decided to force his hand by going straight to President Wilson.

The result was that after the British defeat of March, 1918, when Ludendorff's first great blow practically annihilated the Fifth British Army, Lord Reading, the British ambassador at Washington, succeeded in persuading President Wilson to agree to infantry and machine gunners, only, being shipped to France. For four months, 120,000 per month were to be sent, without any artillery, supply trains, or other components which make up an infantry division.

Some weeks later General Pershing started for London to take part in a conference. On his way he stopped first at General Foch's headquarters. General

Foch, but recently appointed to command the Allied forces in France, acquiesced in the principle of building up a separate American army. General Pershing then visited General Haig's headquarters, where an agreement was come to with respect to American infantry divisions to help the British.

Despite this, at the London conference, during discussion of the question of British shipping to help bring over American troops, the question again was brought up of incorporating 150 American battalions in British divisions.

After a long argument finding General Pershing determined to have an American army, the British sprang as a surprise the cable from Lord Reading, telling that President Wilson had agreed to battalions alone being sent.

Under such dramatic circumstances, the ordinary man would have yielded. However, Pershing, made of steel, after a moment of silence during which all eyes were centered upon him, simply remarked that he could not believe the President had taken such an action. He has not yet disclosed what he said in the cable he sent President Wilson immediately after the conference. However, whatever it was, it worked, because the decision as to what would be done was again left in General Pershing's hands.

General Pershing's policy had always been that in the case of an emergency, he would put our divisions in action, even though they were not trained.

The British army and the French divisions which had come to its help were still being heavily attacked by the Germans. General Pershing, therefore, agreed that during May infantry and machine guns of six divisions, the maximum number which the shipping available could carry, would be brought over for training and service with the British; and that, if the situation continued bad, he would agree to the shipment of the infantry and machine guns of other divisions. He stipulated, however, that these American divisions would be withdrawn when he considered it necessary to use them as an integral part of an American army.

General Pétain in command of the French army, while not approaching the matter as directly as the British, advanced schemes of training for our troops which to practical purposes would have resulted in our regiments' being incorporated in French divisions. The consequent discussion between Generals Pershing and Pétain led the "Tiger," Mr. Clemenceau, the French prime minister, to cable to Mr. Jusserand, the French ambassador at Washington, that General Pershing could not get along with General Pétain.

Mr. Jusserand told our War Department, which cabled General Pershing. Here again, the general showed the stuff of which he was made. No complaint behind Mr. Clemenceau's back; no beating around the bush! He simply wrote to Mr. Clemenceau, stating that any differences between himself and the French

had better be fought out in France and not carried to Washington.

Mr. Clemenceau sent a hot reply. However, the result was an amicable meeting at which a definite understanding was come to with the French. This provided that while our regiments would be sent for a month's training with French divisions on arrival, they would then be withdrawn and assembled in American divisions under American officers.

However, despite these, apparently, definite settlements with the British and the French, attempts to absorb our troops into the armies of our Allies, thus preventing the formation of an American army, did not entirely cease until the Armistice was signed.

The last attempt was made during the Argonne battle, when it was suggested that American divisions should be distributed between British and French armies along the western front. This because "fuller advantage should be taken of their remarkable fighting capabilities than could be expected when they operated as an American Army."

Mr. Lloyd George persisted strongly in urging this course upon Secretary of War Baker, then in London. However, Secretary Baker still backed up General Pershing, believing as strongly as the commander-in-chief of the A.E.F. that there should be an American army.

While General Pershing fought to have an American army, he also had to keep his eyes open for

schemes to relieve him. He knew that the history of our wars shows a considerable list of commanding generals who were relieved. This not so much because they had really failed, as because our unpreparedness prevented them from winning the immediate victory the public demanded. In addition, he knew that his persistency in insisting on our troops' being made into an American army instead of being absorbed into the French and British armies, was being used to prove that he would not cooperate with our Allies.

There was a heavy attack on him along both of these lines just prior to the second battle of the Marne. However, the splendid conduct of our troops, both in the July 15 defensive, in which the last great German attack of the war was stopped, and in Foch's successful counter-offensive, which began July 18, marking the turning-point of the war, put a stop to this criticism.

The difficulty encountered in the Argonne, where our troops not only attacked through difficult, broken, hilly, and frequently wooded country, but after their first success had to get all their supplies through the wreckage of the French and German trenches left by four years' fighting, was another occasion. This, because our troops did not move ahead fast enough, and our supply system did not work smoothly enough to satisfy the critics.

How widespread some of these attempts were is shown by an incident which occurred during one of

Admiral Sims's visits to Paris. An American correspondent of one of our large dailies came to the Hôtel Crillon, where the admiral was staying, and broached the subject of his joining a movement to oust Pershing. Admiral Sims indignantly refused,

As General Pershing, after his arrival in Europe in June, 1917, got in close touch with the situation, what did he find it really to be?

Of course, he knew what any trained soldier, who had been following the situation even from a distance, knew. He knew the rosy picture painted by Allied propaganda, of the Central Powers sinking rapidly into defeat under the powerful blows of the Allies, was not true.

The fact that after three years of fighting, with the single exception of upper Alsace, the German troops still stood on Allied territory a long way from their own frontier, was sufficient evidence of that. The much heralded Allied "ring of steel" around the Central Powers was still a long way from forcing them back on their own territory.

It is the business of a general commanding a re-enforcement, when he arrives in the theater of war, to report to the general headquarters of his side. This in order to find out where the enemy's troops are, what indications exist as to their plans, what his own side is planning to do, and what help he is expected to give.

However, when General Pershing arrived in Eu-

rope there was no such Allied general headquarters for him to go to. There never had been since the beginning of the war. In London, Paris, and Rome were the seats of three Allied governments. Each was primarily concerned with its own problems and, except for conferences from time to time, dealt with the others through the regular channels of peace-time communication. Along the western front from the English Channel to the Adriatic Sea were three general headquarters of large armies—the British, the French, and the Italian—and one of a small force—the Belgian. While the generals commanding had occasional conferences, and each had liaison officers from the others, there was no central body continuously coordinating the activities of all, much less one commander-in-chief in control.

Far off to the east was another capital—Petrograd, and another general headquarters—the Russian. Outside of submarine cable or telegraph messages, these could be reached only by a long, roundabout sea and land trip to the north or to the south, or else a trip around the world. By the north, it was necessary either to go around the Scandinavian peninsula and through the Arctic Sea, or else to attempt to cross the Baltic Sea, which was controlled by the German fleet. The southern route led through the Mediterranean, around Turkey to the Persian Gulf and thence far overland through Persia. The around-the-world trip was across the Atlantic, then North America, fol-

lowed by the Pacific, and finally the two weeks' trip via the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The then General Foch was advocating the formation of at least a central Allied body continuously in session, which could insure the carrying out of a common plan. He was not being listened to.

General Pershing arrived in the middle of a splendid illustration of the evil effect upon the Allied cause of this lack of coordination. He arrived just at the time when nearly three years of failing to fight the war with the single object of beating the Germans was commencing to bear fruit for the Allies in the discouragement and pessimism which culminated about a year later when Hindenburg and Ludendorff delivered the tremendous blows which not only the Germans confidently expected, but the Allies almost admitted, meant victory for Germany.

The chiefs of the Allies had met in November, 1916, to plan the campaign for 1917. The idea was that all of them would attack the Central Powers at the same time.

The British and French were to attack on the western front in France, the Italians along the Isonzo River, the Allied force of French, British, Italians, and Greeks, from Saloniki north into the Balkans, and the Russians, with what was left of the Roumanians, on the eastern front. Thus, with superior forces attacking them from all directions at the same time, the Central Powers would be crushed, because unable to

switch their troops from front to front as each was attacked, as they had been able to do in the past because of the failure of the Allies to attack together at the same time.

Having agreed upon the general idea, the chiefs had to decide upon when to start the attacks. Immediately, there was that divergence of opinion which always characterized Allied councils.

The French maintained they should be started early, as otherwise Hindenburg, the new German commander-in-chief, might start something first, thus wrecking their plans. As it turned out, this was exactly what happened. However, because of weather conditions on the fronts of other nations, the French were overruled. Before April, 1917, the time finally set for the general Allied offensive, a variety of events took place, which completely disrupted it.

In England, Mr. Lloyd George succeeded Mr. Asquith as premier. From the beginning, Mr. Lloyd George was opposed to Marshal Haig, commanding the British forces in France. In general, he believed that the British casualty list was too heavy for the results the fighting produced. He also was inclined to attempt to finish the war by fighting somewhere else than in France. He thought an easier and less costly way of beating Germany would be to make the principal attack from the Balkans against Austria, rather than against the Germans in France. Marshal Haig and General Robertson, the chief of the British Im-

perial General Staff, like all other trained soldiers, were convinced that unless the Germans were beaten in France and driven back into their own country, Germany would never be beaten.

This fundamental difference of opinion between the British premier and the British commander-in-chief operated from then on to prevent the British land forces from being assembled in one large force to strike a united blow against the enemy.

Marshal Haig and General Robertson were worried about the size of the British armies. They would have liked larger British forces in the field. However, this was not their chief worry. What was causing them anxiety was that the point was being reached where the number of new men coming into the army was not sufficient to make good the losses. In other words, it was a question, only on a much larger scale, of the problem which faced Wellington during the Napoleonic Wars. He bitterly complained because the replacements sent him from England did not equal the number of his casualties. To prevent the British armies from shrinking in size there was only one answer—conscription. Like all the other British military chiefs, Marshal Haig and General Robertson had been advocating it for a long time. They had produced any number of figures to back up their contention.

However, Lloyd George was disinclined really to come to it. The partial measures which had been adopted to stimulate volunteering were satisfactory to

him. Apparently, his solution of the problem was to do less fighting which would produce losses, and thus by diminishing the drain decrease the necessity for replacements.

At the same time, changes in the French government and high command brought disagreement between French soldiers and statesmen. General Joffre had been relieved from command of the army and replaced by General Nivelle in December, 1916. General Nivelle had the support of Mr. Briand, the French premier, and of General Lyautey, the French minister of war. However, in March, 1917, Mr. Ribot became premier and Mr. Painlevé minister of war.

They were both opposed to General Nivelle, because they believed that plans which he had for an offensive would only cause the French army further tremendous losses, without producing victory. They believed that the time had come when the French must guard their remaining man-power if they were not to become so weak from loss in battle that the Germans could crash through their line. This because, having commenced the war with conscription, long voted for by the citizens of the French Republic as the only efficient and fair way of raising an army, France from the beginning had had her man-power under arms. Thus, having borne the brunt of the war from the beginning, for her the question was not, as with England, whether or not the government would take more men—there were no more to take.

The new French premier and war minister believed the time had come to adopt the policy of General Pétain, an officer with an excellent war record, who said that under these circumstances the only thing for the French to do if they did not want to be put out of the war by the Germans, was to rest on the defensive until an American army in sufficient numbers had arrived to give the Allies the numerical superiority necessary to attack successfully.

These French and British changes, with the consequent differences of opinion between the statesmen and generals of each country, caused if not downright disputes, at least such differences of opinion between the French and the British that there was no longer unity of action on their part.

The original plan for the spring of 1917 offensive, as agreed upon between General Joffre and Marshal Haig, had given the British the heaviest or principal attack to make and the French the secondary one.

When General Nivelle became the French commander-in-chief, he reversed this. Both attacks were to be on a large scale, but the French one was to be on the larger scale and was planned to break entirely through the German line. At this period of the war, the majority of soldiers, as well as statesmen, were inclined to believe that no one attack, whether made by the Allies or by the Germans, could break through the trench line of the other side. General Nivelle, while in command at Verdun prior to his appointment

to be commander-in-chief, had made two surprise attacks on the Germans which, though only on a small scale, had yielded unusual results. He believed the same system of surprise applied on a large scale would break all the way through.

He had convinced Mr. Lloyd George. The French and British generals, on the whole, were not in agreement with him. As a consequence, with Mr. Lloyd George opposed to Generals Haig and Robertson, and Mr. Painlevé opposed to General Nivelle and supporting General Pétain's point of view, there soon developed a situation in which there was anything but unity of purpose on the part of the French and British soldiers and statesmen.

In the meanwhile General von Hindenburg had moved first, just as the French had feared he would. Secretly and so quietly that the French and British to their front did not find it out until the movement was well under way, the German troops had begun withdrawing from their trenches along the front to the northeast of Paris. Gradually the movement spread until it covered a front of approximately 125 miles.

The Allies were greatly puzzled. The press and the public were inclined to believe it was the beginning of a great German retreat, and, therefore, of the end. The Allied military leaders interpreted it more correctly. They believed that Hindenburg was doing it—as he was—to get his troops out of the old, battered,

muddy trenches into new and better ones; to shorten his line so that it could be held with fewer troops, thus increasing his reserves and enabling him to take the offensive with a larger force.

Marshal Haig thought the offensive would be against the British. General Cadorna, commanding the Italian army, thought it would be against Italy.

The practical result of it was that it largely changed the situation in front of the British army, thus necessitating considerable change in their plans for the spring attack. When they attacked in early April they limited their offensive to capturing Vimy Ridge.

While it did not change the situation in front of the French, it did free German troops, thus increasing their reserves available for use when they did attack. As a consequence of this, and of the Germans' having found out somehow, when and where it was to be made, the attack, begun a week after the British one, was not a surprise and did not break through. The French gained ground, but at the cost of heavy losses.

The first revolution in Russia in March had overthrown the tsar's government and established that of Mr. Kerensky. One of the consequences of this was that General Alexeyef, in command of the Russian army, had wired asking for a postponement of the offensive. Nivelle answered that it was too late, and that the Russians should move immediately. However, they only attacked the last of June.

At this same time, General Cadorna wired General

Nivelle that he saw no signs of any German concentration on his front, and therefore was not going to attack until the Germans had used up their reserves resisting the French. General Nivelle wired back, reminding him of the decision for the Italians to attack at the same time as the others.¹ The Italians attacked May 12, almost a month after the French.

In the meanwhile, the Allies had made two attacks in the Balkans, weeks apart: one early in March, which was over almost a month before the French attack; the other in May, which was over shortly after the Italians began their attack.

Thus, the great plans of the Allies, made in November, 1916, for a simultaneous, crushing attack on the Germans in the spring of 1917, came to nothing.

As an outcome of the whole affair, General Nivelle was relieved and General Pétain made commander-in-chief of the French forces.

Just before this change took place, Marshal Haig had proposed that the French take over some of the southern part of the British line, so that he could have more British troops to use in an attack which he wanted to make in the north near Ypres. After this attack was over, he proposed that the French take over still more of the British line in the south, so that he could attack in the north in Belgium for the purpose of capturing the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge.

¹ Sir C. E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, Vol. I, p. 339.

The British proposition meant that instead of a combined attack being made against the German army, the French were to subordinate their actions to a British attack which had for its purpose not the destruction of the German army but the capture of seaports being used by the German submarines.

In other words, the strategy on the western front was to be twisted from its proper purpose of winning the war through the destruction of the German army, to the minor purpose of capturing enemy naval bases, in order to help suppress the submarines which were operating in the waters around England.

To start with, General Pétain was opposed to still further increasing the burden borne by the French army. He believed that in order to equalize the load carried by the British and French armies, the British should take over some of the lines held by the French. At the end of May, 1917, the French and the British held approximately 565 kilometers and 140 kilometers, respectively. If they had held proportionate lengths of front, the French amount would have decreased to 438 and the British increased to 270. In other words, instead of the French relieving the British, the British should have taken over 130 kilometers, which is approximately eighty miles, of the line held by the French.

This was the beginning of a series of disputes. They were complicated by internal British and French disputes. Mr. Lloyd George more and more objected to

the British losses on the French front. Instead of adopting conscription as the British military leaders urged, he turned more and more to plans for winning the war in Turkey, in the Balkans, or anywhere else than the French front. This led to less and less support of Marshal Haig and also to the relief of General Robertson as chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

In France, Premier Ribot was succeeded by Poincaré, who a few months later fell, in his turn, to be succeeded by Clemenceau, the Tiger.

Unity of purpose was finally obtained only when, faced with defeat as the result of the first of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff offensives in March, 1918, at the time when Marshal Haig published his famous "backs to the wall" order; the Allies finally agreed upon their first commander-in-chief, the then General Foch.

In addition to the lack of unity of military purpose there was some evidence that the statesmen were inclined to count their chickens before they were hatched. They wanted to do things which would put their countries in better bargaining positions at the peace table. In other words, instead of concentrating on military plans, the sole object of which was to beat the German army, they would argue for plans which would give them possession of territory which it would be advantageous for their countries to possess. Territory in the Balkans, in Asia Minor, and above all the

city of Constantinople, had been the object of international rivalries of the different Allied countries prior to the war. These rivalries were not forgotten during the war, and undoubtedly were the basis of the campaigns which some statesmen wished to carry out, and in some cases did succeed in carrying out, despite the insistence of their best generals that there is only one way to win a war—to beat the army of the enemy on the battle-field.

The evidence was clear when Pershing landed in Europe in June, 1917—and continued to grow as time passed—that there was no real leadership of the Allies, and that their strategy was not directed to the common purpose of beating the German army in France, the sole method, as difficult as it might be, of bringing the war to a victorious conclusion for the Allies.

If we disregard the other fronts, the Allies were not fighting with a common purpose even on the western front.

The British thought only of protecting the French ports along the English Channel, these being on the shortest route to London from Germany. Their strategy consisted only in defending the ground they had or trying to get more ground in front of these ports. They had no idea of leaving this vicinity, no matter what arguments were advanced to prove that concentrations of troops on other parts of the western front

would help whip the German army. The Italians were interested only in their own narrow front along the mountains from Lake Garda to the Gulf of Venice. The French stretched like an overdrawn rubber band between the Italians anchored on the right and the British anchored on the left. With a much smaller proportion of soldiers and guns per mile of front than the British and Italians, they had to do the best they could to keep the Germans from taking advantage of this Allied lack of unity of effort and leadership.

General Pershing saw that this condition of affairs was eating up Allied man-power without whipping the Germans. It was his job to use our man-power to beat the German army, not to defend the routes to London or North Italy. Turning our men over to the Allied armies obviously would not have done so.

The only way to insure the use of our man-power to strike the Germans where the most damage would be done was to organize it into an American army.

This General Pershing did, equally regardless of the pressure brought to bear on him in Europe and of the attempts behind his back in Washington to secure his relief from command. The dramatic events of 1918 beginning with the near defeat of the Allies and finishing with victory, proved him right.

Chapter II

WHY GERMANY DEFIED US

WHY was Germany willing to have us enter the war against her rather than give up her submarine campaign?

She already had opposed to her 326,000,000 whites, to say nothing of 320,000,000 British Indians and 22,000,000 natives of French Africa.


Her population plus that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey totaled but 140,000,000.

Yet, she was willing to add to the formidable number of her opponents 105,000,000 Americans.

Was it an act of desperation? Was she like a gambler, who faced with defeat, stakes his all on a last desperate play, hoping the mounting tremendous damage done by her submarines would offset the slow but sure crushing of her land forces?

No! She was not gambling. As the result of careful consideration by her leaders of the war to date, she was certain our unpreparedness would give her the time to obtain a decision, if not a knock-out, from the Allies. She was convinced that even should we decide really to fight we should be too late.

This is the only conclusion which can be drawn from German literature dealing with the war and



- Concentration of German armies as executed in 1914.
- ◐ Concentration of German armies as planned by von Schlieffen with right wing 400,000 stronger and left much weaker.
- Route of German armies in 1914. Note how First Army by trying to outflank the French got so far west that gap opened between it and Second. In closing this gap, von Kluck was outflanked by Sixth French Army.
- > How von Schlieffen planned to outflank French, his strong right always having enough troops to prevent gaps occurring.

above all from numerous conversations I had with former German general staff officers, during different trips to Germany.

The majority are quite willing to talk about the war

from an academic, professional point of view. However, desiring to live on good terms with their neighbors, they do not wish their names used.

One conversation in particular was such a clear outline of what others had expressed that only direct quotation can do it justice:

"Germany figured America would be too late with a fighting army to help the Allies," began the former German officer; "therefore we were willing for America to come in against us, rather than give up our submarine campaign, which at the very time you came in was more successful than ever before.

"For the great German General Staff the war from the beginning had been a race against time—time to knock out France before Russia was ready to really fight—time to knock out them both before England was ready with a real army.

"We believed only bad German leadership had prevented us from doing this.

"Hindenburg came to power before America's entry. We believed his leadership would enable us to win the race before America could get ready—because of your absolute unpreparedness."

For a moment he hesitated, then he went on:

"If a man threatening to shoot you suddenly throws away his pistol, would you be frightened? If a prize fighter broke training a month before his big fight, would his opponent be discouraged? In 1916, when President Wilson was sending us ultimatums threat-

ening war, he was at the same time disbanding the small army that he had taken all the summer of 1916 to get together on the Mexican border. Does it seem now we were so foolish because we figured it would take years for you really to face us with an effective fighting army—and that in those intervening years we had a good chance to win?

“What does the record of the war show above everything else? Something very simple: that just as in a prize fight a war is won only by fighting.

“The same way a trained fighter can whip several untrained men, each of whom may be as big as or bigger than himself, so can a prepared nation whip several unprepared ones each as populous and rich in resources, or even more so than itself.

“Allied war propaganda had taught you that the Russian steam roller was flattening us out on one side, while the British, French, and Italians overwhelmed us on the other—that we were on our last legs with our backs to the wall.”

I interrupted him for a moment. “And like most war propaganda, that was the opposite of the truth.”

“Exactly right,” he continued. “We had beaten Russia so thoroughly that we held a line far within her territory. On our side of this line was all of Lithuania and Poland, new nations today mostly made up of what used to be Russia. We had wiped Roumania and Serbia off the map. We had failed in the first battle of the Marne and at Verdun to put France out.

However, we had caused her army such tremendous losses that we believed it could never regain full strength.

"This same war propaganda had filled you with tales of Britain's tremendous strength, her fleet at sea, how her colonies were responding to the call of their mother country, her wonderful plans to bring the full strength of her industry to bear to win the war; of her new armies, of the gallantry of her regular army in action. All true, but all giving a false impression because not telling that it took Britain nearly two years—until the summer of 1916—to put an army in France large enough to interfere seriously with our plans by fighting.

"And this war propaganda was really favorable to us because it made you believe that if Britain unprepared in 1914 could jump in with such splendid results immediately, you could do the same.

"If you entered the war, however, we were only interested in what fighting against us you could do and when you could do it.

"We had watched you take six months to gather up 200,000 national guard troops, send them to the Mexican border the summer of 1916, train and equip them for war. Then, just as they were finally ready, you sent them back to their homes—discharged them and dispersed them to the winds.

"Suppose you had kept them! What would 200,000 added to your 100,000 regulars—a total of 300,000—

mean in a war where millions fought in the same battle?"

"Quite true," I said. "Only a nation in arms through a draft or universal service can furnish the millions of soldiers of modern armies."

"We had watched the failure of your 'preparedness' advocates to get Congress really to make war plans," he continued. "The bill they passed was so weak it did not even set up the machinery to put immediately your man-power in the army and your factories to making war supplies full blast at once, should war come."

"We had seen Lord Roberts and other British leaders through two long years argue, exhort, and try by every possible means to persuade the British people to adopt a draft or conscription law to build up their armies at the front and keep them full. They had failed."

"If Britain with her empire at stake wouldn't have the draft, why would the United States when nothing more than the sinking of her ships, destruction of her cargoes, and killing of her nationals at sea was involved?"

"The British were already finding out that there is a limit to the size of an army which can be raised by volunteering. You had had the same difficulty in both the North and the South during your Civil War."

"Thus, as we were not having to face Britain's full man-power, there was no reason to believe we should have to face yours."

The facts he was bringing out had been dodged to date because they were unpleasant; therefore I will quote him still further:

"Then there was the question, if you did raise an army, would you send it to Europe? Britain had always kept, and in 1916 and 1917 was still keeping, a considerable force at home. Japan had been in the war since the first month. When she entered she had a large standing army. As she had had conscription for years, the great majority of her men were trained soldiers ready for instant service. Yet, she had sent no troops to Europe despite the needs of the Allies.

"Because Britain relied upon volunteering she had raised her new armies slowly, sending them to France by detachments, each as soon as it was ready without waiting for the subsequent ones.

"Each had suffered in battle before the next had arrived. In this way a large part of her man-power had been used up in small blows instead of driving at us unitedly in a crushing blow. There was every reason to believe American troops would be fed piece by piece into the furnace of war in the same manner and for the same reason."

As he continued, I thought of how later only General Pershing's determination, and the way in which President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker backed him up, had prevented this from happening to our troops.

"Just as Britain had entered the war in 1914 un-

prepared, so would you enter it. Judging from your history during the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and above all the year 1916, there was no reason to believe you would do better than Britain.

"While threatening us if we did not give up our submarine warfare you threw away your pistol. It was only a small one. You made no plans to get a big enough one to really frighten us. In other words, you were disarmed.

"To fight, you would have to arm; and that would take time, despite your great population and great wealth. There are many men as big and strong as, or even bigger and stronger than, your champion Tunney. However, before they could fight him with any chance of success they would have to put in a long time training. "Why should we have given up our submarine campaign because you, who were disarmed and needed so much time before you could fight us on the battlefields of France, threatened to join our enemies?"

I called his attention to the fact that despite British unpreparedness which gave Germany almost two years to knock out France and Russia, Germany had not done so; that if these two nations had given Britain the time to prepare and add her strength to the force against Germany, why was it not reasonable to believe that the three Allies could do the same for us?

I knew what his answer would be. I had heard it before from a dozen other former general staff officers.

It was an answer of two words:

“Hindenburg—Ludendorff.”

General von Hindenburg with General Ludendorff as his first quartermaster-general was in control when Germany brought us into the war. But they were not in command of all Germany's armies during the first two years of the war.

President von Hindenburg of today, trusted by a whole people, regardless of their political affiliations, when the war broke out in 1914 was Major-General von Hindenburg on the retired list of the German army, living quietly in Hanover.

In 1911, at the age of sixty-four, he had finished, so he thought, his active service in the German army. As he turned over his command of the German Fourth Army Corps with headquarters at Magdeburg, he is said to have remarked that the great military knowledge accumulated by him in forty-six years of service from second lieutenant commanding a platoon to major-general commanding an army corps would never be of use to his country.

As an eighteen-year-old second lieutenant of the Third Infantry he had distinguished himself and had been wounded in the head in the battle of Sadowa, the crushing defeat of the Austrians so skilfully planned and carried out by the great von Moltke that Austria was beaten six weeks after war began. As a first lieutenant he served in the Franco-Prussian War, in which von Moltke's plans led to the overthrow of the French regular army in seven weeks.

He took part in this Franco-Prussian War in the repeated and bloody assaults of the German infantry on the village of Saint-Privat stubbornly held by the French, but escaped unharmed. He was present at the battle of Sedan the following month when Napoleon III, surrounded and unable to break out, was forced to surrender himself, his army of 124,000 men, and more than 500 guns.

After Sedan, Lieutenant von Hindenburg took part in the siege of Paris. From its surrender until his retirement he had never heard a hostile shot fired.

As he commented on his military career being finished that day in Magdeburg in 1911, little did he dream that a short five years later, in August, 1916, the kaiser would send for him to make him chief of the general staff of all the German field armies at the end of the second year of the greatest war in history.

With him came General von Ludendorff as chief assistant. He is eighteen years younger than von Hindenburg. Like his chief, he had started his career as a second lieutenant of infantry, being commissioned when he was seventeen. Unlike him, he had never heard a hostile shot fired until this war. The attack on the Belgians holding the forts around Liège in August, 1914, was his first battle experience. By his personal example of coolness under fire and his skill in leadership he straightened out an infantry brigade which had become demoralized and led it to a successful attack.

Now the great decision which had to be made by the German leaders in the fall of 1916 shortly after Hindenburg came to power was whether to give up the submarine warfare and keep the United States out of the war, at least for a while longer, or keep it up and bring us in.

Which course was to be followed hinged on what was the real reason for Germany's failure to date to knock out either France or Russia before Britain, unprepared in 1914, had time to put a large fighting army into France.

As to the cause for this failure there were two groups opposed to each other. One, the Hindenburg-Ludendorff group, insisted bad German leadership to date, first under von Moltke and then under von Falkenhayn, was responsible.

The opposing group said not bad leadership but the pre-war plan of General von Schlieffen was responsible, the strategy of which was too complicated and depended upon more time for each step than the Germans had had. This group were the backers of General von Falkenhayn and General von Moltke, von Hindenburg's predecessors as chief of staff.

The Hindenburg-Ludendorff group insisted:

First: That had von Schlieffen's plan been carried out France would have been knocked out in the first round before Russia could have entered the fight.

Second: That even after the failure to do this Russia could have been knocked out before Britain pro-

duced an army, if von Falkenhayn had had the courage to seek a decisive battle instead of trying the "usury" method of wearing the Russian army down to a point where it would be too weak to fight effectively.

They insisted that in each case failure had been due to trying to play safe, instead of following the bold policy of seeking great decisive victories, even though doing so meant risking defeat.

What was von Schlieffen's plan? Why did he make it? Why didn't the Germans follow it when war broke out in August, 1914?

To find the answer to these questions it is necessary to go back for a moment to Frederick the Great. Then, we must glance at the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the principal battle-fields of which adjoin, or overlap, the Saint-Mihiel salient and the Argonne where so much American blood was shed.

Frederick the Great put Prussia on the political map of Europe by whipping all his neighbors. From the beginning of his career the war problem faced by her military leaders had been to successfully face enemies attacking her from several sides at once. By being constantly ready and by making the fullest use of his military genius Frederick took advantage of the time it took his enemies to plan to crush him by a united blow, to whip first one and then another before they were ready to come at him together.

In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the great von Moltke's constant fear was that before the Ger-

man army could beat the French, the Russians with their tremendous masses would attack Germany from the rear.

When Russia and France made an alliance in 1891 what von Moltke had feared might become his great problem in the Franco-Prussian War became the great problem for the next war with France.

The problem the German General Staff had to find an answer to, if possible, was how to put out, or seriously cripple, one before the other would have time to do any vital damage, and then turn on and destroy the other. Some favored attacking Russia first as the more easily beaten, particularly because Austria-Hungary could help; and others, France first, as the more dangerous. The question of time led to the decision to strike France first.

The Franco-Prussian War, with its bitter defeats followed by the long occupancy of French territory by German troops until the heavy cash indemnity demanded as the result of victory had been paid, had left the French people with no illusions as to what happens when a nation unready for war faces a prepared one. They had been beaten, and badly beaten, despite many examples which will live in military history of brilliantly courageous acts not only by individuals but even by regiments and divisions.

When the leading American soldiers of the First and Forty-second infantry divisions, in their race for Sedan in the last days of the Great War, gained the

last crest held by the Germans, one of the heights their eager eyes saw before them on the other side of the Meuse River was the plateau of Floing. Here on a September day in 1870 General Margueritte's French cavalry division charged again and again in a vain effort to break the German infantry. General Margueritte having been killed, and half the division killed and wounded, with the ground up to the very muzzles of the German rifles covered with the light blue and red of the uniforms of the French and the white bodies of their Arab horses, General de Galliffet, who succeeded Margueritte, when asked if the division could charge again, said, "As many times as you wish, general, up to the last man," and charged again.

After the French standing army had been virtually wiped out by the Germans, the people of the country sprang to arms and fought the best they could to oppose the invader, but without success. Beaten everywhere, with their principal cities occupied, they had to agree to German peace terms.

As a consequence they learned the lesson that a patriotic but untrained people springing to arms may die in large numbers in battle but will be unsuccessful against trained troops. They, therefore, adopted a real system of universal military service which trained every young Frenchman and also taught him that along with the rights of citizenship goes the duty of every citizen to prepare in peace to defend his country in war.

They learned also that time is the great factor. The side which is ready can strike first and generally so hard as to prevent the unready nation from ever catching its wind long enough to make good its unpreparedness.

As a consequence, the French had become a nation in arms, trained as soldiers, ably led, and ready instantly to strike a tremendous blow.

On the other hand, the Russians had shown they needed time before they could strike. The Russian army had shown many weaknesses in the Russo-Japanese War. The small revolts and political disturbances in different parts of Russia during this war had shown the Russian government none too strong.

After the war, the Russian army made a vigorous effort to take advantage of its military lessons. Considerable improvements were made in every direction. However, the internal situation of the country prevented taking all the measures necessary to bring about the immediate mobilization in time of war of a trained army with numbers in proportion to the total population of Russia.

The Duma, or Russian House of Representatives, which the tsar had but recently allowed to come into existence, was not sure that the improvements in the army were wanted only to fight an outside foe. It was inclined to refuse any money through fear that the army was being built up to subdue the Russian people, should they demand further political rights.

On the other hand, the tsar's government, not certain of the loyalty of the mass of the Russians, was not sure that it was a good idea to train an increased proportion of them to be soldiers. The result was that Russia with her population of 170,000,000 had trained only about one-third of the number of men she had available for military service.

Thus France, with a population of only 40,000,000 by comparison with Russia's population of 170,000,000, could put practically as many trained soldiers immediately in the field as Russia.

In addition, the French army could be fighting on the German frontier much more quickly than that of Russia. France, being a highly developed country industrially, had an excellent railway system covering every part of her territory. Also the necessary lines had been built to enable her whole army to be quickly concentrated on the German border. Russia, a backward nation industrially, had comparatively few railroad lines. Despite the urgings of her own general staff, backed up by the French government once an alliance had been made, the railroads necessary to concentrate her army quickly on the German-Austro-Hungarian frontier had not been built.

This meant that the French army, unless stopped by battle, would be pouring into Germany long before the Russians would have reached the German frontier.

Thus, the best German plan was to use the time

which Russia would have to take before she could attack, to defeat the French army. That being done, Germany could then concentrate all her forces, except troops left for garrison purposes in France, against Russia.

However, beating France would be a very different problem from that of the war of 1870-71.

In the first place, she was ready with an efficient and much larger army. In the second place, in that war Britain not only had kept out but in general had favored the German side. Now, while not allied by hard and fast treaties with France and Russia, she was practically tied to them by agreements. She might remain out for a time, but her ultimate entry was a certainty. The question was, what would and could she do when she entered?

Our Civil War from 1861 to 1865 was the first war in which railways played an important part. The strength of any body of troops, the distance it can be moved, and the time necessary are the three fundamentals of strategy. Or, as the Confederate General Forrest, who had no education but was born with a sense of strategy, used to express it, "Get there fust with the most men." By their ability to transport large bodies of troops and supplies a considerable distance in a short time, railways introduced a new feature in military strategy.

General von Moltke was the first European general fully to grasp this. He attributed a large part of his

success in whipping Austria in six weeks in 1866 and destroying the French regular army in seven weeks in 1870 to his use of railways. Afterwards, he often advised, "Build no more fortresses, build railways."

General von Schlieffen, who succeeded him in 1891 as chief of the German General Staff, also was a strong believer in the importance of railways. He used to say, "No longer are we satisfied only to ask how many battalions our enemy has; also we must know what is the extent of his railways, as railways are now an engine of war without which the large modern armies of to-day are helpless."

The tremendous growth in the sizes of the French and German armies, and the consequent necessity to use railways, were among the principal reasons why von Schlieffen had a more difficult problem in planning to defeat the French than that which faced von Moltke in 1870-71.

From the earliest records in our history there have been three main routes for armies from the territory which is modern Germany to invade that which today is France, or vice versa.

The three are strewn with battle-fields on which many bloods have been spilled—Roman, Gaul, Germanic, and Tartar in the days before firearms—Russian, Austrian, Dutch, British, German, French, and Spanish since.

The southern one passes through the territory where Germany, Switzerland, and France come together, not

far from Valdajon, where so much of our artillery trained before going to the front.

The central one comes by the fortress of Metz, which was the next objective of the American army when the Armistice was signed, and the fortress of Verdun, in 1916 the scene of the greatest defense in history. On one side is the Saint-Mihiel salient where we fought our first independent battle, and on the other is the Argonne, the hills and forests of which were soaked with American blood from every state in the Union, shed in the greatest single battle we have ever fought. Between these two routes lie the beautiful forest-covered Vosges Mountains, where most of our divisions had their first experience in trench warfare.

The northern route lies through the plains of Belgium on which there is hardly a town which has not been besieged or seen a battle near by, numerous towns more than one: from the year 1500 until Belgium was proclaimed neutral in 1832, there were 395 battles fought on her soil. The country around Oudenarde, from which our Ninety-first Infantry Division drove the Germans in one of the last combats of the war, had been the scene of eleven previous battles.

Between the central and northern routes lie the wooded Ardennes Mountains, whose evergreen-covered slopes proved such a relief to the eye after the war-torn Argonne, for the divisions making up the left of our army in the long march from the Meuse River to the Rhine after the Armistice.

In the war of 1870-71, the Germans used the central route. As the French forces in battle at any one time never exceeded 125,000, and the total German 200,000, they did not overflow to the right and left very far.

However, the German and French armies had steadily increased in size. When the war broke out in August, 1914, Germany's standing army was 840,000; that of France, 884,000, including native troops in Africa. By the time the first battle of the Marne took place, Germany had mobilized a total of 3,000,000 to face both France and Russia, and France a total of 2,600,000.

The German and French forces which would be deployed along the Franco-German border a few days after war was declared would be so large that they would have to use more than one route. In fact, they would cover the whole Franco-German frontier with a great many left over.

General von Moltke had won his victories by using the German railways to put his troops along a long curved line so that when they marched toward the enemy's army they would converge on it, the way an army of ants starting from one-third of the rim of a wheel and moving down its spokes would converge on the hub. Thus, when the two armies joined battle, the German one was in a position to attack not only from the front but from one or both flanks as well. This was the way in 1870 von Moltke beat Marshal Ba-

zaine's army, surrounded it and shut it up in Metz, where it finally surrendered. Our line on the second day of the Saint-Mihiel salient battle was almost on some of these battle-fields.

This also was the way he beat the Emperor Napoleon III a short while later at Sedan, surrounding him and forcing his surrender with all his army. The ridge south of Sedan mentioned above as captured by our First and Forty-second infantry divisions in the closing days of the war was occupied in the Sedan battle of 1870 by German troops advancing in the same direction as ours in 1918. However, then Sedan and the hills around it were occupied by the French instead of the Germans as in 1918.

General von Schlieffen planned to do the same thing in the coming war, but because of the size of the armies on a much larger scale. However, as the French army more than covered the whole of the Franco-German frontier the Germans would have to advance not only along the whole frontier, instead of just the central route as in 1870, but along the southern route through Switzerland and the northern one through Belgium if they were going to turn both French flanks and bend them back until the whole French army was surrounded. The French thus forced to surrender, the Germans would be free to turn practically their whole strength on Russia.

However, von Schlieffen did not have enough troops to turn both French flanks. Therefore, the question

was whether to turn their right by going the southern route through Switzerland, or their left by the northern route across the plains of Belgium.

The Germans considered the Swiss system of universal training good as far as it went. However, they knew the time of service was so short that the Swiss were not sufficiently trained and disciplined to successfully resist an attack by the Germans. But this southern route is much farther away from the greater part of Germany than the northern route through Belgium. The time necessary to get troops well on their way to Switzerland would put them across Belgium.

Therefore, the northern route through Belgium was chosen. Could and would the Belgians put up enough of a fight to stop the Germans coming through Belgium?

The Belgian people, as a whole, were indifferent to national defense and inclined to dodge the issue by saying that as their neutrality had been agreed to they did not need any. The old King Leopold knew too much history to believe that neutrality would protect a small nation in the way of great Powers at war, any more than being innocent protects a bystander in a street riot.

As a consequence, after a great deal of hard work, the King had managed to get the money to fortify Antwerp, Belgium's principal seaport, and Liège and Namur, two centers where roads and railways running through Belgium cross the Meuse River. These two towns, deep in the narrow river valley cut by the

Meuse and climbing the hills on both sides, will be remembered by thousands of Americans who spent a night in them on their way from the Army of Occupation to various leave areas.

The Germans knew that, aside from their greater numbers, their much better trained and equipped troops would have little difficulty in defeating the Belgian army. They knew the size of the guns in the Belgian forts and the thickness of the armor and concrete protecting them. They had learned the lesson taught by the Japanese during the siege of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese found the siege guns with their army not powerful enough to smash the Russian forts. They knew twelve-inch coast defense mortars could. Therefore, they tore up these mortars from their concrete foundations in the forts protecting Japanese harbors, transported them to their army in front of Port Arthur, where they set them up in concrete foundations. While this took time and was only done with difficulty, once they were in place, their heavy shells soon crushed the Russian forts. This prepared the way for their capture by the Japanese troops and the surrender of Port Arthur.

Following this example, the Germans secretly prepared guns with shells heavy enough to smash the Belgian forts, and carriages which could be taken apart and moved with an army.

A greater question than that of any resistance which the Belgians might make was what Great Britain

could do in case the German right flank came through Belgium on its way to turn the left of the French army.

As Germany was her principal and steadily growing rival in overseas trade, carried by her own merchant ships and protected by an efficient navy, it was believed she would enter the war sooner or later.

An invasion of Belgium undoubtedly would cause Britain to come in immediately. Her statesmen, as well as her soldiers and sailors, had always realized that the defense of England against a continental invader did not begin with her own shore lines but with the Low Countries across the English Channel occupying its eastern or continental side. Von Schlieffen and other German military leaders, arguing from history, were certain Britain would come in.

Britain's career as a great Power started when she drove Holland out of the waters of the English Channel and took control herself. She had fought Spain to put her out of the Low Countries—Holland, Belgium, and northern France of today. She had fought France in the days of the kings to keep her out of the Channel, and to stop her gradual movement to the north by which she swallowed southern Flanders. She fought the First French Republic and the First Empire under Napoleon to get the French out of Belgium and Holland. In 1870 she extracted a promise from Prussia not to send troops through Belgium in the war against France.

The question then was not whether she would come in, but could she put enough troops in the field in time to give the French enough aid to stop the German right from coming through Belgium and turning the French left; the first step in the plan to outflank, surround, and force the surrender of the French army.

Whatever the kaiser may have subsequently said about Britain's "contemptible little army," the German General Staff knew all about it. They had carefully studied the Boer War and the reforms in the British regular army which had taken place as a consequence. They knew that among other things the British regular army had learned really to shoot. They knew its high standards of discipline, of training, and of courage.

However, they knew also that this regular army did not have a general staff in the full modern sense of the word. They knew that consequently it lacked efficient leadership in war, in just the same way that a big business cannot be efficiently handled unless it has a modern system of management.

They knew that in the British form of government the ideas of many civilians in the British cabinet and other important posts would govern when it came to war, rather than those of the best professional soldiers.

They knew that the British people had not accepted the lessons of the Boer War. They knew that, despite the heavy losses in blood and treasure, the numerous

defeats in the early part of the war, and the fact that it took Britain more than two years to suppress the Boers, the British people still refused to accept universal service as a means of training every subject in peace to be ready to defend his country in war.

They knew that when war came, outside of the comparatively small regular army, the only other force with any training would be the territorials, which, in general, correspond to our national guard. This force would need several months to reach war strength and equipment. They knew that the immense army really necessary to fight a modern war would have to be brought into existence after war came.

They knew that no plans existed for raising, training, equipping, and supplying such an army, once war came.

They knew that the only force ready and planned to be immediately sent to France once war came was the Expeditionary Force of 100,000 regulars. This 100,000 would not sufficiently increase the French strength of 2,000,000 to stop the Germans from carrying out their plan to knock France out the first round.

They would have succeeded or failed long before the British could add to the strength of their Expeditionary Force.

In 1905, when seventy-two years old, von Schlieffen was so badly injured by his horse falling with him that he retired from active service.

He died January 4, 1913, murmuring to General von

Hahnke, his son-in-law, "It must come to a fight. Only make the right wing strong."

The Hindenburg-Ludendorff group pointed out in 1916 that in the first days of the war everything had gone better than planned.

The Belgian forts around Liège and Namur had fallen even more easily than had been expected. The Belgian army had been unable to offer any serious resistance to the German advance. The British instead of sending the whole of their Expeditionary Force of approximately 100,000, as had been counted upon, had sent but 70,000. It had gotten no farther north than Mons, where, overwhelmed and outflanked, it was driven back with the French troops on its right.

Until the Marne was reached, the plan had gone according to schedule. But when the French stood upon that river, the German right flank, under General von Kluck, did not have troops enough, as von Schlieffen had planned, to go to the west of Paris, thus turning the French left flank, getting in their rear, and bringing about a decisive victory. Instead General von Kluck in his endeavor throughout the French retreat to keep on turning their left flank, had gotten so far to the west that there was a gap between him and the next German army to his left, under General von Bülow. Therefore, instead of going to the west of Paris, he had to close in to the east in order to get in touch with von Bülow. He had to go so far east that he finished

with Paris to the west of him instead of being to the west of it.

The consequence was that instead of flanking the French, the German right was outflanked by the French Sixth Army, which had been moved up by General Gallieni, the Governor of Paris, under the orders of Marshal Joffre. They attacked von Kluck so heavily that he began to retreat. This was the beginning of the German defeat.

The reason why the Germans did not have enough troops to carry out von Schlieffen's plan, was that his successor, the younger von Moltke, had changed the plan. The change had resulted in the German right flank, which was to march through Belgium and keep on turning the French left flank, being nearly 400,000 men weaker than in von Schlieffen's plan.

Von Moltke had done this because the South German states considered that von Schlieffen had not left enough troops along their part of the Franco-German border, and that, therefore, they would be invaded.

Von Schlieffen had that determination of spirit which characterizes great generals and great surgeons. He would not let a minor hurt interfere with the carrying out of a great operation which would insure ultimate success beyond a doubt. Invasion of part of Germany's home territory, even though it led to destroyed villages and towns and the civil population fleeing across the fields and down the roads to escape the dangers of combat, would not make him change a plan

which would decisively defeat the French army. To do so would have been as logical as for a great surgeon in the midst of a major operation to neglect an essential in order to save the patient additional pain.

Von Moltke, however, was not of such stern stuff. He had the more ordinary type of mind which inevitably compromises. As desirable and safe as this may be in business and other ordinary affairs of peace, no great victory has ever been produced in war on land or sea by such a mind. Von Moltke was the nephew of the great von Moltke. This undoubtedly largely influenced the kaiser in appointing him to succeed von Schlieffen as chief of staff. It is only fair to say that von Moltke did not feel himself capable and did not wish to accept the position.

When sufficient news had arrived at the German general headquarters to make it certain that the first Marne battle was a defeat, von Moltke lost his grip. Instead of immediately taking control of the situation he sat with a white face gazing at the map, a broken man. He was relieved as chief of staff shortly afterwards, being succeeded by von Falkenhayn. He died a few years later, brought to the grave prematurely by his sense of great failure.

To make matters worse from the German point of view, the French commanding general, "Papa" Joffre, had clear strategical vision and the moral courage to carry out what it enabled him to see.

In the first days of the war Joffre carried out the French pre-war plan of taking the offensive immediately, instead of waiting for the Germans to attack. He attacked the enemy in Lorraine on his right, in Luxemburg in his center, and Belgium on his left. When his attacks were stopped and his left flank turned by von Kluck, he did not worry about how much French territory or how many French cities he was abandoning to the invaders. He thought only of drawing his army south to escape the trap laid for him. This despite violent criticism from many of his fellow countrymen. He continued to retreat until the time came when, no longer in danger of being flanked, and reenforced by troops from the Franco-Italian front and from Alsace, which the extreme French right had invaded, he felt he could stand and successfully fight the German army. The great victory of the first Marne vindicated his judgment and confounded those critics who could only see that he had given up many square miles of the sacred soil of France to the invader.

"Papa" Joffre's successful leadership emphasized the claim of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff group that not von Schlieffen's plan but bad German leadership lost the first Marne to the Germans and their opportunity to knock France out in the first round.

The second round, that with Russia, opened with Russia leading strongly. During the first Marne battle, the German retreat to the Aisne which followed, and

the subsequent race to the sea during the fall of 1914¹ the Russians had pushed ahead.

In the north they were invading East Prussia. In the center they were within a few miles of the city of Cracow. In the south they had crossed the Carpathian Mountains and were pouring into the plains of Hungary.

Leaving as few troops as they dared in the intrenched lines in France, which now stretched from Switzerland 500 miles to the English Channel, the Germans concentrated all available forces against the Russians.

Starting with a smashing blow on the Dunajec River in Galicia, in May, 1915, General von Mackensen's troops broke entirely through the Russian line. This started a series of defeats which by the end of the summer had driven the Russians out of East Prussia, Poland, Galicia, and Hungary well back into Russia proper.

The Germans and Austro-Hungarians made such large captures of men and material that the Russian army was virtually put out of action for a year. However, it was not destroyed and put out of the war.

During July and August of 1915, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had again and again insisted that the thing to do was to take the risk involved by first breaking

¹After the first battle of the Marne, the Germans retreated to the Aisne River. Here they successfully resisted all Allied attempts to drive them farther back. Therefore, the Allies tried to flank them. The Germans tried to flank the Allies. Each checked the other until finally the Belgian seacoast had been reached.

through the Russian line and then boldly turning their rear. By doing this they were sure they could bring about a decisive victory on a large scale, which would force Russia to make peace.

Von Falkenhayn would not permit this plan to be carried out. He was content with the safer, but less decisive, method of steadily pushing the Russians back while killing, wounding, and capturing large numbers. Instead of taking the risk of using strategical skill to force the enemy's army to surrender after they had fought ineffectually to keep from being trapped, von Falkenhayn believed the enemy's army could be put out by wearing it down by constant friction. In other words, by constantly attacking large numbers would be killed and wounded with the result that the enemy army would finally disintegrate.

This method, called the "usury" method, later led to "Papa" Joffre's relief from command of the French army. It was to become the chief bone of contention between General Haig, commanding the British army, and Lloyd George, the British premier.

By September, von Falkenhayn decided that the German-Austro-Hungarians had advanced far enough into Russia and withdrew as many divisions as he considered safe, in order to prepare for an attack on Serbia followed by a second one on France.

Thus the second round, the one against Russia, came to an end without putting Russia out.

While the Russians were so badly damaged they

were unable to do any dangerous fighting for approximately a year, a considerable number of German troops had to be left to watch them.

This considerably lessened the number available after Serbia had been wiped off the map in the winter of 1915-16, to attack Verdun. This second attack on France, the third round of the war, began February 21, 1916.

The Germans lost the round.

First, because the French army put up the greatest defensive fight in history. Secondly, because von Falkenhayn again sought victory through "usury."

It is true he wore down the French army tremendously because of the loss of 340,000 which they took. But he also wore down the German army without decisive result.

Thirdly, the British by the end of June, 1916, finally were ready with Kitchener's New Army and with a French force under the then General Foch heavily attacked the Germans on the Somme.

To add to the troubles of Germany, the Russians whom von Falkenhayn had considered so worn down by his "usury" methods as to be unable to make another large offensive came to life.

The result was that in July and August, 1916, when the British and French were hammering on the Somme, large German reserves which might have been seriously needed to stop them, had to be rushed to Hungary to save the Austro-Hungarians. The Rus-

sian General Brusilof had started a surprise attack on them in June. By the middle of August he had captured more than 350,000.

The success of this offensive caused Roumania to enter the war on the side of the Allies.

Von Falkenhayn, in reality relieved, was allowed to resign.

By the end of 1916, Hindenburg had stopped the Russians, stopped the British and French on the Somme, and almost wiped Roumania off the map; killing, wounding, and capturing at least 200,000 Roumanian soldiers.

Once more dark days for Germany had been changed to cheerful ones by Hindenburg-Ludendorff successes—just as that first and darkest period for Germany in the failure of the first battle of the Marne in 1914 had been brightened by them with victories over the Russians.

At Tannenberg in East Prussia in the last days of August, 1914, they killed, wounded, and captured 170,000 Russians with a loss of but 15,000 Germans killed and wounded. They thus virtually destroyed the Second Russian Army. General Samsonof, who commanded the Russians, fleeing with the remnants of his army, could not bear the disgrace. He committed suicide after telling the few of his staff left him, "The Emperor trusted me. How can I face him after such a disaster?"

Nine days later Hindenburg and Ludendorff had

defeated another Russian army under General Rennenkampf at the battle of the Masurian Lakes. The remnants of this army—almost a disorganized rabble—were chased across the river Niemen back to Russia from which they had come.

These two battles were over in two weeks. Two Russian armies, each stronger than the one commanded by Hindenburg, had been decisively beaten.

One hundred and thirty-five thousand Russians had been captured, 40,000 to 50,000 killed, and at least 100,000 more wounded, making a total Russian loss of a quarter of a million.

This record of Hindenburg-Ludendorff finally won the dispute for them. It was decided that had strategical skill and determination of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff type been used since the opening days of the war in 1914 Germany would have knocked out first France and then Russia before unprepared Britain was ready—and the war probably won.

However, by the close of 1916 Russia and France were greatly weakened through having borne the brunt of the war for two years. They had passed their maximum strength and must steadily grow weaker. Therefore, Britain more and more would have to bear the brunt of the war. This not only in giving money and war material to her allies, but above all in putting fighting men on the battle-field.

But as she had not yet adopted real conscription and volunteering had passed its maximum, her army

would not greatly increase in size. It might decrease.

Also, the submarine campaign was more and more seriously interfering with her supply of war material and food.

To judge from Britain's example, it would be two years before the United States would have an effective fighting army. If she decided to send it to Europe the submarines would seriously interfere with, if not stop, her doing so.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff gave Germany the skilled leadership—lacking the first two years of the war—to take advantage of this new opportunity.

America's unpreparedness would give Germany the time needed—so Germany defied us, and we declared war.

Chapter III

WHY THE ALLIES WANTED OUR MEN FOR REPLACEMENTS

WHY did the Allies bring such strong pressure to bear upon General Pershing to get our men as replacements for their armies?

Because the military authorities of France and Britain not only were unable to get the men necessary to increase the size of their armies in the field but were having a hard struggle to keep these armies from shrinking in strength.

The idea generally held by the public during the war and since that the Allied armies always greatly outnumbered the armies of the Central Powers is wrong.

The Allies did greatly outnumber the Central Powers in the total of their male populations.

Had they all entered the war with armies raised by universal service or conscription the Allied armies would have swamped the armies of the Central Powers with their overwhelming numbers.

The same would have been true within twelve to eighteen months of the outbreak of the war if all the Allied nations when war was declared had immediately

put universal service or conscription to work to produce the maximum-sized armies, capable of being drawn from their male population.

All except Britain entered the war with a universal service or conscription law in force. As a matter of fact in August, 1914, the only nations of any consequence in Europe, Asia, and North and South America without such laws were Britain and her colonies, the United States, and China.

However, the only Allied nation which entered the war with such a law in full enforcement and kept up to that standard was France.

Russia's armies in the field after her mobilization did not exceed in numbers those put in by France, though her population was 170,000,000 and that of France but 40,000,000. Until the revolution took her out of the war she did not better this record.

Italy used her universal service law to increase the size of her armies in the field. Her strength ultimately bore a proportion of 13 to 8 to that of the Austrians on her front. However, her high command, far from feeling able to send reenforcements to the front in France, from time to time asked the French and British to send troops to the Italian front. After we entered the war a request was made for several hundred thousand of our troops.

The greater part of Japan's large and efficient army based on universal service never fired a shot during the war. A relatively small force was sent to besiege

Tsingtau, the German military and commercial base in the Shantung peninsula in China. After its capture with the help of a small British force in November, 1914, no more fighting was done.

Britain and her self-governing colonies, with the exception of New Zealand, had not adopted universal service or conscription in its real sense up to the time we entered the war.

Canada put such a law in operation five months after we had done so by our law of May 18, 1917. Britain waited until April 18, 1918, eleven months later.

The British soldiers like Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts knew that nothing less than the manhood of the nation under arms would create and maintain the large army which must be put in the field if the Central Powers were to be beaten.

The British statesmen had not conceived the war on any such terms.

From the beginning of Britain's history as a nation she had never put her whole manhood under arms.

Her wars on the continent of Europe, in Asia, Africa, and the Americas had been fought by her regulars, volunteers from the adventurous part of her population, colonials, and the troops of allies.

Secure from invasion because of her large navy under such great admirals as Hawke and Nelson, the mass of her people remained at home attending to their ordinary affairs.

While navies cost large sums of money the number of men they take from a population is small by comparison with the demands of an army in campaign and battle.

Content with the military situation covered in this manner the British statesmen helped toward victory by using diplomacy to gain additional allies and furnishing money and supplies to those nations which joined their side.

These were the conditions under which Marlborough fought on the continent of Europe during the War of the Spanish Succession and Wellington during the Napoleonic Wars, the two big European convulsions prior to the Great War of 1914-18.

Of the 750,000 Allied troops which moved against Napoleon I in the campaign in 1815 less than 40,000 were British. The rest were Russian and German mostly, with a few Belgian and Dutch.

At the battle of Waterloo Wellington had engaged about 70,000 men of the army he commanded. Of these 25,000 were British, the others being German, Dutch, and Belgian. When the Prussian Marshal Blücher appeared late in the afternoon and attacked Napoleon's right flank he brought 50,000 Prussians with him.

Until the Great War the Boer War was the greatest military effort ever made by the British Empire. Of the 270,000 troops in round numbers sent to South Africa approximately 40,000 were in colonial units.

Shortly after Britain declared war a struggle began on the part of those Britishers who believed that Great Britain must immediately raise and maintain large armies based on the number of males of military age in her population.

From the first they were resisted, and with considerable success, by those who believed Britain could fight this war by the same methods as she had her past wars.

The great Lord Kitchener was appointed British minister of war immediately war was declared. Lord Northcliffe, the owner of the Daily Mail, the London Times, and a long list of other British papers, was largely responsible. Through his papers he had been warning his fellow countrymen for years of war with Germany. He knew that in such a war Britain must throw in her whole power. He knew that only a man of Lord Kitchener's breadth of military view and organizing experience could bring into existence the war army which Britain must have or be beaten, and which she neither had nor had made any preparations to produce once war came.

Through his papers Lord Northcliffe so stirred up the nation that the prime minister, Mr. Asquith, stopped Kitchener, who was just leaving England for the post he then occupied in Egypt. Twenty-four hours later Mr. Asquith made him minister of war.

His first remark on taking over the war office was "There is no army." He meant of course that the 110-

ooo regulars, equal in number to the troops put in the field by Belgium, sent to France as an Expeditionary Force and the 200,000 territorials, a civilian soldier force very similar to our national guard, were utterly inadequate as the war army of a nation like Britain.

He set 70 divisions as the number to which the British army should be raised without delay. If she raised troops in the same proportion to her population as Germany, England had to bring a total of at least 105 divisions into existence. One hundred divisions constituted Kitchener's ideal strength for the British army.¹

Like General Sherman when he announced at the beginning of our Civil War that it would last at least three years and take a large army, Lord Kitchener soon found himself unpopular. This because he fought the idea only too commonly held that Germany would be beaten in a few months, insisted that the war would last from three to five years, and that Britain must put her manhood under arms.

Lord Kitchener's fight was to convince his countrymen that, regardless of whatever they might have done in past wars, they must produce an army containing the same proportion of Britain's men as the armies of Germany and France contained of Germans and Frenchmen.

In other words, he had to put himself in opposition to those who seized upon the phrase, said to have orig-

¹ Sir G. Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, Vol. III, p. 307.

inated with Mr. Winston Churchill, "Business as usual" as an excuse to dodge the seriousness of the issue. This phrase naturally appealed to those who in the period preceding the war had formed the habit of pooh-poohing the warnings of the professional soldier who, as the war was to show, was more than justified in his predictions.

What the public needed to understand—and above all the business man—was that victory could not be had by "business as usual." Unless all civil activities were prepared to turn their energies solely to those directions which made for the supplying and maintenance of a large army in the field and a fleet at sea; unless all business interests were ready to sacrifice every selfish consideration and put the whole weight of the nation's material resources, as well as its man-power, into the scale of war, the balance could not be inclined to the side of victory.

It was not that the nation was not ready enough, and patriotically inclined enough, to go to war as it had done in the past on many occasions.

It was simply that the people as a whole and many leaders of the government did not realize the seriousness of the situation and the magnitude of the effort—far beyond anything ever attempted by Britain before—which had to be made.

Lord Kitchener saw that universal service must come if Britain was to put her man-power in the field. However, his position in the cabinet showed him the

political difficulties which stood in the way of its immediate enforcement. At least half the cabinet was violently opposed to it.

Also Lord Kitchener's loyalty to Mr. Asquith, the prime minister, prevented his urging conscription until volunteering failed to provide the number of men needed both to make good losses and steadily to increase the size of the army. Mr. Asquith's energies were devoted to compromising the differences of opinion which existed.

Therefore for some time Lord Kitchener devoted himself to the great task of getting the principle accepted that Britain must have a large army and of getting the immense work of its organization under way. The method used to supply the men he left to the cabinet ministers and parliament.

His real feelings on the matter are shown by an exclamation he made at a conference of the French and British ministers of war and a number of generals in France in March, 1915. The conference had brought out the difficulties facing the Allies.

Lord Kitchener said and repeated that "the only way out of the difficulty was by conscription and that if we had conscription, none of these troubles would have occurred."¹

That he felt the necessity of working to get the principle of a large army accepted is shown by one of

¹ Sir C. E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, Vol. I, p. 219.

the first of the few speeches made by him in the House of Lords, of which he was a member.

In this speech he brought home in a striking manner that victory could come only as a result of beating the German army on the continent of Europe; that to do this Britain must put an army proportionate to her strength in France.

As an answer to those who feared that sending troops to France would leave England herself in danger of attack—and they were both numerous and politically strong—he said: “Defending the French Channel ports is the same as defending the suburbs of London.” He was trying to illustrate the old military maxim, that “the best defense is offense.” In other words the only way to make England really safe from invasion was to go after the German army wherever it might be and beat it. The only way to beat it was to put a large army in the field facing the German one.

Despite opposition, many discouragements, the tremendous mass of detail which bringing a new army into existence entails, despite ridicule which nicknamed his new army the “shadow Armies coming from nowhere, bound nowhere,” he steadily persisted.

When the waters of the North Sea closed over the British cruiser Hampshire, blown up by a mine or a submarine (which, as yet unknown), bringing Kitchener's life on this earth to an end, his great work of bringing a British war army of 70 divisions into existence was virtually completed.

A few weeks later it was put to its first great test, the stubborn battle of the Somme, which dragged its bloody way through the summer of 1916 to the fall of that same year.

To begin with, volunteering was relied upon to raise the new armies. There was a splendid response. Two million joined the first year. However, to quote Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, the general who longest held the post of chief of the Imperial General Staff during the war, "By the autumn of 1915 it [the volunteer system] was rapidly breaking down."¹

In August, 1915, a national registration act was passed which registered every person between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five but brought no men to the army.

In October, 1915, the Derby Scheme was started, by which men voluntarily attested "their willingness to serve as called to fill the needs of the army." The government promised to call the unmarried men first.

However, it was found that out of 2,000,000 unmarried men fit for service, some 650,000 dodged service by simply failing to attest. This provoked so much indignation that in January, 1916, the first act in any way compulsory was passed.

This act gave these men the choice of voluntarily attesting or being considered, by failing to do so by a certain date, as having enlisted in the army.

¹ Sir W. Robertson, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, Vol. I, p. 290.

In other words, like some of our Civil War legislation, the act was a club used to encourage volunteering.

While a long step forward, this act fell far short of compulsory universal service.

Everywhere the British generals in the field were demanding more men, both to make good the inevitable losses of war and to enable them to carry out the missions which they were given to execute and for which the forces assigned them were inadequate.

Sir John French commanding the British forces in France found himself badly in need of more troops early in 1915. As a consequence plans were made to incorporate the Belgian army into the British by brigades. However, the Belgian king would not permit this to be done.¹

Marshal Robertson shows that though the board of trade, the then recognized authority on British manpower, agreed that 358,000 men could be taken in the first quarter of 1916 without great disturbance of trade, and as many as 530,000 without disaster, the army got only 212,000. The need was for 390,000.

As a consequence, in May, 1916, another service act was passed to take effect in June, which extended the powers of the government to take men, but was still not a full-fledged conscription law. This gave better results, but still did not yield the required number of men.

¹ Sir C. E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, Vol. I, p. 199.

By July, 1916, when the first Somme battle began, Great Britain had in France approximately 1,300,000 troops, including Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, and British Indians. She had another 600,000 from these countries and also from South Africa scattered in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and Africa.

Something over a year later, in August, 1917, the British had reached their maximum strength in France of not quite 2,000,000 men. Thereafter their strength dropped from time to time to as much as 200,000 below this figure. They had something over 1,500,000 more scattered in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and Africa. At that time and since, the best military opinion in Britain, as well as other countries, was convinced that the greater part of these troops should have been on the French front. Victories gained in these distant theaters of war in no way weakened the fighting strength of the German army in France. With Russia out that strength had been greatly increased. Both reason and the information daily gathered showed Germany intended to use this strength to strike a series of tremendous blows. Every soldier was needed to face it in an effort to stop it.

When the first blow came in March, 1918, this lack of men resulted in a German victory and tremendous loss to the British.

Then and only then in a desperate effort to fill their ranks in France, two days before Marshal Haig seeing

himself face to face with the end issued his famous desperate appeal, "With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end," was a bill passed putting conscription fully in force in Britain.

The question of conscription was not a new one in Britain. For a period of years prior to the war—in fact, since the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904—it had been widely discussed.

The leader in this was a society called the National Service League, of which the famous Lord Roberts was the president. Lord Milner, later to be the British minister of war for the last six months of the war, was another leader.

The motto of the society was, "The Path of Duty is the Path of Safety."

Prior to the outbreak of the war, this society advocated compulsory military training in peace to provide adequate home defense in time of war.

At the outbreak of the war, it suspended its propaganda and placed its whole organization at the disposal of the government.

In the fall of 1914, Lord Roberts, its president, died. His advocacy of compulsory service through the years prior to the war, as well as after its outbreak, greatly helped to increase the belief that only by such service could Lord Kitchener's great British war army be brought into existence and maintained.

The people had confidence in both Lord Roberts

and Lord Kitchener, because of their long and successful careers in the British army. Both had fought in most of Britain's many colonial campaigns in Asia and Africa. Lord Roberts in command, with Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff, had taken over the British forces in South Africa after a succession of defeats, with bloody losses, at the hands of the Boers. They then brought this expensive and exasperating war to a successful conclusion for Britain.

The public opposed some of the statesmen who advocated compulsory service. They believed them to be using it as a cloak under which to obtain compulsory labor. On the contrary, they had the greatest confidence in both Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener. As a consequence, to these two men must be given a large portion of the credit for the ultimate adoption of compulsory service, even though it only came in its complete form well within the last year of the war.

Lord Roberts's last message to his fellow countrymen, issued shortly before his death, was "The Supreme Duty of the Citizen at the Present Crisis." It began with the words:

"There is but one duty for the British citizen at the present time—men and women, young and old, rich and poor, all alike must place everything at the service of the State. Nothing must be kept back—time, energy, money, talents, even life itself, must be freely offered in this supreme crisis."

It finished with the words:

"Two years ago, at a crowded meeting in Manchester, I said to my fellow countrymen: 'Arm and prepare to acquit yourselves like men, for the time of your ordeal is at hand.' I claim a hearing therefore when I say today: 'Arm and prepare to acquit yourselves like men, for the time of your ordeal has come.' "

By the end of the first year of the war, that is, in August, 1915, the National Service League had decided that the time had come for it to renew its propaganda for national service. It began the new campaign by stating, "The existence of the British Empire depends upon success in this war, and it becomes increasingly evident that to obtain success we must put forward our whole strength by establishing universal and compulsory military service for such period as the war may last."

It thus laid aside for the period of the war its effort to have compulsory military training for home defense established as a permanent principle of government in Britain. It believed the Great War demanded the much wider system of universal service anywhere the needs of the country might necessitate. Also only a measure for war had a chance for adoption denied a bill to permanently alter British ways.

As an answer to those who thought the volunteer system sufficient, the League said: "It is evident that the fullest value can only be got out of our fighting material by the adoption of universal service, which

substitutes a comprehensive system and an assured source of supply for a hand-to-mouth method which leaves to the accident of the moment the provision of the personnel."

In response to those who asked, "If it is necessary, why doesn't the Government introduce it?" it said, "The answer is simple. The Government does not introduce it because it is not certain that if it did it would have the country at its back.

"We believe that the country would be at its back in this great question."

One of the principal arguments of this League, even before the war, was that compulsory training in peace, and service in war, for all citizens was in accordance with the earliest history of the British people.

It showed that in early British history it was considered the right and privilege of every free man to own arms, to practice their use in peace, and to carry them in war. Only the slaves were denied this great privilege.

It showed that even after the country settled down and the individual citizen no longer needed arms constantly for the defense of his person and property, the ownership of arms by every citizen and the calling together of the citizenry for service in time of war remained the basis of national defense.

It showed that as time passed, and citizens had less and less personal use for their arms, they more and more were inclined to get rid of the burden of pro-

viding them at their own expense. At the same time, the monarch and the people were coming more and more into conflict as to their mutual rights. As a consequence the monarchs were willing to have the people gradually disarm themselves though by doing so national defense suffered.

As time went on, the monarchs built around themselves a force from which ultimately sprang the British regular army.

The League showed that the free citizen's objection to serving in this force, unless he voluntarily entered it, was the root from which had sprung the so prevalent idea that a free-born British citizen should resist compulsory service.

Undoubtedly there was also a considerable number of people who still believed that only a volunteer made a good soldier. This despite the fact that the armies of continental Europe were daily showing that men brought into the army as the result of compulsory universal service were excellent soldiers.

The point was missed, that it is not the method through which a man enters the army which counts, but whether or not he is willing to fight for his country.

In the days of autocracy, large numbers of unwilling men could be and were conscripted for service. In these days of democracy, the passage of a conscription law is equivalent to the whole nation volunteering, because no such law can come into existence unless

the majority of the citizens believe it a fair and proper measure.

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, who during the latter part of the war was chief of the British Imperial General Staff, played a considerable part in creating sentiment for universal or compulsory service, even prior to the war. Shortly after returning on the staff of Lord Roberts from the South African war, he was made commandant of the British Staff College. He held this position for a number of years until he became director of military operations of the British General Staff, his post when the Great War broke out.

This pre-war period included Lord Haldane's reformations of the British military system. These, like the beginnings of our national defense act in 1916, while an improvement on the system which they replaced, were far from being adequate for war. The majority of British military and naval leaders, and many of her most distinguished civilian ones, considering war as inevitable in the near future opposed them.

As commandant of the Staff College, the then Colonel Wilson kept in constant touch with Lord Roberts. He helped in the campaign for national service to such an extent and so openly as finally to be attacked by part of the British press.

During the Balkan crisis of 1912—which almost precipitated the general European war two years before it came—Colonel Wilson, the director of opera-

tions, worked vigorously to show the government how unprepared Great Britain was.

In 1913, a bill for compulsory service was introduced in the House of Commons, but did not become a law. To Colonel Wilson belongs a considerable share of the credit for the matter having gotten this far.

The opposition to the enforcement of real universal service or conscription was led by various cabinet ministers.

Lord Grey, British minister of foreign affairs before the war and during its early years, writes: "Conscription in the early days of the war was impossible; public opinion was not ready for it; it would have been resisted. Voluntary enlistment gave the country a good start in good will and enthusiasm; conscription would have given a bad start. There would have been division of opinion, much resentment; the country might even have foundered in political difficulties."¹

How far his opinion is based on the bitter class struggle which was going on in England when the war broke out, he does not say.

Marshal Robertson records that Mr. Lloyd George, shortly before becoming premier, told him, "Labor would not stand any further compulsion." Also: "Several ministers had always argued that compulsory methods would be of no benefit to the army, since the additional men yielded would probably be more than counterbalanced by the additional number of troops re-

¹ Viscount Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, Vol II, p. 70.

quired to keep the peace in the large industrial centers, where it might be expected compulsion would be resented." ¹

In May, 1917, while General Wilson was at the headquarters of the British army in France, General Haig read him a letter from the then chief of the imperial staff, General Robertson, in which he told him not to expect a great number of replacements, because of the demands of agriculture, of shipping, and strikes on the part of labor. ²

At a meeting of the Supreme War Council in February, 1918, General Foch brought up the question of British man-power. Mr. Lloyd George, while objecting to a French general complaining that Britain had not called as many men to the colors as she might have done, answered that if he were asked to produce more men there might be a revolution in the country. ³

Lord Kitchener, in 1915, foreseeing possible opposition from labor, had made it his business to get in close touch with Mr. Arthur Henderson, who represented labor in the cabinet. Lord Kitchener told him that by early in 1916 he would have to ask for legislation to produce enough men for the army to relieve the commanding officers in the field of the fear that their forces would fall off in strength. Mr. Henderson replied that the Labor party would not oppose any

¹ Sir W. Robertson, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, Vol. I, p. 306.

² Sir C. E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, Vol. I, p. 357.

³ Sir W. Robertson, *Soldiers and Statesmen*, Vol. II, p. 289.

legislative measure which Lord Kitchener believed necessary for victory. At a later cabinet meeting, Mr. Henderson told the members that in the last extremity, if a definite and publicly stated object was given, he was ready to accept compulsory service.¹

Marshal Robertson also believed that labor would not be against compulsory universal service, fairly applied for military purposes only. He believed that the opposition came from the unfairness of the existing methods. In numerous cases young men escaped altogether through the many exemptions granted. Others were taken for non-combatant branches of the army and navy, while older men, and in some cases married ones, who were more patriotic and had a higher sense of duty, served in the trenches.

Whether the soldiers were right in believing that the nation would have submitted to conscription long before it did, or the statesmen in fearing resistance and civil disorder, the fact remains that until the much feared German attacks had started in March, 1918, the British government would not enforce full-fledged conscription in order to increase the British forces on the French front by putting more men in the British army.

Many British statesmen, and in particular Mr. Lloyd George, when he became premier, believed the need for more men could be avoided by seeking victory in theaters of war where results might be obtained with less bloodshed.

¹ Sir G. Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, Vol. III, pp. 315-16.

On the British front in France five men out of every nine became casualties; on the Saloniki front in the Balkans one out of every twenty-one; in Egypt, one out of every fifteen, and in Mesopotamia, four out of every twenty-five.

As the British force in France was much larger than that in any other theater of war, the number of men needed to make good its losses alone would in any of the others both replace all casualties and furnish a substantial reenforcement as well.

In this manner, the constant pressure being exerted by the British generals upon British statesmen to produce more men if they expected victories would be greatly decreased.

Austria-Hungary was much weaker than Germany. So was Turkey. As they would be easier to whip than Germany, why not do so?

An Allied army in the Balkans, particularly if successful, would help to get Greece and Roumania into the war—as ultimately happened—and thus increase the Allied man-power.

Also there is good reason to believe that the trading which inevitably takes place at European peace tables was not lost sight of by some statesmen.

Possession, at the close of the war, of Mesopotamia, of Syria, of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and of parts of Austria-Hungary would afford the possessor a good trading position.

A victorious army in France would occupy no soil to be traded off.

Thus political aims were mixed with and confused with military issues. Some French statesmen also allowed political ideas to overrule military ones.

The result was a number of expeditions and campaigns. All consumed a large number of men. Some brought defeats. The most successful played no decisive part in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

By the time we entered the war, three expeditions had been undertaken.

The first was the attempt to break through the Dardanelles and capture Constantinople. It failed.

Three British battleships and one French were lost; 26,500 French and 114,000 British were killed and wounded. There was besides a heavy sick list. A total of 400,000 troops had been used.

This was a heavy and unexpected drain on British man-power at a time when her new armies were just coming into existence. The result was that the question of producing the men needed both to replace casualties and to increase the size of the forces in the field became so immediate and pressing as to place the British cabinet face to face with compulsion.

The second expedition was to Mesopotamia. This Turkish province in the heart of central Asia was occupied only after repeated efforts and General Townshend's humiliating surrender.

The British losses were 31,000 killed, 15,000 missing and prisoners, and 50,000 wounded. Four hundred

thousand British and Indian troops and 460,000 non-combatants had been used by the time the war ended in 1918.

The third was the Saloniki Expedition. By the end of the war, the British had used a total of 400,000 and the French practically the same number in this theater of war.

These expeditions only added to the scattering of the Allied force, already distributed upon the Russian, Italian, and French fronts.

None of these operated to reduce the strength of the German armies which attacked under Hindenburg and Ludendorff the spring and summer of 1918.

All of them did materially reduce the strength of the Allied armies and particularly the British ones, which had to meet these attacks.

The relatively slow raising of Britain's armies after the first patriotic rush to volunteer had passed, meant a greater drain on her man-power than would have been the case had conscription been adopted in the early stages of the war.

In August, 1914, there were 4 British infantry divisions in France; December, 1914, 11; June, 1915, 21; September, 1915, 29; February, 1916, 41; July, 1916, 55; December, 1916, 58; April, 1917, 62, the maximum number ever there.

As a rule after each increase in strength a blow was struck. While not strong enough to cause decisive results, these blows caused casualties.

Thus, the slow raising of Britain's strength resulted in feeding it by sections into the furnace of war. This caused each section to suffer loss before it was strengthened by the arrival of the next.

Therefore, the maximum effect was not gotten from the numbers which were raised.

Had conscription been adopted immediately war was declared, or shortly thereafter, by the middle of her second year in the war, Britain could have been ready to use her millions of new troops, united in one force, to strike a single tremendous blow together with the French army. Though that army had borne the brunt of the fighting on the western front, it was at that time still in magnificent shape and close to its maximum strength of 3,000,000 in the field at one time.

The first mobilization call brought out 3,700,000 Frenchmen, of whom 2,700,000 were put under the command of the then General "Papa" Joffre, to resist the first German invasion. Of these 90,000 were officers.

By bringing in older and older men to make good losses, and also to increase her strength to the uttermost limit, France by July, 1916, had in the field a total of about 3,000,000 men. She maintained this force of 3,000,000 through the rest of 1916 and until the middle of 1917, when, because of battle losses, it suffered a decrease of more than 100,000.

The sacrifice which she had made to maintain such

a force is best shown by the fact that in the defense of Verdun territorial troops, some of whom were grandfathers, were used in front-line trenches.

Prior to the war, it had been intended to use territorials only to guard railways and for other service in the rear of the armies. However, by the middle of 1915 the French losses were such that they had commenced to use these troops in quiet trench sectors.

The rush of Germany's first invasion into France prevented many of the men called to arms by the first mobilization from joining the army. The ten departments of France occupied by the Germans from shortly after the first battle of the Marne until they were driven out in the last months of the war, were the home of about 5,000,000 people, or one-eighth of the population of France. As the war went on and older and older Frenchmen were called out in the rest of the country to make good the losses suffered in battle, the men of the corresponding age in the occupied territory were not available, because held by the Germans.

Thus, shortly after we entered the war, France, having already given her man-power to the uttermost, could furnish no more men. In fact, from then on it was only by taking older men, really unfit for field service, and young men hardly of military age that she succeeded in keeping her armies from serious decrease in numbers.

It was because France was so drained of her man-

power that General Pétain after taking command of the French army, in the spring of 1918, decided to remain on the defensive, with the exception of small local attacks. He knew that only by such a policy could he prevent a still further and rapid shrinkage of the French army, already fallen off in its numbers.

As Russia dropped out of the war, the chance to persuade her to put a far greater proportion of her 17,000,000 men of military age under arms disappeared.

Thus, during the anxious winter of 1917-18, there remained but three ways of increasing the number of soldiers on the western front—to concentrate there both the considerable forces held in England because of fear of invasion, and the troops operating in distant theaters of war; to enforce full-fledged conscription on Britain's remaining man-power, and to tap liberally America's yet untouched large reservoir.

Chapter IV

WOULD AMERICAN TROOPS REALLY FIGHT?

WOULD the American troops really fight? This was a question asked with increasing anxiety by both the Allies and the Germans as the fateful spring of 1918 gave place to the historic summer of that year, the hot July days of which were to bring forth one of the great dramas of the human race: the second battle of the Marne.

The Americans had no doubt.

The Europeans had.

The Europeans did not expect the Americans would refuse to fight. They doubted, however, if they would fight with the determination, the desperation, of men whose hearts and souls are wrapped up in the success of the cause for which they go to battle.

As Russia withdrew from the war the question became a burning one:

To the Allies reeling under German blow after blow, because if this American reenforcement would not fight, it could not help them.

To the Germans because if this American reenforcement would fight it might rob them of their opportunity to beat the French and British to their knees

with the million men Russia's dropping out had permitted them to add to their strength on the western front.

How burning the question was is best shown by the effect on General Pershing of my asking him a short while ago:

"Today, ten years after the war, what do you think, general, as to European doubts after we came into the war as to whether or not our entry would make good Russia's loss?"

He jumped up from his desk in the State, War, and Navy Building in Washington, his famous impassiveness gone, all the instinctive combativeness of his nature showing, with eyes flashing, jaw stuck out, and said:

"The superb way in which the American soldier put his heart and soul into his fighting from the very first soon settled the doubts of the Germans and fears of the Allies as to whether America's entry would compensate for Russia's going out of the war. As I look back now, after ten years, I more than ever believe that, as valuable as our numbers, two million men, were in determining the final victory, nothing was of more importance than the fact that in the early days of our activities, from the very first combat and in each succeeding one, the American soldier showed himself an eager and courageous fighter, who, far from being discouraged by stubborn enemy resistance, causing heavy losses, was only the more determined.

Our soldiers in the last war proved themselves worthy descendants of the men who, despite losses never exceeded proportionately in the whole course of the Great War, so distinguished themselves at Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, the bloody angle at Spottsylvania, and numerous other fights in our Civil War."

Napoleon I said, "In war the moral is to the physical as three is to one."

If that was the proportion in his day when battles were usually over in a few hours, twenty to one was the proper ratio in the last war when men were under fire for weeks at a time.

When we declared war the morale of the Allies was still good.

The Russian monarchy had been overthrown but the press was full of reassuring statements as to the determination of the new Kerensky government to keep on fighting. The increasing ravages of the German submarine campaign were fairly well hidden from the peoples at large and the armies in the field. The withdrawal of the Germans along the whole of their line from just south of Arras, to the north of Paris, to the new Hindenburg line was hailed as a great German retreat. In many quarters it was interpreted as the beginning of the end. The disgust of the French and British publics because Germany had not yet been crushed had been met some time before by changes in political and military leaders.

Hence the fact that America's coming into the war had made her vast material resources freely available to the Allies while entirely denying them to their enemies was of more interest than how hard such American soldiers as came to Europe would fight.

However, shortly matters commenced to change for the worst.

The French spring offensive of 1917, from which so much had been expected, came to an end with slight gains and after really bloody losses. As the French had borne the brunt of the fighting and the bulk of the losses, not excepting Russia, since August, 1914, when the war began, this failure seriously depressed the morale of both the army and the nation.

The British new armies, now finally at full strength and with the losses of the Somme battle of 1916 made good, started in to pound down the enemy. They captured ground, notably Vimy and Messines ridges, taken with great gallantry, but gained no decisive victories.

The price paid in blood was so high that those British statesmen who insisted the war could never be won on the western front, that some easier way must be found, received support both in the army and in the nation.

Then came blow after blow, any one of which was bound to depress Allied morale, and the succession of which inevitably left them staring defeat in the face.

In November, 1917, came Caporetto, the great

Italian defeat. In December, 1917, the Bolsheviki seized control of Russia and signed a truce with the enemy. In March, 1918, the British suffered the greatest defeat in their military history. In May, 1918, the French with tremendous losses found themselves, after almost four years, driven once more to the banks of the Marne River.

Thus the question not only of how many Americans would arrive but how they would fight in battle became a vital one to the Allies.

The war-worn Germans had spurred their energies by visions of a German peace as the inevitable and immediate result of the staggering blows they were dealing the Allies in 1918. They had been told the Americans could not arrive in time and in sufficient numbers to prevent it.

However, as these attacks progressed they found a steadily increasing number of American soldiers facing them. But numbers are not everything, as the German soldier's war experience had taught him. In most of his battles with the Russians he had been outnumbered but had won. In the Roumanian campaign he had been greatly outnumbered but had wiped Roumania practically off the map in four months.

What he wanted to know above everything was—were these Americans sufficiently interested, sufficiently wrought up about the war to really fight? Were their hearts in it?

What the individual soldier feels about a war has a

lot to do with the way he fights. The Russian soldier did not always have his heart in the fighting. The same revolutionary tendencies which had created trouble during the Russo-Japanese War had increased in the nine years between that war and the outbreak of the World War.

Heavy losses and constant defeats had discouraged the average soldier and increased his disinclination to fight for the tsar and his government.

I remember an incident at the Russian fortress of Brest-Litovsk, in the late summer of 1915, which showed that even the old soldier who had spent his life in the army was commencing to question the worth of his leaders. During a continuously victorious advance the Germans and Austro-Hungarians had captured from the Russians fortress after fortress, each with large numbers of prisoners and guns.

To escape being cut off and captured, the Russian garrison of Brest-Litovsk had abandoned the fortress and set it and the near-by town on fire. Through an interpreter, I was talking to a physically magnificent Russian non-commissioned officer. The hot August sky was almost hidden by the shooting flames and clouds of smoke from the burning fortress and town, mixed with an all-permeating cloud of fine dust rising from a seemingly interminable near-by column of marching troops.

The sergeant's thoughts were greatly troubling him. Among other things, he said: "Why are we always

beaten? Our men are brave. We have taken heavy losses without running away. Yet always we retreat. Just like the war with the Japanese. Even when we beat the enemy directly in front of us, we retreat. I was captured by the Japanese at the battle of Mukden. My regiment was not beaten, but there was a retreat and some of us stayed too long and were caught."

He hated to say so, and would not directly, but it was plain he thought something was very wrong at the top. He was losing confidence in his leaders and heart in his cause.

The vicious fighting which had taken place from 1914 on plainly showed that the French, British, and Germans believed they had the best of reasons for fighting. The soldiers of each nation had put heart and soul into it.

However, they had reasons which the American did not have.

The Germans and the French had been fighting each other since the Treaty of Verdun in the year 843 split up the Empire of Charlemagne, giving Germany to one son and France (the name for what had once been called *Gaul*), to another. The Germans had not forgotten Napoleon's conquests. The French remembered their bitter defeats during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, followed by enemy occupation of their country until a huge indemnity was paid. In the war then going on the French had seen their women, children, and old men taking such meager belongings as

they could carry, fleeing before the invader. They had seen, and still were seeing, their villages and towns destroyed by the violence of modern shell-fire. A large part of their country was still in the hands of the invader. They had every reason to fight.

The British remembered German sneers at their early military defeats and subsequent difficulties throughout the Boer War of 1899-1902. They had not forgotten German sympathy with the Boers and hostility to the British even prior to the Boer War. They remembered the kaiser's famous telegram to the Boer President Kruger, after the Boers had repulsed the British raid led by Dr. Jameson in 1895. In this telegram, the kaiser, besides congratulating the Boers upon their success, decidedly gave the impression that Germany had been ready to help the Boers had they been unable to beat Dr. Jameson alone.

For years before the war, the British had watched the steady growth of the German navy, built to fight in the North Sea, plainly intended as a challenge to the British navy. For years they had watched the growth in numbers and efficiency of the German merchant marine. On every trade route of the world, and in every port, it challenged the British merchant marine, as it had not been challenged since before our Civil War, when our ships carried our flag and our cargoes to every corner of the world.

For years they had watched the growth of German colonies, backed by a colonial ambition ready to seize

territory in every quarter of the globe, given the opportunity.

So convinced had they become of the challenge of Germany that they had settled their troubles with France and Russia, their two hereditary enemies, and made agreements which the world accepted as being, for all practical purposes, alliances against Germany.

Consequently for years prior to the outbreak of the war, the Briton and the German had looked upon each other as enemies who would have to fight it out.

The general staffs of these three countries were interested from the professional point of view.

Every nation likes to believe that it is made up of natural-born scrappers who only have to have arms put in their hands to give an opponent a good licking. While everyone laughed at William Jennings Bryan's statement that millions would "spring to arms overnight," as an answer to the argument for preparedness, he only expressed in words what the public, perhaps not quite consciously, believes.

However, general staffs, like managerial departments of big businesses, are from Missouri, and have to be shown.

They knew we had successfully fought British regulars in the days before modern armies and when we were still a hardy frontier people, the majority of whom were really expert riflemen. They knew we had fought each other for four years in our Civil War. However, both sides in that war started unprepared

and committed the same military errors for the first few years, until hard campaign and battle experience had taught the generals and armies how to fight. Therefore that war did not show necessarily what we would do on European battle-fields, face to face with a modern foe, equipped with modern weapons.

While we remember victories such as Bunker Hill, New Orleans, and Gettysburg, Europeans were more inclined to recall how Washington's army almost disappeared from desertion and starvation the terrible winter at Valley Forge, how a small force of British regulars captured and burned Washington in the War of 1812, and how the vanquished in the battle of Bull Run hurried—to put it politely—back to Washington, and the completely exhausted victors, hardly realizing their success, were unable to pursue.

More than anything else, they overemphasized the differences of opinion which had existed in this country about the war prior to our entry into it. Each side had overestimated the value of its own propaganda and mistaken the noise made as indicative of the feeling of a large part of our people. The Germans overestimated the number of those friendly to Germany. The Allies believed they had persuaded us finally and with reluctance to do our duty toward them.

With that curious European inability to recognize the fact that there are Americans just as there are Britons, French, and Germans, they insisted upon considering us as European colonists who would only

think about or act in the war from the points of view of our different European ancestors. Europeans are willing to admit that the boasting of a Britisher about his Norman-French ancestry does not lessen his British patriotism. They can see the fact that though a Breton boasts of his Breton blood and language he is still a patriotic Frenchman. They seem incapable, however, of learning that, regardless of where their ancestors came from, or what language they spoke, the overwhelming majority of the people of this country are Americans, not Europeans; that as a consequence, they put this country and its interests above every other.

Thus, they were doubtful as to how hard our men would fight because they missed the heart of the matter, which was that the American soldier was not fighting for Europe or Europeans, but for his own country, which had been defied by Germany.

The first combat experience of our troops was had in trench raids by the Germans against us or by our people against the Germans. While nothing out of the usual run of such affairs happened, these raids showed that our green soldiers would stand the gaff. These sudden forays by night or by day, while on a small scale, unite all the terrors of war, surprise, hand-to-hand fighting, often with cold steel, as in combat of ancient days, and the vicious fire of machine guns and wholesale destructive uprooting of high-explosive shell, the developments of modern civilization.

The first German raid against Americans was made at night, against a small isolated post of the First Division. While the German surprise was complete and resulted in their getting some prisoners, they lost prisoners to us and left wounded and dead on the ground. Our dead were found at their posts, their wounds and their positions showing that they had not flinched but had died at their posts facing the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

The first daylight raid by American units was made by two companies of the 168th Infantry of the Rainbow Infantry Division. This raid had for its objective the destruction of a strong point in the third line of enemy trenches.

The Germans became alarmed before the raid started and heavily shelled the American trenches. Despite losses in killed and wounded, and though it was the first time they had ever been under any kind of fire, the companies moved to the attack exactly on time, penetrated to the enemy's third line, destroyed the strong point and returned with prisoners. In addition to other troubles during the raid, they were attacked several times by low-flying German airplanes, the machine-gun fire of which added to their losses.

Though it was not his duty as chief of staff of the division, Colonel Douglas MacArthur went along on the raid. The 168th Infantry, then the 51st Iowa Infantry, was one of the regiments which fought in the Philippines in the division commanded by General

Arthur MacArthur, the father of Colonel MacArthur. General MacArthur started his career at the age of eighteen as a private of infantry in a Wisconsin Infantry regiment in the Civil War.

General MacArthur, the senior, finished the Civil War in command of a brigade, as did his son in the Great War. General MacArthur was decorated for bravery in battle beyond the call of duty in the Civil War, as was his son in the Great War.

Various incidents, while of small importance tactically, showed that no matter where the American soldier was, or what branch of the service he happened to be in, he never hesitated to put up a first-class fight.

Near Cambrai in the fall of 1917, the British had very effectively surprised the Germans with a tank attack. Shortly after, the Germans returned the compliment. Some of the troops of the 11th U.S. Engineers were working on a railway just behind the lines. Though not there for combat purposes they immediately joined in the fight. Some used rifles they had picked up; others, pick handles or any other extemporized weapon handy.

When the first of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff attacks smashed through the British Fifth Army and reached the outskirts of Amiens, three companies of the 6th U.S. Engineers quickly joined a nondescript force of all kinds, hurriedly gathered together by General Carey of the British army, in a desperate effort to stop the German advance.

In July, four companies from the 131st and 132nd Illinois Infantry were receiving their first training in British trenches, just in front of the little village of Hamel, held by the Germans. They were there for training purposes only, and not supposed to take part in any attack. Nevertheless these four companies, practically in defiance of instructions, accompanied an attack made by the Australians in which they took the town of Hamel. Along with them went a number of individual soldiers belonging to other companies of these same regiments not in the trenches who had borrowed uniforms from neighbor Australians so that they could take part in the attack.

In May, when the second of the great Hindenburg-Ludendorff attacks swept the French from the Chemin-des-Dames down to the Marne River, the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division distinguished itself.

The 3rd Division had not yet had any experience at the front, even in a quiet trench sector. It was under orders to go to one in Lorraine. These were hastily changed and it was started toward Château-Thierry instead.

The 7th Machine Gun Battalion, being motorized, was sent on ahead. As it approached Château-Thierry from the south, it encountered first crowds of civilian refugees with such meager belongings as they had been able to take with them and then some of the troops which had been driven back. As the battalion

rushed to the river to go into action, the Germans were entering the northern edge of the town of Château-Thierry.

Two guns under command of Lieutenant Bissell were stationed in Château-Thierry north of the bridge. They were subsequently cut off with some French infantrymen by the blowing up of the stone bridge behind them, during the night of June 1. However, in hand-to-hand fighting during the same night they and the few French infantrymen with them fought their way to the railway bridge 500 yards to the west and managed, after great difficulty, to regain the southern bank.

The fire of these two guns and of the rest of the battalion along the south bank is given the credit for having held up the Germans long enough to permit the last of the French to gain the south bank of the Marne and blow up the two bridges, thus preventing the Germans from crossing.

General Pétain cited the battalion: "It barred to the enemy the passage of the Marne. In the course of violent combat, particularly the 31st of May and 1st of June, 1918, it disputed foot by foot with the Germans the northern outskirts of Château-Thierry, covering itself with incomparable glory, thanks to its valor and its skill, costing the enemy sanguinary losses."

A few days before the incident of Château-Thierry the troops of the 1st Division showed their willingness

to put up a good fight in the open. Brought around from a trench sector in Lorraine, where they had had their first experience under fire in this war, they had been put in the line northeast of Paris reached by the Germans as a result of their March attack.

In front of them in German hands lay the town of Cantigny. Cantigny was of local importance because it occupied the top of a slight hill in the center of a German salient. It also gave the enemy a good observation post from which to look over our line and that of the French on either side. It was strongly occupied by enemy troops who had fortified it. Its local importance had led to its capture and recapture twice before the 1st Division came into the sector. The energy and determination shown by the Germans in recapturing it the second time showed they intended to hold it.

The 28th U.S. Infantry of the 1st Division was given the task of carrying it by assault on May 28. The day before, the enemy becoming suspicious determined to capture some prisoners and find out what was going on. After a heavy artillery preparation they put down a box barrage around parts of the line held by the 26th and 28th Infantry. However, their infantry raiding parties got no American prisoners. Instead they were so vigorously driven off and pursued that the action ended with American infantry in parts of the German trenches, from which they returned with German prisoners.

Early in the morning of the 28th, the assault was

made and the town captured after considerable fighting at close quarters. Despite a continuous heavy concentration of enemy artillery fire and a number of infantry counter-attacks, Cantigny was held.

The night of May 30-31, when the 28th Infantry was relieved by the 16th Infantry, also of the 1st Division, the losses to that division were 45 officers and 1,022 men killed and wounded, mostly from the 28th Infantry.

During these same fateful last days of May and first days of June, the 2nd Division showed that it also had a stomach for a good fight. The artillery and one brigade of infantry of this division were regulars of the army, and the other brigade of infantry were regulars from the Marine Corps.

Just as the 3rd Division was rushed for the Marne just south of the Château-Thierry, the 2nd was hurried from the west out along the Paris-Château-Thierry highway. Taking up a position across that highway about four miles west of Château-Thierry, it successfully resisted several attacks made upon it by the Germans.

In front of the left infantry brigade, composed of the 5th and 6th Marines, was a wood covering the rocky hilltops of a number of hills just south of the villages of Torcy and Belleau, and just east of that of Bouresches.

Until then this wood named after the near-by village of Belleau had never been heard of. However, its

name was soon to go down in military history as symbolical of the stomach for fighting of American troops.

The Germans tested the mettle of each American division as it arrived in the line for the first time, by heavy artillery bombardments, trench raids, and gas attacks. They made holding the village of Cantigny a test for the staying powers of troops of the 1st Division. The desperation with which they held on to Belleau Wood can only be interpreted as meaning their intent to show the Americans that when it came to a knock-down-drag-out fight, the Germans were their masters.

Not that the wood was without local tactical importance. Like Cantigny, it was important both as an observatory and as a strong point in the German line. It was a strong point, the capture of which was essential before any advance could be made to take the Etrepilly plateau, the southwest bastion of the great Marne salient which the Germans had made as the result of the second of the great Hindenburg-Ludendorff attacks, that of May, 1918.

The important Etrepilly plateau a few weeks later, during the second battle of the Marne, was to give a great deal of trouble to our 26th New England Infantry Division and the French divisions on either side when they attacked it, because its fall meant the German evacuation of Château-Thierry and all the southwest portion of their Marne salient.

On June 6, the Marine Brigade attacked. Despite

heavy losses and desperate resistance on the part of the Germans, they captured the village of Bouresches and got well into Belleau Wood. From then until June 16, the marines stubbornly continued their advance, though the Germans with equal stubbornness literally contested every foot of the broken, rocky ground, covered with trees and thick underbrush. Aside from the usual local counter-attacks, the Germans after several days of preparation made a large, formidable one on June 14. It was successfully resisted, as was another on June 15.

In the meanwhile the other brigade of the division, made up of the 9th and 23rd Infantry, drawn into the fight, had also advanced, capturing parts of the German line in front of them though this was not originally intended.

The night of June 16, the Marine Brigade was relieved by the 7th U.S. Infantry, sent from the 3rd Infantry Division, on the Marne near by.

General Harbord tells ¹ how in the fortnight preceding this relief he had lost from his Marine Brigade 17 officers and 400 men killed and nearly 3,000 wounded and gassed.

After six days, the 7th Infantry, which had continued the fight and gained some ground, was again relieved by the marines. In a carefully prepared final attack on June 25, the marines captured the rest of the wood. From then on they held it.

¹ J. G. Harbord, *Leaves from a War Diary*.

General Degoutte, commanding the Sixth French Army, in which the 2nd Division was then serving, cited both regiments—the 5th and 6th Marines—and decorated their colors with the Croix de Guerre, with palm. In honor of its capture, the official name of the wood was changed by the French to “The Wood of the Marine Brigade.”

The casualties of the 2nd Division, as a whole, during this period came to nearly 8,000 officers and men.

Recently I asked General Harbord, “General, looking back after ten years, what do you think now of the Belleau Wood fight?”

He said: “June, 1918, found Allies and enemy alike doubtful whether our troops, led by their own officers, could be depended upon to fight. The Marine Brigade of the 2nd Division that month at Belleau Wood forever removed the doubt.

“The capture of the wood was tactically important. Much more important, however, was the decision as to whether or not the Marine Brigade in its first attack upon an enemy position would allow that enemy to stop it. No matter how stubborn, how courageous, how skilful that enemy; no matter how difficult the attack across open fields, upon a wooded, rocky group of small hills, the Marine Brigade had to prove its moral supremacy by capturing the wood. They did it—after long, hard, bloody fighting.

“The nearly ten years that have passed since then and several visits to the wood only confirm my devo-

tion to the Marine Brigade and strengthen my admiration for the glory of its deeds."

In the meanwhile, other American divisions were shedding their first blood in successfully passing through the tests to which the Germans put each to find whether all the American divisions would fight, or only a few of them.

The 26th New England National Guard Division and the 82nd National Army Division from Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee were on the south side of the Saint-Mihiel salient, occupying part of the trenches from which the first attack of an American army in Europe was successfully to be made in the coming fall.

In Lorraine were the 77th National Army Division of New York, the 5th Regular Division, and the 35th National Guard Division from Kansas and Missouri. In that portion of Alsace seized by the French in their first offensive in 1914 and always held on to thereafter—the only piece of German territory held by the Allies throughout the war—was the 32nd National Guard Division from Wisconsin and Michigan.

In the north, in the plains of Flanders where almost every village has seen at least one battle during the last four hundred years, there were besides the 33rd Illinois Infantry Division several others getting their first experience in the line with the British.

There were the 30th National Guard Division from Tennessee and the Carolinas, the 27th New York Na-

tional Guard Division and the 80th National Army Division from Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Virginia.

Throughout all this preliminary period, prior to the second battle of the Marne, when both the Germans and the Allies were finding that the Americans would really fight, there were many individual acts of bravery. Some brought the Distinguished Service Cross, only awarded for extraordinary heroism in action. Two won the greatly coveted Medal of Honor, only granted "for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy."

Of the 2,000,000 American soldiers and officers who served under fire during the Great War, but 78 won the Medal of Honor. Of these 20 were killed—or so seriously wounded that they died—in winning it. A considerable portion of those who survived winning it were wounded doing so.

The Distinguished Service Cross must be awarded by the President. The Medal of Honor award must also be confirmed by Congress.

One of the two Medals of Honor was won by Corporal Thomas A. Pope, of the 131st Illinois Infantry, during the Americans' unauthorized attack on the village of Hamel. His company was advancing behind a line of tanks when it was halted by violent hostile machine-gun fire. Pope, undismayed, rushed forward alone and attacked a machine-gun nest. He killed sev-

eral of the crew with his bayonet, and then stood astride the gun holding off the others until other men of his company, encouraged by his action, rushed forward, capturing or killing his assailants.

The other Medal of Honor gotten in this preliminary period was won by Gunner Sergeant Charles F. Hoffman, of the 5th Marines, on June 6, the day of the first attack on Belleau Wood. Sergeant Hoffman, while attempting to organize a captured position, saw twelve of the enemy armed with five light machine guns, crawling toward his group. Immediately, with great gallantry and utter disregard of danger, he rushed the hostile detachment single-handed, killed the two leaders with his bayonet, and forced the others to run away abandoning their guns.

Private Harold C. Batley, of the 308th Infantry, 77th Division, won a Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in action during the first experience of his division at the front. A patrol sent out to get information about the Germans had attracted their attention, with the result that their artillery had brought down a defensive barrage. The patrol failed to penetrate this barrage and thus was unable to gain any information as to the Germans to its front. A second patrol also failed. Private Batley then volunteered to see what he could do. Bravely and successfully he got through the barrage to the German trenches and back again through the barrage, bringing the information which was wanted.

Sergeant Charles E. Cunningham, 126th Infantry, 32nd Division, won a Distinguished Service Cross by declining to go to the rear and remaining in command of his men, though seriously wounded, during a German surprise attack on the trench which his platoon occupied. He stayed and directed his men until the enemy attack had been stopped and those attackers not killed or wounded driven off without having captured any American prisoners, the purpose of their assault.

Private William R. Davis, 104th Infantry, 26th Division, was accorded the Distinguished Service Cross for exceptional courage and devotion to duty in action. When many of the men on either side of him had been driven back by a German raid he remained at his post, though severely wounded, and continued to fire his rifle and throw grenades at the enemy.

Corporal Clayton H. Moore, of the 138th Infantry, 35th Division, was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. While trying to carry back to shelter, through heavy machine-gun fire, a wounded comrade, he was wounded himself. Despite this, he succeeded by a display of unusual pluck in bringing his comrade to safety. Then finding a scarcity of stretchers, he insisted on the other wounded being carried to the rear, while he struggled back on foot as best he could.

The second battle of the Marne was one of the great decisive battles of the world because it forever turned the tide of German victory then mounting until it threatened to engulf the Allies in defeat.

Like Joffre's great victory of 1914 it was named after that river which through the long centuries so often had had its waters stained with the blood of men killed in battle: Roman and Gaul and Hun in the early stages of European history, German and French and English later, and finally Americans, from a continent undiscovered when the Marne Valley was already old as a highway for armies.

In it the Americans, regulars of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, national guardsmen of the 26th, 28th, 32nd, 42nd, and national army men of the 77th Infantry Division showed beyond doubt to friend and foe alike that they would fight and fight with heart and soul.

Whether on the defensive, in the white chalk trenches of Champagne, being torn to pieces by shell fire, smothered by gas, and facing the enemy's infantry assaults; whether grimly holding on unprotected by trenches on the southern slopes of the Marne Valley; whether attacking in the dark green depths, thick with underbrush, of Belleau or Villers-Cotterêt Wood, or the forests of Fère and of Nesle, amid the hell of crashing shells, banging grenades, and the rat-tat-tat-tat of machine guns; whether struggling through the deep ravines near Soissons or south of the Vesle, or stubbornly crossing the bullet-swept, poppy-sprinkled wheat fields of the plateaux south of Soissons, or on both gentle slopes of the Ourcq River—the answer proved by the thickly scattered dead, the long columns of ambulances filled with wounded,

and the long columns of prisoners in German field gray, was always the same.

The regular with his numerous campaign badges; the national guardsman whose father served in the Spanish-American War and grandfather in the Civil War; the man in the national army, drafted it is true, but because he instructed his representative in Congress to vote for the draft as the fairest way both to the individual and to the nation to raise an army, some of old stock whose ancestors had fought for America, some the first generation in the United States, and some born abroad—all were Americans proud to serve their country and determined to pass with honor through that greatest test of citizenship: service in war for one's country.

Having in mind Napoleon I's dictum, "In war the moral is to the physical as three is to one," I recently asked Major General Charles P. Summerall, now chief of staff of our army, his opinion of the moral effect of the American soldiers' fighting capacities.

He commanded the artillery of the 1st Division up to and including the fight at Cantigny. He commanded that division during the famous assault south of Soissons in the second battle of the Marne, as he did at the battle of Saint-Mihiel. The splendid assault it made during its first appearance in the Argonne, stubbornly and successfully carried forward day after day despite bloody losses, caused his promotion on the battlefield to command of an army corps.

His answer was: "A Napoleon may plan and direct a combat. The supporting artillery may plan and execute its accompanying fires to perfection. But there will be no results to victory, unless the individual infantryman, soldier and officer, will courageously advance into the enemy's position, drive him out and stick there himself, regardless of merciless counter-attacks and heavy shelling. At Cantigny I saw our 1st Division pass gallantly and successfully through its first great test in attack and in holding what it took. At Soissons, at Saint-Mihiel, at Exermont, at Beaumont, and near Sedan, I saw the American soldiers prove themselves veterans in the true sense of the word. Any courageous man can, because of the valor of ignorance, go through his first grueling combat. Only the true veteran with heart of oak and that calm courage which comes from being able, despite knowledge of the consequences, to look death squarely in the eye can again and again, as often as asked by his leaders, go into battle and fight with that determination essential to success. Ten years have not changed my opinion, formed on the battle-fields of France, that the fighting value of the American soldier played a vital part in bringing the war to a successful conclusion."

Chapter V

COULD AMERICAN GENERALS BE TRUSTED WITH MODERN ARMIES?

WHAT reasons did the Allies give for their continuous effort to absorb our men in their armies first as individual replacements and finally by divisions?

Their last effort was made after the First American Army under command of General Liggett had fought halfway through the Argonne and the Second American Army under General Bullard was planning a later attack in the direction of Metz. Both armies were under command of General Pershing.

The reason for this final effort within a little more than two weeks of the Armistice can be told in the words of a Britisher: "Lord Milner, Secretary for War, proceeded to Paris on the 24th [October] as arranged, to discuss . . . , and to propose that American divisions should again be distributed between the various British and French armies along the Western Front so that fuller advantage should be taken of their remarkable fighting capacities than could be expected when they operated as an American Army."¹

¹ Sir C. E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, Vol. II, p. 141.

In other words such American generals as Pershing, the commander-in-chief, Liggett and Bullard in command of armies, Summerall, Hines, and Dickman commanding the army corps then struggling through the Argonne, and their staffs were not competent enough to get the results from American troops of which they were capable.

This last effort like its many predecessors was based on two arguments, both of which seem plausible enough to anyone unacquainted with the facts of our military history.

The first was that we did not know much about war in general—this because we had had but little war experience in the past, and also had no military traditions to speak of.

The second was that the Great War was quite different from any other war, and therefore needed a special knowledge which we could not possess.

These ideas were a natural outcome of the Europeans' practice of ignoring our military history. They studied all their own wars to the last insignificant detail. With the exception of a few of their students, they ignored ours.

There was hardly an action of a cavalry patrol of an officer and a few men in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 that was not studied in great detail. The main fighting in both was over in six weeks.

Our Civil War of four years, by far the greatest

war between those of Napoleon and the Great War, was practically ignored.

One German student of war, whose works were avidly studied all over Europe, dismissed it in a few paragraphs, as a conflict between large bodies of undisciplined men from which no military lessons of importance could be gathered.

Here and there, particularly in England, Stonewall Jackson's campaigns and General Lee's leadership of the southern armies were studied.

General Grant, the father of modern war, in that he was the first general to recognize the necessity for, and to put in practice the principle of, concentrating the whole man-power and resources of a nation in an effort which never ceased until the enemy was destroyed, was generally ignored.

This attitude was typical of that of military Europe until some of those Europeans, particularly the logical French who saw the American Expeditionary Force in action, sought the causes for its success. They discovered our long military history, rich with examples of the splendid results obtainable in war when a hard-headed people refuse to be bound by doctrine and insist on obtaining results by the most practical methods available.

Our attitude has always been the reverse. When our people served as British colonial troops and when they were fighting the Revolutionary War they carefully studied the methods brought from Europe by the

British regulars and the Hessian mercenaries, both troops of considerable battle experience. From the time of our independence, our professional military people have studied European methods, not only through military literature, but by direct observation in both peace and war.

General Sheridan was an eye-witness of the Franco-Prussian War. General Greene, an eye-witness of the Russo-Turkish War, wrote a book containing his observations, which, to this day, is widely used as a textbook.

Hundreds of our officers have witnessed the yearly maneuvers of every army in Europe. Scores of our officers have taken courses in Continental military schools. When the war broke out in 1914, we had a number of regular officers serving in both French and German regiments, who, of course, were promptly relieved.

Until our relations with Germany became really strained, we had officers as observers on the German side as well as the Allied one.

We have never allowed national pride to interfere with the adoption of any European method which proved on study to be better, from a practical point of view, than our own.

We had in our Revolutionary armies numbers of officers who like George Washington had served with British troops in the colonial wars on this continent. Also, a considerable number of enlisted men had

served in American colonial units incorporated in British forces. We were, therefore, quite well acquainted with British methods of those days.

Our trumpet signals for the mounted service and drum and fife signals for the infantry were British. During the War of 1812 the British trumpet calls were abolished and French ones adopted instead. The American reveille today and that of the French infantry are exactly the same. Our tattoo is French and was the favorite call of Napoleon I. The British drum and fife signals were kept. Today, at West Point, about the last place where the drum and fife is still used in our army, the cadets still assemble for mess to the tune of "The Roast Beef of Old England."

Our first Articles of War, which have not greatly changed since, were the same as the British. The customs of the service, many of which still obtain, were British. Calling a lieutenant "Mister" instead of "Lieutenant," which the new officers of the Great War never understood nor practiced, any more than did the volunteer officers of the Civil War, is British.

When it came to artillery and engineers, our Revolutionary army copied the French, long recognized in the military world as the masters in both. For this reason the majority of our terms in both these branches of the service are still French. For example the word "caisson," familiar to every artilleryman, is the French equivalent for "ammunition wagon," the term used by the British.

In the same way, we did not hesitate to take from the Prussian von Steuben such ideas as were useful in raising the discipline of our hastily organized troops, who were only too inclined to do as they pleased.

From the close of our Revolutionary War until the present any number of examples could be cited of our willingness at all times to take anything from Europe which we thought practical and beneficial.

Some years before the Great War, it was decided that while our mounted service was excellent from the point of view of western rough riding, it did not know enough about horse mastership. In other words, while our cavalry and field artillery, like the western cow-puncher, were perfectly willing to take, and capable of taking, any kind of horse and getting work out of him, they did not know enough about the higher training of animals. A number of cavalry officers was sent abroad to study all European cavalries, and above all their schools of equitation. We then sent a number of cavalry officers to take the courses at these schools. As the result of a thorough study of the whole question, we decided that the French methods of horse mastery were the best, and accordingly adopted them for the instruction of our cavalry and field artillery.

Some years before the war, the French were the first to invent a quick-firing field gun, the famous 75. They surprised the world when they equipped their field artillery with it. They were the first to work out the

new artillery tactics possible as the result of its rapid fire.

We frankly recognized that this was the greatest forward step in field artillery since the invention of the breech-loader. We with equal frankness promptly adopted the French artillery methods. With slight modifications they were the ones we used when we entered the war in 1917.

This readiness to adopt European ways which are better than ours has never led to the desire for the wholesale adoption of European methods, except on the part of individual officers here and there.

In admiration of courage the American yields to none. At the same time he believes that anything as serious as war should yield practical results.

Thus, as much as he always has admired the splendid examples of great courage and determination with which the record of all Europe's wars is replete, he has not hesitated to examine European tactics with a critical eye as to the results produced.

The result has been that in general he believes the European too conservative in his methods, too inclined to stick to tactics which have proved successful in past wars and not ready enough to change when new weapons open up new ways, or when an enemy using methods not familiar to Europeans is encountered.

In other words there is too much of an inheritance from the days of chivalry when high courage led the knight to disdain any method other than hard fighting,

and he rode full tilt, lance at rest, straight at his enemy. The knight despised the archer who shot him down from a distance, though frequently this disdain led to the knight's defeat.

He equally despised the first musketeers until gunpowder finally shoved the knight off the battle-field into the museum of military antiquities.

Sabutai and his Mongols invaded Europe in the thirteenth century. They brought with them tactics new to Europeans. Mounted archers prepared the way by shooting holes in the Christian ranks. Then the mounted men at arms attacked through these gaps. Though they had suffered defeat a number of times as a consequence of these attacks, the Europeans would not change their methods.

Seventy thousand Christians died gallantly on the plains of Hungary in a final battle. The Knights Templars died to the last man rather than yield or retire. The exhibition of courage was superb. The inability to adopt new tactics gave all that part of Europe to the Mongols.

Near the present site of Pittsburgh on July 8, 1755, General Braddock with 1,373 British regulars and several hundred Virginia militiamen was ambushed in the depths of the forest by Captain Beaujeu of the French army with 70 French regulars, 140 French Canadians, and 650 Indians.

General Braddock was a veteran of forty-five years' experience. Fighting on Flanders Field was an old

story to him. He knew European tactics thoroughly and had practiced them often enough in battle to be confident of their value. He did not know the methods used on this continent. He was not open to advice. As the enemy fire poured in upon the British from hidden sources they first advanced and then stood firm, firing crashing, steady volleys into the forest about them. However, the pitiless fire from hidden sources steadily taking its toll in dead and wounded finally was more than the bravest man could stand. They broke and fled. Braddock, exposing himself with the utmost courage, had four horses shot under him. While on his fifth he was mortally wounded.

Of the 1,373 British only 459 escaped being killed or wounded. Sixteen French and a small number of Indians were killed or wounded.

The territory around where Pittsburgh stands to-day remained French.

At Bunker Hill, the British regulars made two unsuccessful assaults upon the American entrenchment from its front only. Despite heavy losses, they gallantly made a third, which drove the Americans from the hill. Of 2,500 British, 1,054 were killed or wounded. The Americans numbered 1,700, of whom 450 were killed or wounded. They were untrained, undisciplined volunteers for the most part, but they were deadly shots with the rifle.

The same result could have been attained with less loss to the British and more to the Americans if the

British had attacked, as they easily could have done, on one flank as well as from the front.

The British got the hill, but the morale of the Americans was so raised by the heavy loss they occasioned the British that to this day the battle of Bunker Hill to the American mind is a victory. From a technical military point of view it was a British victory.

In 1899 the early battles of the Boer War showed the same methods—direct attacks across the open, gallantly carried forward despite heavy losses. Despite the courage of the British these attacks were generally stopped by the Boers with their deadly rifle fire from concealed positions, with but slight loss to themselves.

The practical mind of the American with its disinclination to be bound by doctrine when reason tells him there is a better way has led our cavalry far away from the European idea of its proper use in battle.

In the Franco-Prussian War the Germans had 56,000 and the French 40,000 cavalry. The majority of this mass of nearly 100,000 horsemen had no firearms other than pistols. The minority had carbines or short rifles but no pistols. They all had sabers; many had lances.

This enormous number of mounted men had no decisive influence on the war. The German cavalry did excellent scouting work while at the same time keeping the French from obtaining information of their army. Small bodies of the cavalry of each side made charges

with such courage and persisted under such heavy loss that they can justly be described as heroic. These charges brought no results of any particular practical value.

General Sheridan, the great cavalry leader of our Civil War, was an eye-witness of the four bloody charges by General Margueritte's cavalry without effect on the Prussian infantry which had climbed to the plateau of Floing near Sedan. He said the charges were most nobly made.

Little did he dream that forty-eight years later two American infantry divisions, the First and the Forty-second, would lose their last killed in action in a race for the crest of the hill south of Sedan just across the Meuse, which he must have seen every time he raised his eyes from the thrilling but useless sacrifice of the heroic men and gallant horses taking place in front of him.

Five years before, our Civil War had been brought to an end by the decisive use of cavalry in the hands of Sheridan. With his cavalry he had cut off, surrounded, and forced to surrender that splendid soldier General Ewell and his corps of infantry, the rear-guard of General Lee's army.

A relatively few hours later, by the same bold use of cavalry, Sheridan cut off the retreat of General Lee's army, and by holding until the Union infantry arrived he brought about Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

But both the Union and the Confederate cavalry were armed throughout with carbines and pistols. They also had sabers which they did not hesitate to use on each other in mounted charges.

The secret of the many decisive actions which must be justly credited to both during the four long years of war was that they never hesitated to use the best tactics to win the fight in which they were engaged. They had no false pride about dismounting from their horses and fighting on foot with their carbines like infantry. They did not hesitate to tackle infantry. They charged boot to boot at a thundering gallop with drawn saber like European cavalry when experience told them this would produce the best results. The four feet of the horse, the two feet of the cavalryman, the saber, the pistol, and the carbine were the tools given them. They solved each problem by such combinations of these as hard-headed reasoning and experience had taught them. Tradition could not limit them. Results were what they were after and got.

Our experience with European troops and our study of European wars have taught us many valuable lessons which we have not hesitated to accept. Also our military history contains the record of many mistakes on our part. At the same time both have confirmed our belief that the tactical methods evolved by our troops from our greatly varied battle experience of one hundred and fifty years, using American hard-headedness as a guide, are more practical than those created for

Europeans fighting in Europe and impregnated with European traditions.

In nothing have we differed more with Europe than in the use of the rifle on the battle-field. We have believed from the beginning, and our experience on the battle-fields of the Great War has confirmed this belief, that the rifle in the hands of an individual soldier who has been trained until he can pick out and hit individual enemies during battle is one of the most, if not the most deadly weapon in existence.

Throughout our history, the individual soldiers not only of our infantry but also of our cavalry have been taught to the limit of their personal ability to be such shots. Such lapses as have occurred in this have been due to over-economy on the part of Congress—always vigorously resisted by the army until done away with.

Each year several months have been devoted to rifle shooting and, for the cavalry, also pistol shooting dismounted and mounted.

The course followed has taught all soldiers two things: first, to fire accurately and carefully at individual enemies at ranges to include 600 yards; secondly, to fire rapidly and accurately as many as five shots in twenty seconds at 200 yards, and five in thirty seconds at 300 yards, at different enemies. In addition, those men who have shown themselves better than the average shot, have been taught to fire accurately as far as 1,000 yards.

To reward good shots and stimulate interest in

shooting, the men have been divided into different classes, according to their shooting ability. The three highest classes—expert rifleman, sharpshooter, and marksman—are given extra pay. Qualification each year is essential in order to draw this pay.

Aside from this, the companies of infantry and troops of cavalry in the army are graded each year according to their shooting ability. This competition not only stimulates interest, but also is an important factor in determining the military efficiency of the captains.

To create still further interest, a series of competitions is held each year. They start in each unit as a means of picking the men and officers to go to the next higher competition. Each class of competition is used in the same way to determine the contestants for the next higher one until the National Match is reached. This is a great annual event, in which the best shots of the regular army, the civilian soldier forces, the navy, the Marine Corps, and civilian shooting clubs compete.

In Europe, the amount of money and time spent on instructing the individual soldier in the use of his rifle has always been much less than in America. Also, instead of great faith in the individual rifle shot, the general tendency is to count upon the hits resulting when the massed fire of a whole unit sprays the ground to its front.

The only marked exception to this rule was the

British regular army, which as a result of the heavy losses inflicted by the excellent shooting of the individual Boer in the South African War took up rifle shooting in earnest. However, as Great Britain's war armies were raised, they did not even attempt to produce the high standards with which the regular troops in 1914 entered the campaign in France.

As the Great War progressed and more and more green men had to be hurriedly trained and sent to the front, the infantry in most armies relied more and more on the use of machine guns and grenades and less and less on the fire of their rifles. In fact, the point was reached where many infantrymen hardly considered their rifles as more than poles on the end of which to carry their bayonets.

The American observers who visited the different fronts, prior to our entry into the war, and the officers sent there after our entry to study conditions, soon came to the conclusion that the small results charged to the infantry rifle were not due to its use being out of date, but simply to the fact that the troops, besides lacking training in its use, did not even realize what could be done with it.

Thus, while not hesitating to increase the proportion of machine guns with our infantry units and to add hand and rifle grenades to our infantry armament, we vigorously trained our new infantry in the individual and accurate use of the rifle, and took every means to create a feeling of confidence in this weapon.

After the tactical use of weapons, the next question of importance is the leadership of an army.

Where do the officers come from? What is their military training? What capacity have they for successful leadership of our men in battle?

The oldest military school in the world with a continuous history is the United States Military Academy at West Point, established on the site of two of the forts built to guard the Hudson River during the Revolutionary War. George Washington's foresight was responsible. For a century and a quarter the school has proved the value of his belief, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." Its roll of graduates contains the names of the vast majority of all our military leaders in all the wars since the Revolution. Its graduates killed in action in the dates of their death cover well over a century. The places where they fought their last battle extend from France on the east to China on the west, and from the wintry plains of the Dakotas and Wyoming on the north to Cuba, Mexico, and the Philippines in the tropical south.

The majority of European military schools have a course of but two years. The course at West Point is a four-year one. As the new class enters each year a day or two following graduation, the course is really four years. There is but one summer vacation, at the close of the second year, when the cadet has actually been there two full years. There are no other regular

vacations. The men with the highest standing, and above all upper classmen, are allowed a few days off now and then, where most schools, including the European military ones, grant a vacation to all their students.

The course is the same for all. There are no elective subjects. Failure in any one subject insures dismissal. The course is planned to keep the cadet continuously busy up to the physical and mental limit of the average healthy boy of the age of the cadets present.

Practically all European military schools are either to train cavalry and infantry officers, or else engineer and artillery officers. The fundamental idea of West Point is that a man must graduate with a theoretical and practical knowledge of all branches of the service—engineers, ordnance, artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

The carrying out of this idea through four years, crammed to the limit with study, drills, marches, and exercises of all kinds, is considered to be the reason why Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, and the long list of other commanders, were such successful generals in war, though their service in the army was before the days of higher military education. Their four years at West Point had given them an understanding and grasp of all branches of the service and their mutual coordination, which is the first essential of good generalship.

A man who is only a first-class infantryman, a first-class cavalryman, a first-class artilleryman, or a first-

class engineer, is a specialist. A specialist is not competent to command a body of troops made up of all arms, and successfully direct their energies to a single end—defeat of the enemy.

That great British soldier Lord Kitchener was asked by the Australians what military school to take as a model for the one they were about to establish. He told them West Point.

Lord Kitchener visited West Point when Major-General Hugh L. Scott, who was our chief of staff when we entered the war in 1917, was superintendent. Later Colonel Bridges, who subsequently established the Royal Military Academy outside Melbourne, came to study the system used.

General Scott tells¹ how on a visit to Britain in 1917, at dinner one night he sat next to the officer in command of all the Australian forces in Europe. General Scott asked if the Australian West Point had been of any value in the war. The answer was, "Any value? Why, it has been the backbone of all our Australian forces in Europe, and we will never let it go."

Shortly after Marshal Foch's return from his trip throughout the United States, I talked with him in his office in Paris about what he had seen. Among other things, he said, shaking his finger at me and smiling:

"Your country claims to be so pacifistic. Never in my life have I seen so many people who like military things. For example, at the head of the parade in In-

¹ H. L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*.

dianapolis was a magnificent squadron of cavalry; young men in handsome uniforms mounted on splendid black horses.

"I asked, 'What corps d'élite of your army is that?' The answer was, 'Oh, they don't belong to the army. That is the Black Horse Troop of the Culver Military Academy.' I found on inquiry that the Culver Military Academy is a private school, maintained from the tuition fees paid by parents; that the magnificent black horses came from the same source."

The marshal then went on to tell how he had found that Culver was not the only military academy maintained by funds other than those from the national government; that the country was dotted with excellent ones maintained by private and state funds, the only assistance from the national government being the loan of a certain number of regular officers and sergeants for instruction purposes.

The Culver Military Academy in Indiana was established as the result of the belief of a business man that military training was not only essential for war purposes, but above all an excellent training for the vocations of peace. Aside from its regular courses, summer training-camps of the same kind as the one established by General Wood at Plattsburg were started in 1915.

In addition, in the summer of 1916, foreseeing our entry into the war, the Academy held a training-camp for graduates to bring them up to date. This was the

first of a series of short courses held for the same purpose, not only before we entered the war but throughout its continuation.

More than 1,300 graduates or students of Culver served in the army, navy, or Marine Corps during the recent war. More than seventy percent were commissioned officers.

Another famous school is the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, Virginia. It was created by an act of the Virginia Legislature in 1835, to provide for military education. It is organized like West Point, the course of study is similar, the discipline and training the same.

During the Civil War, this school furnished many efficient officers to the Confederate armies. Its battalion of cadets took part in the battle of Newmarket, in which it successfully carried by assault a Union battery of artillery, driving off its infantry escort.

During the recent war, large numbers of its graduates were officers of the army and marine corps.

The numerous other military schools throughout the country have produced a respectable list of officers for our peace-time regular army and long lists for our war armies, the records of which demonstrate the great military value of these schools to the country.

Our army has not been content that the military education of its officers should cease with the close of their first military school days. In the course of years, a complete system of schools has grown up to train

officers as specialists in engineers, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, as general staff officers, and as generals commanding.

The first of these higher schools was established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1881 by General Sherman, then in command of our army. His experience in our Civil War had taught him the necessity to devote more attention to completing the education of officers. Also, at this time there were a good many officers who had gone into the regular army at the close of the Civil War, who had gained great practical experience during the four years of that war, but who lacked a thorough military education.

As time passed, the two years' course widened its scope. The idea that Leavenworth should be a school to make good the fundamental military education of officers, where lacking, gave place to the present one that Leavenworth was primarily a school in which officers who possessed that education got higher instruction, which would enable them efficiently to perform the duties of general staff officers and generals commanding in the field in war.

In looking back over our military history, it was evident that our great defect was not that great military leaders failed to appear when needed, but that we failed to have a sufficient number of well-trained subordinate generals, and, above all, general staff officers who knew organization, equipment, training, transporting, and handling of an army in combat require-

ments, and who, furthermore, were competent to do all these things with certainty and success.

More and more, graduation from this school came to be looked upon as a requisite for promotion to the higher grades of the army. As its graduates increased in number and spread throughout the regiments of the regular army, and as instructors in the various military schools of our country, the knowledge taught there of what constitutes, and of the necessity for, staff and command work permeated our military system.

In 1902, during the term of Mr. Elihu Root as secretary of war, the General Staff Corps of the Army was established. For a long time the leading officers of the army had realized the necessity for such a coordinating body; above all in a country which never prepares for war and always expects a small War Department, and a relatively small corps of regular officers, immediately to organize the millions of untrained citizens brought to the Colors, into a large and effective army.

Also, thanks to Mr. Root, the Army War College was organized. This institution—a college in the true and best sense of the word—made our system of higher military education and research work complete.

The result was that when war came, for the first time in our history we had a numerous corps of professional officers whose thorough training over a long period of years made them competent quickly to organ-

ize and train our new armies and to get them in the presence of the enemy and to fight them efficiently, from the point of view both of general staff work and of commanding generals.

In practically all European armies, officers on entering the general staff corps leave their branch of the service and become permanent general staff officers. It is true that from time to time they are sent back to do a short period of service with troops. However, they are essentially general staff officers, and no longer troop or line officers, in the true sense of the word. During the Great War it was found that as a consequence many general staff officers were out of sympathy with the officers and enlisted men of the fighting units. They had gotten too far away from troops to understand their point of view.

When our general staff was formed, the older officers of the army, who were veterans of the Civil War, and remembered the results in that war of lack of sympathy and understanding between troop and staff officers, insisted that we should not adopt this system.

The result was that officers of our general staff remain officers of artillery, cavalry, infantry, or whatever their branch of the service happens to be. They are simply detailed for four years. At the end of this time they must serve at least two years with troops before they are again available for detail. Many are not redetailed for longer periods, or at all. The conse-

quence is that a very high proportion of regular officers have served on the general staff; and that all general staff officers, knowing they must return to troop duty, are careful as to the measures which they advocate for the troops.

In general, the result has been an absence of dislike between the line and the general staff, and a mutual understanding and sympathy, which made for smoother relationships between the two during the Great War.

Another thing which has strengthened our corps of officers is the entire absence of any class distinction as a determining factor, with respect either to the branch of the service which the officer enters, or to influence on his promotion—two things somewhat prevalent in most European armies.

Men are commissioned in the different branches of the service according to their capabilities as officers in those branches, not because of their social standing. They are picked for the cavalry because they are good cavalymen; for the infantry because they are good infantrymen; for the artillery because they are good artillerymen, and so on. The cavalry is not better socially than the other branches of the service. The infantry is not considered less desirable socially than the other branches of the service. They are all on a par socially. The same is true of the regiments in each. There are no crack regiments which look down upon others.

In the first place, there are no class distinctions in this country.

In the second place, all cadets at the Military Academy at West Point are on exactly the same footing in every way. They all take the same course, and do not know until just before graduation whether they are going to be cavalrymen, infantrymen, artillerymen, or engineers afterward.

The result is that every man has classmates and friends in every branch of the service. A cavalryman is not going to turn up his nose at a classmate and friend who has gone into the infantry because he liked it better, and who, perhaps, had a higher standing, scholastically and otherwise, throughout their four years together at the Military Academy.

In addition, approximately half the corps of officers, as a rule, are not graduates of the Military Academy. Some come from private military schools, some are graduates of the great colleges of the country. In each war a number of men who are volunteer or temporary officers find they like the army and a military life better than they do civil life. Many of these men are commissioned in the regular forces. Enlisting in the ranks and working up to a commission has been a favorite way with many youngsters who are unable to obtain an appointment to West Point.

Regardless of which methods the officers used to obtain their commissions, their military and social standing are absolutely alike. Being essentially Ameri-

can, they do not consider themselves a class apart from the mass of their fellow citizens. In accepting a commission in the army, they are merely following a profession in the same way that other men become lawyers, doctors, or engineers.

As for military traditions, not only the regular army, but the national guard also, is full of it. There are older regiments in Europe than in this country, because Europe is much older. However, when the Great War broke out there were few European regiments with as many battle honors on their colors and standards as those carried by a number of our regiments.

In the periods between the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War, the Indians kept our regulars busy. From the close of the Civil War in 1865 until 1881, each year they took a toll in dead and wounded officers and men. They have done so several times since.

The Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer Campaign in China, and various armed expeditions into Mexico, all have furnished their list of brave deeds done in battle and of men who suffered wounds and death in the service of their country.

Many of our national guard regiments have old traditions. Belonging to their communities, they have gone to each of our wars as the direct representatives

in our army of these communities. There were numerous of these regiments in the Great War which contained men, sons of those in the same regiment in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection, and grandsons of soldiers in these same regiments in the Civil War.

The Forty-second Infantry Division of our Great War was called "The Rainbow" because it was made up of picked national guard units from New York to California and from Minnesota to Alabama. Upon being assembled, the New York infantry regiment and the one from Alabama, later to become the best of friends, promptly engaged in a row because they had faced each other on several battle-fields of the Civil War. The New York regiment was in the Army of the Potomac throughout. The Alabama regiment was in the Army of Northern Virginia throughout. Both regiments served in 1898 and on the Mexican border in the summer of 1916.

Some of our national guard regiments antedate our Revolutionary forces, having been in existence as troops of a British colony.

The idea that the Great War was different from other wars was not held by all the French and British military leaders. Marshal Foch never believed it. It furnished a convenient excuse for those civil and military leaders of the Allies who were responsible for the bad management of the war. It was a good answer to the question, why had not the Allies yet beaten Ger-

many, when they so outnumbered that country in population and material resources of every kind?

However, Foch was not in command when Pershing arrived in Europe, nor was he to be until practically ten months later. Furthermore, what Foch advised to be done was not done. It was only when face to face with defeat by the Germans, in March and April, 1918, that the British and French authorities finally agreed to put him in charge of the western front.

When Marshal Foch was put in charge of the western front, he showed by the orders he gave and the movements he had carried out, that he did not think the Great War was different in principle from the wars which had gone before it. Since the Armistice, two books on the art of war, written by him prior to 1914, have been widely in demand. Though new editions have been printed, the only change the Marshal has made is to add a preface. In other words, his war experience has not led him to add to or change the principles he enunciated in these books.

General Pershing and our trained officers did not believe the Great War different from other wars, any more than did Marshal Foch.

The fact that fighting was going on with both sides in trenches was nothing new. The use of trenches to aid armies, both in attack and in defense, was steadily developed in our Civil War. The final stages of that war found Lee's army in trenches stretching from in front of Richmond to in front of Petersburg, with

Grant's army in trenches facing them. While the trench line in the Great War was much longer than the Richmond-Petersburg line, the only reason was that the armies facing each other were much bigger than those of Grant and Lee, and, therefore, needed more trenches to protect them.

Grant's troops made headlong assaults, which failed with heavy loss, just as did similar assaults in the Great War. Mines were dug underneath enemy trenches and exploded, blowing them and their occupants into the air. Hand grenades were used, in fact, had been used in the siege of Vicksburg nearly two years before. A short mortar, called a coehorn, was used, just as the trench mortar of the Great War, to throw a shell full of explosives almost straight up into the air, so that it would drop down into the enemy's trench and explode there, thus robbing the men in it of the protection given by "digging in."

The Russo-Japanese War was seen by General Pershing, by General Kuhn, the chief of our War College when we entered the Great War, and by General March, General Pershing's first chief of artillery in Europe, and later the war chief of staff in Washington. This war was studied by all our higher ranking officers. Trenches were extensively used in it. There were no developments beyond those of our Civil War, except those which the greater range of modern weapons and the greater force of modern explosives demanded.

Our past military history had shown us the way and furnished us the experience to determine proper organization for our armies, the tactical methods best suited to modern weapons, and the leadership which would carry our people to the greatest success in battle.

Our study of European methods, extending over a period of more than one hundred and fifty years, including the Great War up to the time of the appearance of our troops on its battle-fields, had convinced us of the adequacy of our own methods for modern warfare.

The records of Pershing, Liggett, Bullard, Sumnerall, Harbord, and our other successful corps and divisional commanders, show them worthy successors of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, and the other leaders of our armies in our Civil War.

They also prove the European fear of the inadequacy of our leadership to meet the problems of the Great War to have been baseless.

Chapter VI

THE RACE BETWEEN HINDENBURG AND AMERICA

WERE the Germans right in thinking because of our unpreparedness we would be too late in bringing to the hard-pressed Allies a sufficient reinforcement of fighting troops?

This was the great question as the doubt and anxiety of the winter of 1917-18 gave place to the black depression of the spring and early summer of 1918.

As Russia first signed a truce with the Central Powers late in 1917, and then a peace treaty in the spring, the Allies saw defeat staring them in the face as the consequence of the disappearance from their ranks of her 3,000,000 soldiers.

Could unprepared America get enough of her 105,000,000 civilians into her army, into France, and into battle in time to make good this tremendous Allied loss of man-power?

General von Hindenburg, delivering smashing blow after blow against the Allies, expected to crumple them up before it could be done.

America, straining every nerve, worked to get an army on the battle-fields of France before it was too late.

Nowhere were the fears and hopes engendered by this race more openly expressed than in the secret conferences of the Allies at the Supreme War Council in Versailles.

Therefore, recently I sought out our representative on that Council, General Tasker H. Bliss.

In the fall of 1917 he was appointed chief of staff of our army. A short while later he was made a full general. President Wilson considered his services to be of such value that though General Bliss reached the age of retirement December 31, 1917, the President continued him on active duty. He was sent abroad by the President as his military representative on special missions to London and Paris.

When finally, faced with defeat, the Allies put aside their mutual jealousies and organized for the first time a central coordinating body, the Supreme War Council, the President appointed General Bliss to represent him on it.

I asked him:

"General, how far were the Allied leaders convinced that unless we got troops on French battle-fields we would be too late to stop the Germans?"

He answered:

"Both the Allies and the Central Powers knew that victory would come to the side whose people had the best and most obstinate morale and whose armies had the most man-power and the equipment which must go with it.

"Eleven years ago at the time we entered the war many men here and in Europe thought it both possible and probable that the war would last at least through 1919.

"Then in October, 1917, came the second Russian Revolution and the Soviet government which began to negotiate peace with the Central Powers. They knew as everyone did that the war would be decided on the western front between the North Sea and the Alps."

I interrupted:

"Then, general, you have no sympathy with those who thought they could find an easier way than fighting it out on French battle-fields by whipping Turkey or invading Austria from Greece? You don't believe get-rich-quick schemes will work in war any more than they do in peace?"

He answered:

"Of course not! You have to pay with real fighting for success in war, just as you do with real work for success in peace.

"To go back, Russia's dropping out now gave Germany the chance to transfer a large force of comparatively fresh troops from the Russian to the French front.

"Therefore victory was to be decided by relative man-power.

"Everything pointed to the necessity for Germany to carry out her plans for attacking the Allies as quickly as possible.

"Had a strong American army been in France by the end of 1917 it could have stopped the Germans from even starting their attacks. However, it was not there, with the result that Germany in March began the first of her great attacks with a startling success.

"From then on it was clear that America's primary business was to as quickly as possible restore the balance of man-power to the Allied side by rapidly increasing her army in France.

"This was the general view of the Allied governments as early as October, 1917. It was made clear by them to the American mission sent by President Wilson to Europe, of which I was the military member. Before we left the United States Allied representatives had suggested that we stop for the time being sending troops and send food and other supplies instead. But when we reached Europe the British and French authorities responsible for fighting the war always said it would be disastrous. They wanted soldiers and more and more soldiers, not food."

I said:

"Despite all the slogans about 'Food will win the war,' 'Ships will win the war,' the whole thing came down to what it has in every other war: the only way to win is to whip your enemy's army on the battlefield."

"Why, of course! How can there be any other way when you are at war with an enemy who really fights?"

Then continuing, he said:

"I was told both in England and in France that the plans for sending over our troops as then laid down needed to be changed to bring over at least twice as many by the end of the spring of 1918 or a grave military crisis could be expected. The British and French laid great stress on the disaster to the Italians in the Caporetto battle and the fact that Russia had practically withdrawn from the war.

"They said that the number of their divisions had been reduced and also the number of men in each division. They believed their reserve of man-power was practically exhausted.

"At a conference in London in November the British prime minister, Mr. Lloyd George, said: 'After a good deal of consultation with my colleagues and our military and naval advisers, I should put man-power and shipping as the two first demands for your consideration.' "

I interrupted by saying:

"After all we had more troops ready than we could get ships to carry them."

The general said:

"Yes. Shipping was the neck of the bottle.

"But to continue, when the Supreme War Council at Versailles took up the question of the general policy for 1918, the four heads of the United States, French, British, and Italian governments adopted one based on the assumption that success could be obtained only by

enough American troops arriving to restore to the Allies the balance of man-power and keep it restored.

"In short, it was the Allied conviction as early as the month of November, 1917, that the Germans were about to begin the transfer of a minimum (and more could be made available) of fifty divisions from their eastern to the western front in France, which would more than give them the balance hitherto held by the Allies. They had no hope of meeting this, and on every occasion frankly so stated, except in a prompt and rapid increase in the arrival of American man-power.

"So convinced were they of this as the crisis approached that they made available a large amount of tonnage believed to be almost vital for other uses, solely for the purpose of the rapid transportation of our troops. And then began that speeding up which resulted at its maximum in the arrival of Americans at the rate of approximately 300,000 men in one month and which enabled General Pershing to meet the crisis and turn the tide of war the summer of 1918."

Just after the second great successful Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack in 1918, when the discouragement among the Allies was profound, Mr. Lloyd George, the premier of Great Britain, spoke in Edinburgh. He described the position of affairs as "a race between General Hindenburg and President Wilson," in which "the Germans were straining every nerve to reach the goal ere American help should be available for the Allies."

From about the time we entered the war in the spring of 1917 until spring of 1918, when Russia made peace with the Central Powers, the Allies watched Russia's army gradually disintegrate. The 140 infantry divisions and 33 cavalry divisions, a total of about 3,500,000 men, with their immense number of guns which had faced the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, gradually dwindled away. The men simply went home without permission. Every railway from the front was crowded with them. Up to 10,000 a day passed through some of the railway junctions.

As the Russian army dwindled, the Germans were free to move their divisions from the Russian front to the western front in France, while the Austro-Hungarians moved many of theirs to the Italian front.

In January, 1917, there were 135 German divisions in France. A year later, by January, 1918, there were 174 divisions, an increase of 500,000 men.

On the Italian front the number of enemy divisions in the two weeks preceding the highly successful enemy attack at Caporetto increased from 43 to 53, a reinforcement of approximately 150,000 men.

The 1,750,000 Germans and Austro-Hungarians who had been on the Russian front were moving west.

As Russia first signed an armistice and then peace practically the whole armed strength of Germany appeared on the western front in France.

There could be no doubt that as soon as their preparations were complete Hindenburg and Ludendorff

would use it to strike the hardest blow the world had seen in its military history.

What had the Allies to meet this mounting tide of enemy troops? When it had reached its maximum, it was certain to put a pressure on the western front which it was extremely doubtful if that front would stand.

When Russia was still in the war, the Allies had outnumbered the Central Powers on every front. The Russian and Roumanian armies alone outnumbered the whole German army on every front. On the western front, the French, British, and Belgians outnumbered the Germans almost 6 to 4. The Italians outnumbered the Austro-Hungarians 13 to 8. In the Balkans the proportion of Allied troops to Central Powers troops was 4 to 3, and in Turkey 6 to 5. In light field guns the Allies outnumbered the Central Powers 6 to 5 and in heavy guns 7 to 6.

The total British and French forces in all theaters of war by the end of 1917 was 3,700,000 combatants, not including all the services of supply and their auxiliaries so essential to a modern army. (These are included in the ration strength, or number of men who have to be fed. Therefore, the ration strength of an army is always considerably above its combatant strength.)

Against this the German combatant strength, not including the other Central Powers, was 3,400,000 combatants. Thus, the French and British armies were

stronger than the German. As a matter of fact this had been true for two years.

However, despite their great strength when Russia was still in, the Allies had been unable to whip Germany! What was worse, they had not been able to prevent her striking them practically always when and where she chose!

The first battle of the Marne, the first battle of Ypres, the Verdun defensive, were all Allied successes. However, in each the Allies were on the defensive. They were Allied successes only because in each a German blow had been stopped. In each it was the Germans, not the Allies, who had decided when and where the blow would be struck. The wiping out of Serbia, of Roumania, the staggering blows which sent Russia reeling into revolution and out of the war, were all successful blows struck by Germany where she chose.

Far greater efficiency in military and political leadership was the reason why the Germans with inferior numbers had been able on the whole to get the better of the Allies up to the time we entered the war and Russia dropped out. If this were true with Russia in the war, what was going to happen with her out?

This, even though the Allies, with approximately 5,400,000 combatant French, British, Italian, Belgian, Portuguese, Serbian, and Greek soldiers, slightly outnumbered the approximately 5,200,000 combatant German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish soldiers.

More soldiers to be put on the battle-field had to be gotten from somewhere. First, enough more must be had to stop the Germans when they attacked with the additional strength of their troops brought from Russia, fully expecting victory to perch definitely on their banner. Secondly, enough beyond this additional number must be gotten, once the German attacks had been stopped, to definitely turn the tide of victory away from Germany by attacking and never ceasing until, beaten, she was ready to make peace on Allied terms.

Where were these additional soldiers to come from?

With the French man-power drained to its last dregs in a vain effort to keep the French army from falling off in its strength; with the British government unwilling to enforce real conscription, and with the Italians certain that their safety depended upon keeping their troops along their own front, there was only one source of supply: America.

The German General Staff knew this as well as the Allies. They knew that after more than two years of war every European country engaged was full of war-weary people ready to make peace.

They counted on the smashing blows they were preparing to deliver the Allies, to send up the morale of their own people and more and more depress that of the Allied peoples.

With a series of successes on the battle-field and a growing conviction among the Allied peoples that they were beaten, only one result was possible—Victory.

They could see but one possible interference with this plan—the arrival of sufficient American troops on the battle-fields of France to give the Allies that reinforcement which was essential if the German offensives were to be stopped.

The yardstick with which they measured the time which must elapse before an American army could arrive (presuming unprepared America really intended to put an army in Europe) was the two years lacking one month between unprepared Britain's declaration of war in August, 1914, and her first attack on a large scale on the Somme, July, 1916.

Also, they counted on the immense difference between transportation of an army twenty miles across the Channel and 2,500 miles across the Atlantic.

The short twenty miles of shallow water between England and France could be denied to the German submarine with comparative ease.

The vast reaches of the 2,500 miles of the deep Atlantic Ocean between America and Europe could not. The freedom with which the submarines were then roaming its breadth and depth, sinking their prey where they found it, was the best proof.

However, the Germans had not foreseen, nor had the Allies for that matter, the immense and united energy with which America would immediately throw the whole of its man-power and material resources into the waging of the war.

Had we been prepared, the force of our immense

resources could have been used during the fall of 1917 in a blow, which, as General Bliss points out, might have been decisive, against the German army then concentrating its full strength in France in preparation for its smashing attacks in 1918.

However, as has been true at the outbreak of each of our wars, we were unprepared. We had no war army of millions. We lacked the ships to carry such an army to Europe.

Outside of our small regular army and our national guard we had no troops. It is true that for the first time in our history we had a general staff; also, it was composed of fully competent officers. However, outside of this directing, coordinating body, we lacked everything necessary to expand our small forces to the war army of millions we needed.

We lacked the camps to shelter the men; the uniforms to clothe them; the personal equipment for each man; the wagons, rolling kitchens, and infinite variety of heavy equipment for each unit; the arms and ammunition.

If we sent all our 300,000 regulars and national guard, our only trained troops, to Europe immediately, there would be no one left to train and lead the millions of untrained called to arms.

If we kept most of them at home to prepare our millions for the battle-field, we could send only a few troops to help the Allies during the long period before these millions would be ready.

Why were we caught like this, thus giving Hindenburg his chance?

Even though our public did not know the truth about the danger to the Allies resulting from Britain's unpreparedness when she entered the War in 1914, why did not our War Department know?

There was no excuse for its being fooled by propaganda. Why had it not done something?

It did know the truth! It did its best to have us prepared!

Its plans were blocked by President Wilson, by his supporters in Congress, and by the peace propaganda thickly spread all over the country by our pacifists.

The war had been going on less than a year before it was evident that both sides were violating our rights at sea. This, coupled with the steadily increasing feeling against Germany, made it evident we should overhaul our national defense and make it ready for the immense expansion which war would demand.

Societies sprang up to preach the necessity for this. The National Defense League, the Army League, and the Navy League were the most prominent. General Wood organized the Plattsburg camps.

Finally, the movement reached such proportions that President Wilson in 1916 instructed the War College section of the General Staff to prepare a bill for Congress.

It did so. When he saw what the bill called for he not only did not send it to Congress, but forbade the War

Department to give out its details. He had always shunned the War Department's desire to show him how unprepared we were. When public opinion forced him to act, apparently, he was horrified at what was needed.

What we had to do later shows that the general staff in its fear of shocking the statesmen did not go nearly far enough in this bill to create and maintain the 4,000,000 men we put under arms once war was declared.

Senator Chamberlain of Oregon, chairman of the Senate military affairs committee, introduced a bill in the Senate which called for about what the general staff had asked for.

Led by Senator Wadsworth of New York, the Senate passed it by a large majority. When it came to the House it was supported by such men as Kahn of California, Tilson of Connecticut, Olney of Massachusetts, Green of Vermont, and Morin of Pennsylvania.

However, the administration defeated the purpose of the bill by amalgamating it with one named after Mr. Hay, a congressman from Virginia.

Mr. Hay of Virginia, Mr. Dent of Alabama, and Mr. Anthony of Kansas were the leaders in this.

The resultant so-called Hay-Chamberlain Bill, touted to the country as preparing us for war, did nothing of the kind. The confusion and delay which took place once we declared war proved this.

Jane Addams of Chicago, Oswald Garrison Villard,

and the rest of our leading pacifists appeared before Congress and did their best to prevent our making any preparations.

The Church Peace Union, which works hand in hand with the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ, worked against preparedness.

To quote a report prepared on the answers received from a questionnaire by Dr. Sidney L. Gulick and Dr. C. S. Macfarland, which was published for the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ: "The answers to these letters were very satisfactory, and in the abstracts given out through the daily press of the nation furnish much encouragement for those opposing demands for excessive armament."

We had the men. Our population of 105,000,000 assured that.

They were ready to go. Even before war was declared they flocked to enlist in the regulars and the national guard, the navy and marine corps. From the day it was declared, there was an overwhelming rush of volunteers, which swamped the arrangements made to receive them.

While Mr. Wilson's administration had refused, prior to the declaration of war, to prepare for our entry, once war was declared nothing could have excelled the energy displayed by Mr. Wilson, the President, and Mr. Baker, his secretary of war, in rushing our preparations to put a fighting army on the battle-fields of France, the only way of bringing victory.

The General Staff, shortly before the war, had had its strength in Washington seriously reduced, as the result of an attack made on it through Congress. However, it for some time had made the arrangements by which all the different staff corps of the army had plans for immediate expansion, once war came. These plans included not only the purchase of supplies and equipment, but also their transportation. The only thing that was needed was the money necessary.

Immediately war was declared, Major-General Hugh L. Scott, then chief of staff, took to the secretary of war, Mr. Baker, the estimates for the \$50,000,000 necessary to carry out these plans. He writes:

"I explained to him that to expend public money unappropriated by Congress was a penitentiary offense, but that these things must be done at once. Within five minutes I was back in my office among a council of the chiefs of bureaus with the signature of the secretary, and said, 'There it is, gentlemen. The secretary has touched the button and the wheels must begin to move, not this afternoon, but now. Go to it.' " ¹

General Scott had made up his mind that when war came, if he could bring it about, the army was going to be expanded the many times necessary to bring it to war strength without repeating the errors of our past history. He had settled upon three major points:

First, that the man-power should be raised, from the beginning, by conscription.

¹ H. L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, p. 565.

Second, that no political but only military considerations should govern in the character of the troops raised and in the issuing of commissions to new officers.

Third, that to gain a commission a man must be physically qualified and must submit himself successfully to the course of training prescribed.¹

Our General Staff and trained officers, like those of every other country, had no illusions as to the quickest, most economical, and fairest way to raise a new army of the numbers needed for a long period of a war in which the nation really fights with its whole strength.

It is to be doubted if in the history of the world there was ever raised by the volunteer system a larger army in proportion to the male population than the Union army of our Civil War, prior to the adoption of conscription. Out of a population of 10,795,422 of the Union states, as shown by the 1860 census, 1,356,593 volunteered.

However, this number was not sufficient to bring the Union armies to, and maintain them at, the strength necessary for victory.

General Scott's 1916 annual report as chief of staff contained a dissertation on the benefits of compulsory service. He tells how favorable newspaper comments flowed in from every section of the country throughout the winter of 1916-17.²

¹ H. L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, p. 555.

² H. L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, p. 559.

When the time came it was found that both the President and the secretary of war were in favor of universal compulsory service, or conscription.

As a consequence of this, and public opinion, a conscription law was passed and came into operation on May 18, 1917, within six weeks from our declaration of war.

Some members of the executive branch of the government, while believing such a law a correct measure from a military point of view, doubted its practicality from a political point of view, fearing the country would not like it. Some congressmen, opposing it, spoke against it, using the customary, threadbare arguments about "one volunteer being better than three pressed men," etc. etc. However, the overwhelming sentiment in the country for it made itself felt.

The ease with which it was put in operation, and the smoothness with which it worked, are the best proofs of the fact that the country considered it the most businesslike, most efficient, and fairest way of raising an army.

There was no opposition from labor, as such.

Finding that men were being taken from employment useful for war purposes, while others—not by any means all of the labor class—were idle, the provost marshal general's office wished to issue a "Work or Fight" order. By this order men who were unemployed—rich or poor—were to be drafted immediately, without waiting for their turn.

Some of Mr. Wilson's advisers were afraid that labor would be insulted at such an order, so it was not immediately issued. However, shortly afterward, these facts leaked out. The press of the country eagerly seized upon them, and strongly supported the issuance of such an order. It was issued without even causing a ripple among the ranks of labor.

Registrations under the compulsory service act, plus the large number of men who had already enlisted, prior to its passage, came to 26,000,000 men, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Of this number, 4,800,000 served in the armed forces of the nation; 4,000,000 of them were in the army.

The cost of recruiting the 4,000,000 was one-twentieth of that of recruiting the 2,000,000 in the Union army during the Civil War.¹

The attitude of labor throughout the war was patriotic.

One of the important steps taken, among the inadequate defense plans passed by Congress in 1916 as the result of the nation-wide cry for preparedness, was the creation of a council of national defense. One of the first acts of the council of national defense was to create a labor committee. Samuel Gompers, long the head of labor in this country, was appointed to this committee.

As early as February, 1917, he called a preliminary

¹L. P. Ayres, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary*, p. 20. The author was chief of the statistical branch of the general staff.

meeting of the representatives of a large number of labor unions to bring about a general agreement as to the attitude of labor toward the approaching war and the problems of labor which would come into existence when war was declared. As the result of this conference, there was a meeting of more than 150 executive officers of labor organizations. They passed a formal declaration promising the unqualified support of the war by union labor, and asking that the government curb profiteering and give labor adequate representation in all business dealing with industrial matters.

At a subsequent conference, shortly thereafter, of both labor and employers, also called by Mr. Gompers, a general agreement was reached that, "Neither employers nor employees shall endeavor to take advantage of the country's necessities to change existing standards." ¹

There were strikes at various times. However, the only labor trouble which can be directly charged to opposition to the war was that stimulated shortly after our entry by the Industrial Workers of the World on parts of our Pacific Coast. This was easily dealt with. Such other strikes as occurred were not due to hostility to the war or to conscription, but were caused by the vicious circle, perhaps unavoidable in war, where the price of necessities soon jumps ahead of each increase in wages. Various boards dealt with these.

¹ B. M. Baruch, *American Industry in the War*, p. 83.

Perhaps no one had more dealings with labor under the most difficult circumstances during the war than Mr. Edward N. Hurley. It was his job to teach 350,000 men and 130 new managements how to build ships.

In summing up the labor question, he says, "I am convinced, however, that our publicity work, our reserve of shipyard volunteers, our persistent and systematic appeals to the patriotism of the workers, and our word pictures of the consequences which must ensue if ships were not forthcoming at top speed, averted more strikes than did the wage increases of the Macy Board [one of the labor adjustment boards]." ¹

The employers were not behind their employees. To quote Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, chairman of the war industries board, "There was not a slacker to be found among the industries. No one had to be coerced." ² He sums up our industrial mobilization as follows: "In insuring our victory, the importance of the battle line at home must ever be a strong factor. The mobilization of America's industrial forces and their conversion from peace and construction to war and destruction was a gigantic task and responded to in a gigantic manner." ³

The nation had not dawdled. It immediately took

¹ E. N. Hurley, *The Bridge to Francē*, p. 194.

² B. M. Baruch, *American Industry in the War*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

the necessary steps to put its man-power under arms—not a few hundred thousand at a time, dragged over a period of years, but at once. In the same way its industry was mobilized for war purposes at once, and without regard to those who, thinking of “Business as usual,” wished to make such mobilization secondary to the interests of private business.

However, despite this energy, determination, and patriotism, which produced results far beyond those thought possible by either the Germans or the Allies, there was danger that we should be unable to use this tremendous force in time to stop Hindenburg and Ludendorff from smashing their way through to victory.

This because of the lack of means to transport our millions of soldiers, and the supplies necessary to maintain them, across the Atlantic Ocean to the battle-fields of France.

When our Civil War broke out, our flag, carried by our merchant vessels, was a familiar sight in every port of the world. The record for speed in crossing the seven oceans belonged to our clipper ships. Our total tonnage was far beyond that of any other nation except Great Britain, to which it was a close second.

During our Civil War, this great overseas merchant marine was destroyed by Confederate cruisers, most of which were built in British yards and outfitted in British ports. The crushing burden of debt resulting

from the more than four years of that war was one of the primary reasons why our merchant marine was not immediately rebuilt.

As time passed and the standard of living increased in this country, that part of our merchant marine which operated along our coasts thrived because it was protected from the competition of foreign ships built and manned by cheap foreign labor. Our overseas merchant marine, however, received no such protection, and therefore, unable to compete with foreign merchant marines, did not revive.

The German General Staff had estimated that it would take us at least a year to put a maximum of 500,000 troops on the western front. This, of course, provided the transports carrying them escaped the submarines, which the Germans were quite certain would not happen.

After we had been in the war something over six months, the Allies made the same estimate as regards numbers, but thought it would take somewhat more time. The Allied conference which began sitting in Paris the last of November, 1917, and which created the Allied maritime transport council, was of the belief that a continuance of the plans we then had under way would enable us to land an army of 500,000 in Europe, and maintain it there, by the early summer of 1918.

General Pershing's clear vision of what was essential if victory was to be obtained, had made him in-

sist that European ports and land transportation should be immediately prepared—as a first step in the arrival of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe—to receive and handle a minimum of 1,000,000 troops and the supplies necessary to maintain them. He was scoffed at on the ground that he was wasting time, money, men, and material in an effort to provide something which would never be useful.

Even our ambassador to London, Mr. Walter Hines Page, joined in this. In a note he said, "It is becoming apparent that the bulk of tonnage assigned to transport the army is being used to bring over material to create the facilities for handling and supplying a projected army so large that it can probably never be landed in France—at least not in time to get into the game."¹

When General Peyton C. March came home from Europe in March, 1918, to be chief of staff, he, like General Pershing, was impregnated with the idea that above every other consideration American troops must be got to Europe if the war was to be won. He was thoroughly in accord with General Pershing's idea that a million men was the smallest unit which could be considered.

Mr. Hurley tells that General March wished to transport 250,000 men a month, but that the best estimate he could submit at the time for the transport of men, and sufficient supplies to keep them going,

¹ Frothingham, *The American Reinforcement in the World War*, p. 120.

was 125,000 per month. This resulted in the conversation in which the President said, "Hurley, we must go the limit."¹

Mr. Hurley had accepted the chairmanship of the United States Shipping Board and the presidency of the Emergency Fleet Corporation in July, 1917, at the personal request of President Wilson. He and General March promptly got to work to overcome the wide discrepancy which existed between their figures of demand and supply.

General March made the transport service a separate arm and put at its head General Frank T. Hines. The troop capacity of the transports was increased forty percent by packing the men in tighter. The total number carried was also increased by decreasing the number of days necessary for a troop-ship to make a round trip. In November and December of 1917, this time, called a "turn-around," was averaging over sixty days. This was brought down to an average of thirty-five days.² The fastest ships averaged under thirty days. In the time of the greatest emergency, the *Leviathan*, the *Mount Vernon*, and the *Kronprinzessin Cecilie* averaged twenty-seven days; the *Great Northern* and the *Northern Pacific*, twenty-five and twenty-six days, respectively, and the last two on several occasions, nineteen days.³

Also, the requirements for cargo tonnage were de-

¹ E. N. Hurley, *The Bridge to France*, p. 121.

² P. C. March, "Miracle of the First Million," *New York Times Magazine*, July 1, 1928.

³ L. P. Ayres, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary*, p. 43.

creased by reducing to the minimum the number of pounds needed to maintain each man and each horse at the front. The soldiers of the horsed artillery and supply trains will never forget the difficulties experienced in keeping their animals going, as a result of the short rations they received.

The tremendous work done by Mr. Hurley in speeding up the construction of new ships with an organization the greater part of which had not only come into existence, but received its training, since the declaration of war, is shown by the fact that by July 1, 1918, he had turned over to army uses, in round numbers, 1,125,000 dead-weight tons of ships.

Nothing shows better how much the putting of an American army on French battle-fields depended upon shipping than the fact that the size of this army had to be limited by the amount of shipping available.

The War Department had prepared three programs.

The minimum army considered essential was one of 60 divisions. Sixty American divisions were the equivalent of 140 British, not quite that many French, and something over 160 German ones. This force, with the proportional strength in army corps, army, and service of supply troops, would total 2,500,000.

The War Department would have preferred to put 100 divisions in France. This would have been the equivalent of 233 British divisions, something less than that number of French ones, and something over 266 German ones. With auxiliary troops these 100 divisions would have totaled 4,260,000 men.

Between the two was an 80-division program, totaling 3,355,000 troops, and necessary supplies.

Each of these programs was to be completed by July 31, 1919. Taking into account the shipping already afloat, and that which Mr. Hurley's unexampled work was producing, it was necessary to adopt the 80-division program.

Besides building ships, we reached out for them in every direction. Nineteen German ships and one Austrian, which had been interned in our ports, were seized. How valuable they were is shown by the fact that they transported more than 550,000 American troops overseas.

We chartered neutral ships. We traded steel and food to belligerent nations like Japan and neutral ones like Holland, in exchange for ships. We used every conceivable method to obtain ships. The Germans brought such pressure to bear on the Dutch that they were unable to carry out their agreement with us. Therefore, we exercised under international law "right of angaria." The President issued a proclamation and we seized 87 Dutch vessels, totaling more than half a million tons, which happened to be in different ports of the United States. The Dutch crews and owners were fully compensated.

We chartered ships from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and France. The winter of 1917-18 the British chartered to us the Olympic, Aquitania, and Mauretania, three of their ships with the greatest

troop-carrying capacity, which had been laid up in their ports. While they were operated by their owners, the United States assumed all risks.

We combed the world for ships. We established a tremendous shipbuilding industry, and launched ships on a scale such as the world had never seen, or probably dreamed of. Despite this, had it not been for the possession of our coastwise merchant marine, we could not have avoided failure.

Had we, in the period between the Civil War and the Great War, neglected it in the same way that we did our overseas shipping, and, as a consequence, been dependent upon foreign ships, we could not possibly have got a large force of American troops on French battle-fields in time.

If we had been able to keep Hindenburg and Ludendorff from attacking until our program of shipbuilding had progressed far enough to take over our 80 divisions, this overwhelming force, added to that of the Allies, not only would have prevented any further attacks by the Germans, but would have meant their decisive defeat, with complete victory for our side.

However, not allowing us to do this was the very basis of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff plans for German victory.

Thus, when they made the first of their great attacks on the front in France in March, 1918, practically destroying the Fifth British Army and threatening to separate entirely the British from the French, we did

not have the shipping available to move the troops immediately needed.

Britain had the ships. However, up to this time she had not realized the necessity to organize shipping "so as to serve military rather than economic purposes." Also, she was possibly influenced by the fear "that any sacrifice of shipping to serve an inter-Allied purpose might, after the war, lead to the loss of some previously long enjoyed national economic advantages."¹

The British offered to supply the ships, provided we allowed one American battalion of infantry to be incorporated in each British brigade of infantry, thus raising it from its strength at that time of three battalions to its former strength of four.

This effort on their part to use our troops for replacements in their army led to the famous conference in London, in which they sprang on General Pershing a cable from their Washington ambassador, Lord Reading, saying that the American government had agreed to this plan.

However, President Wilson backed General Pershing in his refusal to agree to any such scheme, inevitably delaying, if not entirely preventing, the formation of an American army. The result was an agreement by which British ships were furnished to bring over the infantry and machine gunners of seven divisions in May and six divisions in June, with the

¹ E. N. Hurley, *The Bridge to France*, p. 196.

understanding that these troops would go immediately to the help of the British, but that General Pershing could withdraw them when he believed them necessary to form the American army. We were to, and subsequently did, pay for the use of these ships as transports.

As a result, the number of our troops transported in May was practically double that in April. By the first of July, 1,000,000 American soldiers had been embarked. The number for July exceeded all previous monthly totals, being more than 306,000. Before the end of October, the second million of our troops had sailed from our shores. During many summer weeks the number carried was more than 10,000 a day. During July, the total landed every day of the month averaged more than 10,000.

No such movement of troops had ever before been planned, much less taken place. In fact, no such transportation by water, for such a distance, and in such a period of time, of such a large number of human beings had ever before occurred.¹

Of all soldiers sent overseas, forty-nine percent were transported in British ships, forty-five percent in American, three percent in Italian, two percent in French, and one percent in Russian ships. Of over 900,000 transported in the American troop-ships safeguarded by our own navy not a single man was lost by an enemy act.

The part of our navy in this war was not a spec-

¹ L. P. Ayres, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary*, p. 36.

tacular one. This was due to the fact that our battle fleet and that of Britain together were so much stronger than Germany's that it was hopeless for the latter to engage them in battle.

However, our navy played a decisive rôle.

At the time we entered the war, the submarines had sunk a total tonnage to date and were rapidly increasing their monthly totals to an extent that justified the German General Staff in its belief that, even if we raised an army, we could never get it to European battle-fields.

From January to April, 1917, inclusive, they sank 2,000,000 tons. During the month of April, 1917, alone, they sank 800,000 tons. This was twice as much as the total sunk by them from the beginning of the war until January 1, 1917.

The 25,000 officers and men sent abroad by the navy, outside of one of our battleship divisions with the British grand fleet, devoted themselves primarily to the suppression of submarines.

To our navy belongs the credit for a number of moves which were the primary factor in overcoming this submarine menace. They themselves used, and also persuaded the British to use, a convoy system for troop and cargo ships. By this system, instead of single ships attempting to pass through the submarine zone, as had been the case, groups of ships were assembled at ports and sailed together, being escorted through submarine zones by navy vessels.

Our navy brought into use an American device which enabled surface vessels to determine the position of submarines by listening under water to sounds made by them.

They proposed, though the British at first considered it impractical, to put a barrage of mines from Scotland to Norway, all the way across the northern part of the North Sea. The British had practically denied the English Channel to submarines coming out of German ports to seek their prey. They, therefore, had to take the northern route between Norway and Scotland, and thence around Scotland into the Atlantic. The thing to do was to block this second opening.

The Americans persuaded the British it could be done. Sixty-nine thousand submarine mines were laid in several lines across the 240-miles-wide northern entrance to the North Sea. The British laid 13,000 of these. Our navy laid 56,000.

The success of these new methods, in addition to the British efforts, was shown by a steady falling off in the number of ships sunk by the submarines. They also brought about a constantly increasing loss among the submarines. There is reason to believe that at least 200 German submarines—with their crews of 5,000—were sunk.

This decrease in sinkings by submarines, plus the steady increase in the number of new ships built by this country, made the output of new tonnage equal the loss of old by the beginning of July, 1918.

Thus, by the middle of that same July, when Hindenburg and Ludendorff launched their last great assault—the one from Château-Thierry in the west almost to the Argonne Forest in the east—the opening act of the second battle of the Marne, one of the decisive battles of the world because it changed forever the tide of German victory to defeat—there was a reenforcement of more than 1,000,000 American troops in France. Of these, 700,000 were in the line or in local reserve.

The dusty white chalk plains of the Champagne glowing in the hot July sun, the rolling poppy-sprinkled grain fields interspersed with deep green woods of the watersheds and valleys of the historic Marne, Ourcq, Vesle, and Aisne rivers, liberally scattered with the dead of far-off America among the blue-clad dead, natives of the soil on which they lay, showed America had won its race with Hindenburg.

Chapter VII

FOCH AND PERSHING FINALLY GET THEIR WAY

WHY was it that the Germans from the very beginning of the war in August, 1914, more than held their own for nearly four years before, in July, 1918, the tide could be turned against them?

It did not take General Pershing long to find the answer to that question, soon after his arrival in Europe led to his entry into the inner circles of Allied leadership.

There was a lack of determination to unite all the resources of the Allies under a single plan for the sole purpose of beating the German army, thus gaining victory.

Divergent interests created a scattered, uncoordinated effort, which the Germans had taken advantage of.

The certainty that our man-power, instead of being used to the maximum to beat the German army, would be wasted in the divergent, uncoordinated Allied efforts, was one of General Pershing's principal reasons for insisting upon the formation of an American army, instead of allowing the Allies to use our men.

The then General Foch was working hard to con-

The prevalent idea that there were no great generals in this war, as there were in past ones, is wrong. There were such generals.

However, the huge size of modern armies caused them to work in altitudes beyond the vision of the mass of their armies. The day of armies small enough for the commanding general sitting on a horse to see his whole army, and be seen by it, has long since passed. Coupled with this is a rigid censorship never before known which has kept the public at home in darkness.

The more facts come out, the more certain it is that Marshal Foch's clear grasp of the situation, of the remedies needed to correct it, and his success in applying them, once he was given the power, will enshrine him in history among the great military leaders who preceded him.

Recently the marshal, in response to a request from me as to his view, after ten years, on this lack of Allied unity, replied:

"History shows that coalitions have many weaknesses, even when they have large military forces. One of their greatest weaknesses is the lack of real leadership. The greater the number of nations included, and the more they are scattered geographically, the more this weakness shows.

"The Great War of 1914-18, in this respect, confirmed the lessons of history.

"This was true, even on the side of the Central Powers, for a considerable time in the first part of

the war. Neither side had taken steps before the war to overcome this grave defect when war broke out.

"What was done on the side of the Allies during the war was done only because the pressure of events made it absolutely necessary. During the first three years of the war, while the Allies lacked many things in the way of war munitions, they had on practically every front a larger force than did the Central Powers. These larger forces enabled them to stop the enemy without suffering too much damage, even though their forces were scattered in the different theaters of war, and were not under a single command.

"However, with their numerical superiority, they would have gained much more than this if all their armies had been united under one command, looking at the picture as a whole, and deciding what to do from this broad point of view.

"Some of the military chiefs were well aware of this grave defect in Allied leadership. In an endeavor to limit its evils as much as possible, the various commanders-in-chief of the different Allied armies held conferences from time to time. The idea was that this way they could arrange a general plan and agree what part the army of each would take in it.

"However, as useful as these conferences were, they could not replace a single command which would be in touch with the situation at all times, and could issue orders accordingly.

"The governments of the different Allied countries

were much more backward in realizing this situation than were the military chiefs. They had not always seen the necessity to organize to handle the general direction of the war. The result was that the efforts of the Allies were uncoordinated, even when not divergent.

"It took nothing less than the terrible defeat of the Italians in the battle of Caporetto, in October, 1917, the first result of Russia's dropping out of the war, to make the Allied governments create a common war organization. This organization was the Versailles Superior War Council.

"There was no doubt about the situation. Freed from attack by Russia, the German armies were concentrating practically their whole force on the western front. This gave them a superiority on this front of approximately thirty divisions, plus a formidable artillery. They were certain to have this superiority until enough American divisions had arrived, first, to make up for it, and then to give the Allies the superiority. These divisions after their arrival had still to complete their organizations by getting horses, carriages, matériel of all sorts, and a large part of their armament and munitions.

"During the weeks, or even months, which must roll by between the beginning of the expected German offensive and the entry in line of the American forces, the Allies, despite their numerical inferiority, simply had to hold, no matter what the cost.

"Aside from the courage of their troops, there was only one chance of safety left. That was to organize a strong general reserve, capable of being used immediately, from the North Sea to the Adriatic, to help any one of the Allied armies attacked by the Germans.

"However, such a reserve could be formed only if each of the Allied armies gave troops toward it. No one army was strong enough to do it alone.

"Also, it must be entirely separate from the reserve which each army kept for its own particular use. Otherwise, when the troops promised by some particular army were asked for, it would be found they had already been used up for some purpose of its own.

"Above all, this general reserve must be under a supreme command, independent of the commander-in-chief of each of the different armies. This because each commander-in-chief, influenced by the enemy's activities against his army, is not as capable as is such a chief of judging the situation as a whole and making a decision which is to the best interests of all the armies concerned.

"Finally, the Allied governments saw the necessity for an independent general reserve. The 2nd of February, 1918, they agreed to make it. However, they were still unwilling to go the whole way. Instead of putting this reserve under a single chief, they put it under an executive committee, composed of four Allied generals. This was a timid solution. However, this was some progress in the right direction.

"Unfortunately, the various governments did not have the strength necessary to overcome the opposition to this plan, with the result that, faced with difficulties in its execution, they abandoned the project. After a while there was not even a question of forming a general reserve.

"Therefore, the committee, which should have controlled it, found itself without a reason for existence.

"After several months had slipped by, the lesson of the Italian defeat was forgotten. At a meeting, the 14th and 15th of March, in London, this prudent plan for a general reserve was side-tracked, despite vain efforts made to convince the governments of the grave responsibilities which they ran.

"Several days later, on the 21st of March, the German attack on the British front brutally exposed the false security in which the Allies were resting, and clearly revealed to them the greatness of their peril.

"The time for hesitancy had passed. A radical solution was demanded—the immediate institution of a supreme command for the coalition. Such was the purpose of the agreement at Doullens the 26th of March, completed and made formal at Beauvais the 3rd of April, 1918.

"Supreme command!

"It is necessary really to understand what was meant by this expression. Too often it has been used in an absolute sense, which is erroneous. What was agreed to was not command in the ordinary military

sense of the word, as practiced in the different armies of the world. With such different armies as the Allied ones, no such simple method would work.

"The supreme command, in this case, meant that the commander-in-chief of the Allied armies pursued a course which secured a coordinated effort of the forces under his orders. This could only be done, provided the various governments, the various Allied commanders-in-chief, and their soldiers gave their confidence to the supreme commander-in-chief.

"This confidence was wholly given him in 1918."

The then General Foch was appointed to supreme control of the Allied armies in France at a conference at Doullens March 26, 1918.

Five days before, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had made the first of the great assaults in 1918, by which they expected to gain a victory for Germany. In a tremendous blow against the Fifth British Army, which ultimately destroyed that army, and was the beginning of the greatest defeat in British military history, they drove over the existing lines far west in the direction of Amiens, separating the French from the British.

The Doullens conference had been hurriedly called to see what steps could be taken in the face of this tremendous defeat. There were present, the French president, Mr. Poincaré; Mr. Lloyd George, premier of Great Britain; Lord Milner, the British minister of war; General Sir Henry Wilson, chief of the British

Imperial General Staff; Marshal Haig, the British commander-in-chief; Mr. Clemenceau, premier of France, and General Pétain, the French commander-in-chief.

General Foch, having given his views, was walking up and down with some of his staff in front of the city hall, where the conference was held, when Mr. Clemenceau, the French premier, came out, rushed up to him and said, "You have got the place you wanted."

Foch replied, with evident anger, "What do you mean, Mr. Prime Minister? You give me a lost battle and ask me to win it. I consent, and you think you are making me a present. I am disregarding myself entirely in accepting it."

General Foch's anger was justified. For months he had been predicting just what had happened—a heavy blow from the Germans, with the Allies unprepared to strike back. For months he had argued that the only way in which this expected, and greatly feared, German blow could be met was to have a central reserve. With such a reserve ready to move instantly, because not in the line, and in a central position, a strong counter-attack could immediately be made.

When a great assault drives way into a line, it makes a deep salient, both sides of which are weak. Therefore, both flanks of the assaulting force are open to attack.

Foch's plan was that when Hindenburg and Ludendorff had driven such a salient, he would at once strike with his central reserve—and strike hard—on one of

their weak flanks, thus giving them the choice of withdrawing or being cut off.

Here, the last of March, was the situation exactly as he had foreseen and predicted it! The means, and the only means of effectually meeting it—a central reserve—was lacking!

At the same time, the people who had refused to listen to his advocacy of such a reserve, and who were now face to face with defeat as a consequence, turned the situation over to him to solve.

He neither hesitated nor feared to accept the grave responsibility of a situation fraught with every possibility of defeat for his country, as well as the chance that history might hold him responsible.

He had not hesitated when in command of the Twentieth Corps, in the dark days following the battle of Morhange in August, 1914—when the French forces were being driven back into Lorraine—to stop where he was on the hills protecting Nancy, and grimly to hold on.

He had not hesitated when in command of the Ninth Army Corps, in the first battle of the Marne, to order an attack at the blackest moment when the troops on both sides of him were being driven back.

He had not hesitated during the first battle of Ypres, when Sir John French, the British commander, was persuaded that only retreat was possible, to urge him to stand where he was and to throw in to his help all French troops within reach.

What made him angry, and justly, was to have the very people who had created this terrible situation by their refusal to follow his advice, ask him to solve it as if they were giving him a present.

The first blow struck by the Central Powers, as the result of the reenforcement of their front from the North Sea to the Adriatic by the troops freed when Russia dropped out of the war, was against the Italians in November, 1917.

This blow cost the Italians 37,000 killed, 91,000 wounded, 335,000 prisoners, and 3,000 guns, almost half their artillery.

Fear that this might lead Italy to drop out of the war, coupled with the necessity to give her immediate help, so demonstrated the danger resulting from having no central controlling body that the Allies at a conference at Rapallo November 7, 1917, decided to establish the Supreme War Council.

This war council was not purely a military body, but was a body made up of the premiers of the different nations, who could speak with authority on the general policies their governments would follow. Each of them had attached to him military members who could work out the military plans needed to carry out any policy decided upon.

In other words, for the first time since the beginning of the war in August, 1914, the Allies had a central body to plan and carry out a definite policy to beat the Central Powers. Its civilian members, being the

premiers of their nations, had the political power necessary to insure each doing its part. Its military members provided the professional knowledge essential to work out the military plans necessary to put the general policy in effect on the battle-field.

This was an excellent move in the direction of the appointment of a single commander-in-chief for the Allied armies. However, the Supreme War Council soon found itself beset with many difficulties in its attempts to secure unity of purpose and of action.

General Sir Henry Wilson was appointed the British military representative. General Foch was appointed as the French military representative. They both believed the establishment of a central reserve essential. The fact that both the French and the British armies were falling off in their strength, as the result of lacking replacements to make good casualties, made the formation of at least a small central reserve all the more important. This for the reason that had both these armies been well over strength each would have had a considerable reserve in no way tangled up with the line. Because of this freedom from entanglement, such reserves could quickly be ordered to any danger spot.

The absence of such reserves, in any considerable quantity, back of both French and British lines meant that when a reserve was needed time had to be taken to have some divisions take over more line, in order to permit others to be withdrawn.

Nothing is more important in determining the success or failure of a counter-attack than time. Made at the psychological moment when the enemy flushed with victory is more or less in the confusion which it brings, and has not yet had time to organize the protection of his flanks, a counter-attack carries all before it, thus leading to great success.

On the other hand, once sufficient time has elapsed to allow the enemy to straighten out his victorious troops and reorganize the protection of his flanks, the counter-attack only bumps up against a well-prepared position, with the usual consequence that it is stopped with bloody losses.

Neither Marshal Haig nor General Pétain was anxious to give up divisions to form a central reserve. Each was inclined to believe that should his force have to face the next German attack it would be in grave difficulties due to lack of man-power.

General Pétain, apparently, still believed that the British were not holding a length of line—by comparison with that held by the French—in proportion to the relative strength of the two armies. This even though the British had agreed to, and were taking over some of the French line.

Marshal Haig, backed by the imperial chief of staff, General Robertson, believed that conscription should be put in force and the army in the field brought up to its former strength, before any further demands should be made upon it.

As the result of an inquiry as to how many divisions each army would give toward the formation of a central reserve, General Pétain replied, eight; General Diaz, commanding the Italian army, six, and Marshal Haig, none.¹

The upshot of the matter was a series of discussions which developed a great deal of friction between the various generals and statesmen. This friction came to a head at a conference in London March 14 and 15, at which no adequate decision was reached. Marshal Foch protested, but without effect.

Six days later, on March 21, began the German attack, which more than justified his position.

The German use of the central reserve principle, and the failure of the Allies to have it, was the primary reason why the Germans, far from having been beaten to date, were still on the offensive. They habitually reduced the number of divisions defending each front to the minimum they considered reasonably safe. This permitted them to concentrate the maximum number of divisions where the principal and most important fighting was taking place.

For years prior to the war, they had carefully developed their railway system, not only from the point of view of the demands of peace, but also from that of the strategic necessities of war. Thus, they were

¹ Sir C. E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*, Vol. II, pp. 67-68.

always able quickly to concentrate the maximum number of troops where they were most needed.

One section of the French General Staff has prepared a series of graphic tables showing the movements of German divisions from one front to another during the war. It is not necessary to read the texts which accompany them to see what happened. Merely turning over the leaves quickly produces the effect of a moving picture, showing the divisions flocking from all directions to each front, in turn, as the Germans took the offensive or defensive in the war's great battles.

With the exception of the campaign ending in the victory of the first battle of the Marne, the Allied strategy could not compare with that of the Germans.

"Papa" Joffre won the first Marne campaign by brilliant strategy. Like every other Frenchman, his heart was torn to see vast stretches of French soil abandoned to the enemy. The occupation of Paris by German troops would have been to him a profanation. Despite this, despite abuse, he kept his mind rigidly fixed on one thing—so to maneuver the French army that the German plan to force it to fight in a bad position, turning first its left flank and then its rear, thus forcing its surrender, would fail. Had he not had the great moral courage to retreat to the Marne; had he not been ready to go as far back as the Seine, if necessary; had he thought only of protecting French soil, French villages, French towns, and finally Paris, the German plan would have succeeded.

The French army would have been out in the first round. The Germans would have been free to turn their attention to putting out Russia, before the two years needed for unprepared Britain to get ready would have passed.

The success of their 1915 campaign against Russia shows that had they had their whole army available they would have disposed of her in less than this time, and thereby won the war.

With this single exception of Marshal Joffre's brilliant campaign of the first Marne, the Allied strategy had been based on the simple idea of using their much greater resources and geographical position almost surrounding the Central Powers, to crush them by a contracting ring of steel.

They had a population of 300,000,000 whites, and nearly 400,000,000 of other colors, as against 115,000,000 on the side of the Central Powers. They controlled the seven seas, and therefore had available the resources of the world. The Central Powers were blockaded and thus were limited to the meager resources of their 1,207,661 square miles of territory. Therefore, the Allies thought all they had to do was to march on Germany from all sides at once and crush her.

They forgot that similar plans to crush France when Napoleon I led her armies, again and again failed. They forgot that the Allies of his day only succeeded in suppressing that great military genius

when France, bled to death by a quarter of a century of whipping all Europe, could no longer supply him with the men he needed for combat.

Napoleon's method was to move out quickly from his central position, with the greater part of his force, and smash one of his enemies before the others could close in on him. He would then turn on another and polish him off before the rest could arrive to help. As he was in the center, he could move in any direction. His enemies, being in a ring around him, could only move toward its center. As he did not wait for them to close in, but struck first, they never knew which one would receive the blow. As he moved faster than they did, he frequently struck the one least expecting it.

One of the best examples was his campaign of 1804-1805. At the opening of it he had his army concentrated on the English Channel, preparing to invade England. The Austrians and Russians marched on him from the east. Before the Austrians realized that he was anywhere near, he had marched his army from the English Channel across France, across the Rhine and into Bavaria. He so surprised them that with but little difficulty he surrounded General Mack at Ulm and compelled the surrender of his army. He then moved quickly across Bavaria into Austria and decisively defeated a large Austrian and Russian force at the great battle of Austerlitz.

In 1915, in 1916, and again in 1917, the German

by the use of this same principle had three times upset the Allied plans for a concentric general attack to crush the Central Powers.

While the Germans failed in the first Marne battle in 1914, and again in the attack on Verdun in 1916, in each case it was the Germans who struck first, and where they saw fit, and the Allies who had to follow the German movements, stopping them as best they could.

General Pershing from shortly after his arrival in Europe, could not help seeing that the lack of unity of command and of purpose inevitably meant grave chances of the Allies' being defeated.

It was his duty, both in his position as American commanding general and in obedience to his instructions, to make the best use of the American troops to prevent any such defeat.

Putting aside national self-respect, which demanded that we have an American army under the American flag, and forgetting that while each of our Allies wanted our troops for replacements, neither was willing to put its forces under a commander-in-chief from the army of the other, General Pershing had to decide what was the best thing to do.

With the mounting tide of the German force in France, due to the steady flow of German divisions from the former Russian front, there was no doubt that victory or defeat hinged on man-power.

With the man-power of France exhausted, the rest

of Britain's not available because of the lack of full-fledged conscription, and Italy asking for help, America must furnish that man-power.

She was furnishing it. The question was, what was the best way to use it to prevent defeat and bring victory.

The Allies said, pour it into their armies, which war-hardened, and under war-experienced staffs and generals, could put it to the maximum use.

However, General Pershing and the rest of our officers, who had been in Europe long enough to know these armies, had come to certain definite conclusions as to what would happen should this be done.

In the first place, both the French and British armies were trained primarily for trench or siege warfare.

The German forces opposite them were trained, and were being still further trained, for warfare in the open, or a war of movement.

The French army had entered the war highly trained for warfare in the open and imbued with the idea of movement as a means of taking and keeping the offensive, the only way to whip an enemy.

However, four years of heavy loss incurred in hard, grueling fighting had killed or disabled a large proportion of the splendid corps of officers with which the war was started. A large proportion of the men who filled the vacancies had only experienced, and been trained in, trench or siege warfare.

The British regular army had started the war excellently trained for warfare in the open, and imbued with the spirit of the offensive. The officers of the territorials had been similarly taught. However, the regulars and territorials were of such relatively small numbers that they were swamped in the large war army brought into existence by Lord Kitchener.

This army's first experience was in the trenches. As it grew in size, it was more and more trained primarily for trench fighting. As haste in putting new troops in the field was essential, the system of training became similar in principle to that used by Ford when he makes his cars.

Groups of men and officers were trained almost exclusively for certain parts. When trained for these parts, they were joined to other groups, each similarly trained exclusively for some one part. In this way the regiments, brigades, and divisions were fitted together and sent to the front.

There can be no doubt that such a system produces quick results, and works reasonably well as long as the job faced by the whole remains the same. However, when the job to be done changes as materially as from trench to open warfare, the lack of elasticity in such a system immediately produces undesirable results.

There can be no question that many French and British officers, particularly those who had been in these armies prior to 1914, believed that training for

open warfare should be had. Some efforts were made in this direction. However, the difficulties to be overcome were too great. The wear and tear of a number of years' war and the fact that trench warfare was the only kind the majority of officers and men had experienced or believed possible, prevented such efforts from becoming widespread enough to produce material results.

Our new army, while taught the elements of trench warfare, was primarily trained for open warfare. Thus, it was ready for the kind of warfare for which the Germans were preparing and which they were soon to introduce by smashing through the British trench system in March, and the French one in May, into the open country beyond.

Thus introducing our men as replacements in the British and French armies, while bettering their instruction in trench warfare, would add nothing to their training for open warfare.

Furthermore, finding that veteran French and British troops were trained only for trench warfare would weaken the confidence of our young inexperienced troops in the value of the training they had received; this, unknown to them, was soon to stand them in good stead in their first big battles, which, with the exception of a division here and there, were all to be in the open. From a strategical point of view, the use to which they probably would be put was even less desirable than the tactical.

Tactical training in trench warfare, instead of open, would hinder their success, but would not be necessarily fatal.

A strategical use of our man-power which would exhaust it in fighting that could not bring a decisive victory would be fatal.

The constant tendency of Mr. Lloyd George to seek an easier way of winning the war than whipping the German army in France had led to using British troops, badly needed by Marshal Sir Douglas Haig in France, in other theaters of war.

As a consequence, pouring our man-power into the British army very possibly would result in an equal number of British troops being withdrawn from France and used in the Balkans, Palestine, or Mesopotamia, all theaters of war in which desirable territory might be occupied, but in no one of which the German army could be decisively beaten.

Such a use of our man-power would not add to the total Allied strength in France, which every trained soldier knew was the only theater of war in which the German army could be beaten.

Also, the British strategy in France was not based on the principle of disregarding territory gained or lost, and thinking only of so maneuvering as to whip the German army in accordance with the strategical principle by which "Papa" Joffre won the first battle of the Marne.

It was based on the traditional British policy of

keeping the enemy from occupying the English Channel ports and the country to their east.

Since England has been a nation her troops have fought in the Low Countries with this object. The Spanish and the French were their opponents in the past. This time, it was the Germans.

Starting with London as a center, the closest line of defense is the country just around outside. The next one, farther out, is the British seacoast along the Channel. The next one, always considered their first line of defense by the British strategists, is on the continent of Europe in Belgium and northern France.

In a German attack against England alone, the building up and holding of such a line would be all right. Even then, the best way to keep the Germans from invading England would be to whip the German army wherever it might be.

However, with a French and a Russian army—each bigger than the British army—to be faced, the Germans could not think of invading England.

In this case, tying the British army to the Channel ports was bad strategy. This because it meant that the British forces in France, instead of operating anywhere the military situation showed to be vital to Allied success, were tied down to the territory along the Channel.

It also meant that the much larger French army could be free to move, in cases where the heavy fight-

ing was not in the north, only by taking the risk of leaving a gap between itself and the British. Not a complete gap, but a thinly held line, between the British and French, in March, 1918, gave Hindenburg and Ludendorff the opportunity which they promptly seized, with almost fatal results to the Allies.

This strategy had the same effect as would result from tying a prize fighter to his corner by a short piece of rope, instead of leaving him free to move as he thinks best to beat his opponent.

Whenever an army fights to defend ground, or to capture ground, rather than to beat the enemy's army wherever it may be, both sides soon sink into a mass of trenches.

The trench warfare in the last war was only the siege warfare of past wars conducted on a greater scale. Siege warfare has always been bloody. Siege warfare has never led to decisive results, because the capture of a piece of ground, or one or more cities, never decided a war. The very gallantry and determination of the British troops increased the bloodiness of the siege warfare they carried on, year after year, in northern France.

When a large price in blood is paid, and victory is not obtained, statesmen, and too often the public as well, inevitably condemn the generals. The longer the bloody siege warfare continued in northern France, the more the British statesmen criticized the British generals.

Whatever may have been their shortcomings, to have expected them with hastily raised armies to beat, and that quickly, probably the best prepared army the world has ever seen—that of Germany—was both unfair and tragic.

Military history is going to give them great credit for the way in which they organized, trained, and determinedly fought, despite every discouragement, a large war army raised from an unprepared people.

It is too soon after the event to say who was responsible for this unduly bloody siege warfare, year after year, in northern France.

It may have been the statesmen, whose idea of an army defending anything is to have the army sit down in a defensive position in front of it.

It may have been some of the British admiralty, which attached great importance to holding the French Channel ports not in German hands, and to the capture of those Belgian ones held by the Germans.

It is true that these ports were valuable as submarine bases. However, to tie down large armies in war time to the protection or capture of navy bases is as good strategy as to detail the infantry of an army to guard the forage and supply bases of the cavalry, or to use it to capture those of the enemy's cavalry.

The cavalry, by its success or failure in beating the enemy's cavalry, determines whether an army crosses the land frontier of an enemy to fight on the enemy's soil or has to fight on its own.

A navy, by its success or failure in beating the enemy's navy, determines whether an army crosses a sea to fight on enemy territory, or fights on its own when the enemy's army comes over the same sea.

Great admirals like Nelson never worried about using the army to protect their own or capture enemy navy bases. They sought and whipped the enemy's fleet, and then said to their own army, "Now you can go wherever necessary to beat the enemy army and thus win the war."

Whoever was responsible, the result was that the British army in France was tied down to a strategy which could not produce decisive victory and might invite defeat.

Thus, leaving aside every question other than the best tactics and strategy to avoid defeat and give the maximum chances for victory, it was General Pershing's duty to prevent our troops from being absorbed into the armies of the Allies.

However, when the great crisis came, and the first Hindenburg-Ludendorff assault was smashing its way through the Fifth British Army, and separating the British from the French, Pershing did not let the belief that an American army was essential to ultimate success cause him to hesitate to offer our troops in any way in which they might be useful.

This offer to General Foch, just appointed by the Doullens conference to supreme control of the Allied armies in France, was made immediately in writing

and then in person as quickly as General Pershing could get to General Foch's headquarters.

It was this offer¹ which Marshal Foch, speaking at the banquet given by the Anciens Combattants de France to the American Legion in Paris in the summer of 1927, characterized as the most generous ever made by any general in history.

Furthermore, the American troops, because of General Pershing's foresight, were prepared to engage in that open warfare forced on the Allies by the Germans' breaking completely through the trench system into the country behind.

General Foch's first efforts, as soon as he assumed control, were to stop the victorious German advance. There being no organized central reserve, he had to take, besides the few French divisions in reserve back of that army, other French divisions out of the line. Before the Germans were stopped, he had taken twenty-five percent of the French divisions out of other parts of the line and brought them north to help the British. By the time the last of them arrived, forty divisions, or nearly one-half of the French army, had been put in this tremendous battle, stretching from north of Paris to Belgium.

The First and Second American divisions were also brought around north of Paris, the First being put in the line at Cantigny and the Second in reserve. Other American divisions were rushed to replace the

¹ See Prologue, p. 1.

French ones withdrawn from the trenches to be sent to this battle.

As soon as this battle, resulting from the first of the great Hindenburg-Ludendorff offensives in 1918, was over, General Foch proceeded to gather divisions to form a central reserve.

His idea was to gather this reserve in the country north and east of Paris. Thus, if the Germans again struck the British, making a still deeper salient toward the west, the reserve would be in a position to strike on its southern flank. On the other hand, if the Germans attacked the French, driving a salient toward the south, this reserve would be in a position to strike on its west flank.

Unfortunately, General Foch, while titular commander-in-chief of the Allied armies in France—except the Belgian one—did not have the authority to order troops of any of the armies wherever he saw fit.

In exchange for the French help sent him, Marshal Haig had allowed four exhausted British divisions to be put in the French line between the Chemin-des-Dames and Rheims, to replace French divisions sent north. However, he was averse to allowing any more divisions to go beyond his immediate control.

General Pétain, expecting the next Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack to be made against him, was greatly worried about the strength of his line, almost half his force having been used to help the British against the first, or March, Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack.

The result was that when Hindenburg and Ludendorff made their second great attack—this time in May against the French front, along the Chemin-des-Dames and from there to Rheims—General Foch did not have a strong enough central reserve to strike the German western flank.

He had only a few French and American divisions. As the Germans drove south, sweeping the French and the four British divisions before them, making a deep salient which reached to the Marne River, they left a long exposed western flank.

Had General Foch then possessed the central reserve he had so long struggled for, of sufficient strength, he would have immediately struck this flank and undoubtedly turned a German victory into a German defeat. The few French and American divisions he had available were insufficient.

Our Third Division was rushed to the south bank of the Marne to stop the Germans from crossing that river at Château-Thierry, which it did. Our Second Division was rushed out along the Paris-Château-Thierry highway north to the Marne to stop the Germans from moving farther west, which it did.

After this second lesson of the danger of not having a central reserve, General Foch again endeavored to form one. He asked the British for four infantry divisions and later, as the evidence increased that the third Hindenburg-Ludendorff assault would again be against the French, for eight. He got four. Two others

were moved to the southern part of the British line. At the time, Marshal Haig had the infantry of five American divisions, in strength more than the infantry of ten British ones.

Six American divisions—the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-eighth, the equivalent of twelve French, or thirteen British, divisions—were in place ready to strike, or had reached the locality where General Foch was assembling his central reserve. Other American divisions had replaced French divisions in other parts of the line, thus freeing these veterans for use in reserve.

Thus, when the third great Hindenburg-Ludendorff assault was made on July 15 and 16, 1918, the presence in France on the line, or in reserve, of 700,000 combat American troops gave General Foch the opportunity, for the first time, to form the central reserve, for which he had so long battled.

Early the morning of the 18th of July, he used this central reserve to strike a tremendous blow against the western flank of the German salient which reached to the Marne. This blow, relentlessly continued day after day, shoved its way eastward into the German salient to such an extent that finally Hindenburg had to give the order for the withdrawal of the German troops.

This blow was the beginning of the second, or offensive, phase, which coupled with the preceding defensive against the third great assault of Hindenburg

and Ludendorff, made up the second battle of the Marne. [31]

This battle was not only a victory, but one of the decisive ones in the history of the world, because it turned the heretofore mounting tide of German victory to defeat.

This battle proved conclusively the soundness of General Foch's strategical views. It proved, by the success of our divisions fighting in the open, the soundness of General Pershing's tactical views. It proved the soundness of his strategical views, because our troops were available when General Foch most needed them, which they would not have been had they been scattered as replacements throughout the French and British armies.

General Foch was rewarded by being made a marshal of France. General Pershing was rewarded by being given the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, the highest possible French decoration. Also, Marshal Foch agreed to the immediate formation of an American army under its own commander-in-chief.

Chapter VIII

THE DECISIVE DAY OF THE WAR

DURING the spring and early summer of 1918 the Allies were on the defensive quivering under smashing German blows, which drove them back with tremendous losses.

In the fall of 1918, the Germans were on the defensive, being driven by Allied blows sullenly back toward Germany.


Somewhere between these two periods was a day when the Germans passing from one victory to another, certain that their goal of a German dictated peace was just ahead of them, were stopped in their course. Not only stopped, but stopped so thoroughly that they never again took the offensive.

Which day was that decisive day of the War?

What part, if any, did we play in making it so?

General Ludendorff says that the 8th of August was the black day of the war for him. This because on this day the German troops did not resist a British and French attack with the same stubbornness they had always displayed up to this date. They gave way too easily and surrendered in large numbers.

Those, and they are many, who insist that we only



Front line July 15.

Ground gained by Germans July 15-18.

*Where General Gouraud pulled his infantry back.
American infantry divisions.*

THE MARNE DIPPER ATTACK OF JULY 15

arrived on the battle-fields of France in time to hasten the already certain German defeat, always quote Ludendorff's black day.

They say that the German army had been steadily deteriorating for years; they say that the crumbling of the German troops on the 8th of August proves it was this long deterioration and not a decisive battle which led to German defeat.

Their opponents claim that the tide of German victory was stopped on the chalk plains of Champagne the 15th and 16th of July, when, for the first time, a grand Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack was abruptly stopped with a bloody repulse.

In March, Hindenburg and Ludendorff with their reenforcement of fifty divisions, 650,000 men, brought from the Russian front, had heavily attacked the British.

The British Fifth Army of approximately 200,000 was practically wiped out of existence—killed, wounded, captured, dispersed! It was the greatest defeat in British military history!

The fighting spread northward.

During March and April this great battle cost the British at least 200,000 killed, wounded and captured.

Added to this enormous Allied loss was the weakened effect on the French army because of the help they gave the British. First, the hole made in the line between the British and French by the defeat of the Fifth Army had to be filled up. Second, reenforce-

ments had to be sent to the north, where the Germans were savagely attacking the British.

The French sent a total of forty divisions with a large force of cavalry and additional artillery—about 750,000 men, or nearly one-half of the fighting strength of their army. To do this twenty-five percent of their divisions along the rest of the front had to be taken out. Thus, besides heavy battle casualties the greater part of their line was so thinned out as to be very weak.

May 27, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, taking advantage of this weakness, started their second great attack. They chose the part of the line along the Chemin-des-Dames famous for General Nivelle's bloody failure to break through in the spring of 1917, and from its eastern end to Rheims dominated by the tower of its ruined cathedral. This part of the line was thinly held by French divisions and some British divisions sent there to rest after the March fighting.

The total force used by the Germans was 500,000 men with 4,000 pieces of artillery.

The attack swept over everything. With the remnants of the original defenders it drove French division after division, hurried to reenforce the line, before it. By June 3, as the last little wavelets of a rising tide reach their highest point on the beach, the most advanced German troops came to rest on the Marne River between Château-Thierry and Dormans.

When would the next great blow come? Could the

Allies stop it? Or would it drive everything before it as the first parts of the March and May attacks? This time, because of the heavy Allied losses from these two attacks, and the consequent lack of Allied reserves, would it crash through, ending the war in Germany's favor?

On March 21, when the first German attack began, there were 197 German divisions in France.

By the end of May 11, there were 208, a force of more than 2,500,000 men.

The French and British had different opinions as to where the blow would fall. The same had been true before the March attack. In both cases, the British were sure it would be made on them and the French inclined to believe they would have to face it. In each case enemy actions justified this opinion, thus keeping the Allies guessing.

Picture a warm, calm summer July night, with the stars by their brilliance attracting the gaze upward. Hardly a sound disturbs the apparent peacefulness of the scene. Apparent peacefulness, because it is the calm which precedes the terrific storm of an artillery fire such as the world has never before seen.

From Château-Thierry in the west, along the Marne River to Dormans, thence across the rolling country to the old city of Rheims, where most of the long line of French kings were crowned; around and just to the north of Rheims and across the chalky plains of the Champagne, almost to the hardly penetrable forest

of the Argonne, a distance of eighty-five miles, 1,000,000 men wait in almost breathless expectancy and that terrible anxiety, which comes to many before combat, for the opening crash of artillery which will begin the second battle of the Marne, one of the great decisive battles of history.

To the north of the line are 650,000 soldiers in the field gray of Germany, who make up the armies of von Boehn, von Mudra, and von Einem all under the Crown Prince of Germany. Opposite them, stretching from Château-Thierry to Rheims, is the Fifth French Army commanded by General Berthelot. And from Rheims east across the Champagne the Fourth French Army under General Gouraud.

In these two armies are three American divisions, the equivalent of six French, British, or German ones because of their strength of 27,000 men each.

In the middle of Gouraud's army is the Forty-second Infantry Division, commonly called the Rainbow because made up of units from twenty-six states, from Minnesota and Illinois on the north to Alabama and Texas on the south; from New York on the east to California on the west. Made up of national guardsmen, some of its regiments have long battle traditions to live up to.

The New York and Alabama infantry regiments, now friendly rivals, served in opposing armies during the Civil War, in one battle of which they attacked each other. The Ohio infantry also has a Civil War

record. The Iowa regiment not only distinguished itself in the Civil War but fought during the Philippine Insurrection in a way which will never be forgotten.

Among the ranks of the division are many sons and grandsons of the men who made these past records. They are soon to show they are worthy descendants.

On the extreme left of the line, not far from Châteaue-Thierry, stretched along the southern banks of the Marne is the Third Division. It is made up of regulars. Shortly they will add one more name to the glorious list on their colors, and prove once more that, regardless of losses, of the isolation of being surrounded on three sides by an attacking enemy, the regular imbued by the spirit of West Point expressed in its motto, "Honor, Duty, Country," will not let an enemy pass.

Near by is the Twenty-eighth Division, made up of national guard troops from Pennsylvania whose heritage stretches from the days of Washington's battlefields up through every war fought by the Union. Once more sons of that state are to prove their loyalty by bravely giving their lives in battle.

The French have brought all the artillery which can be spared from their whole front, and concentrated it back of these two armies. They have brought all their infantry reserves.

Are they right? Or have they made a mistake, and will the German attack come somewhere else and crash

with ease through the thinned-out defenses, denuded to concentrate this mass of men and guns from Châtea-Thierry to the Argonne?

What is going on, on the other side of the line, the unusual quietness of which for weeks has excited suspicion?

The enemy has made no trench raids to get prisoners; he has not retaliated to the artillery fire brought down well inside his lines to interfere with troop and supply movements. By day the French airplanes can find no movement; by night they can see nothing, but do hear the noises which indicate considerable movement. The trench raids made by the French have brought back from the German front lines only the older men of the divisions habitually used in the quiet sectors; no younger men of the "storm troops" used for attack have been caught.

Many had believed that the attack would come the night of the 13th-14th of July, the night before the great French holiday corresponding to our Fourth of July. With breathless anxiety the troops stood to their arms and waited; but nothing happened. With the first signs of dawn, instead of the expected attack, there was only a silence so beyond that of an ordinary sector as to be ominous in its intensity.

With sunset of the 14th, began another period of anxiety. Would the attack come? After all, was the French high command wrong? Had it made a terrible mistake in concentrating its reserves of infantry and

artillery back of the Fourth and Fifth armies, with the consequence that the war would be lost because of the ease with which von Hindenburg and Ludendorff would decisively smash through elsewhere?

At nine o'clock, when it was completely dark, Lieutenant Belastier, with Sergeant Lejeune, Corporals Hoquet and Gourmelon, and Private Ausmasson, all of the Fourth French Army, without artillery support fire, with great courage and skill managed to slip through the older troops in the front-line German trenches. Finally, when well in the German line, they saw infantry approaching and by their bearing judged them to be younger men and storm troops. With heroic courage they attacked them by surprise, made several prisoners and succeeded in fighting their way back to their own lines, bringing their prisoners with them.

Questioning proved these men to be "storm troops"; also that the artillery preparation for the attack was to begin at midnight and the infantry to go over the top at daylight.

If this were true, the country opposite for miles back was swarming with the advancing hordes of German infantry moving to the positions from which they would make the assault in the morning. If this were true, here was a target for the French and American artillery, long adjusted to fire on every road, every path, and every communicating trench for miles back in the German territory opposite.

If it were not true, and the command was given to

fire, the tremendous artillery conflagration which would blaze forth would notify the Germans as clearly as a message printed in the blackest and largest type on the whitest sheet of paper that the French expected the attack along this front, and as a consequence other fronts being feebly held could offer but little resistance.

General Gouraud, prior to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, had spent twenty years of his life fighting in Nigeria, in the French Sudan and in Morocco. In these combats he had been twice wounded by arrows. In a hand-to-hand combat he had killed a native chief Samory, who for years had terrorized an immense territory and always successfully evaded the French columns sent in pursuit. Early in the war he had been wounded in the shoulder by a rifle bullet, but had refused to leave the line. At the Dardanelles, where he commanded the French troops in the combined British and French Expeditionary Force, a shell blew off one arm, broke one leg, and so badly smashed the other that he can walk only with difficulty. His experience had bred that determination of character without which no general, no matter how brilliant, ever succeeds; while his suffering, far from lowering his spirit, had exalted it.

After listening to the result of questioning the prisoners, General Gouraud without hesitancy, and without undue delay, gave the command for the heavier long-range guns, and half the lighter guns, to fire at

11:30 P.M. The other half of the light guns were kept as a daylight surprise for the German infantry when it left its trenches to attack.

With a crash that was heard in Paris 100 miles away, with a fiery flare that illuminated the night, so that crowds poured from their houses into the streets of that city to watch it, thousands of guns opened fire on the twenty-five miles of the Fourth French Army front. Thirty minutes later, at midnight, the Fifth French Army, on the left, opened the same fire.

Minute after minute passed and not a shot from the Germans. Ten minutes passed, fifteen minutes, twenty, twenty-five, and still silence.

Some of the watching and waiting officers almost cried in their increasing fear that a tremendous mistake had been made; that after all the Germans planned no attack on this front, and that instead of this avalanche of shells bursting in the midst of German storm troops moving to their attack positions, it was being wasted on the mostly deserted roads and trails and communicating trenches of a position lightly held with older defense troops.

General Gouraud, watch in hand, stood silently waiting to see if the German fire would begin at midnight as the Germans captured in the raid had said. The minutes dragged along without a word. The clock in the room began to strike twelve. It completed twelve. No fire! Minute after minute dragged itself by. No fire!

At 12:10 came the roar of several large-sized projectiles followed quickly by the terrific crashes of their explosion. The electric lights went out. The electric power plant had been destroyed.

In the darkness the chief of staff heard General Gouraud say, "Thank God."

The anxious watchers in the trenches suddenly saw the sky behind the German lines opposite light with a tremendous flare, stretching farther to the right and left than any individual could see. In the fraction of a second longer which it took the sound to travel came the roar of 2,000 German batteries. This, an average of one gun for every twenty yards of the whole forty miles of front, was the greatest artillery concentration in history. The shells bursting on the whole front and reaching back for miles not only covered the battle-field proper, but fell even in the town of Châlons, twenty miles to the rear.

This fire continued without abatement until noon the next day.

It smashed trenches. It blasted paths and roads out of existence. It searched the ruins of villages and farmhouses, churning them up, previous fighting having left but little to blow down. It reached back and tore up small groves and woods hitherto ignored as too far to the rear. It reached into and tore down villages well to the rear of the battle-field driving their inhabitants, who had not been fired upon in previous Champagne battles, into the fields. For nearly four years

since the closing of the first battle of the Marne the French and Germans had fought each other in the Champagne without great gains one way or another.

The German artillery fire searched every locality, every spot which four years of fighting along this same line had taught them could be useful to troops and guns in battle; every locality which desperate troops being driven back might occupy in attempting to stay a victorious advance.

It did everything that artillery can do to prepare the way for the victorious advance, beginning at daylight, of the twenty-five divisions of infantry which were to crash through the French and Americans of the Fourth Army, and with nothing but their fleeing remnants before them, to reach the Marne at and on both sides of Châlons the same day.

From Rheims to Château-Thierry the German artillery was preparing the way for twenty-five German divisions to smash through to both sides of Epernay, ten miles away on the Marne and twenty miles to the west of Châlons.

With both German armies on the Marne and to the south of it west of Epernay, the center of the Allied line would be broken. The Allied troops to the west could only retreat toward Paris and the sea unless touch was to be lost with the British to the north. This would have created the very separation Hindenburg and Ludendorff had tried to bring about by their March attack.

The troops to the east of the German break-through, if they retreated east would soon be back to back with the French and American troops along the line from Verdun to Switzerland. This would mean danger of being surrounded and captured as the Germans had planned to do with the whole French army before they were defeated in the first battle of the Marne.

If, to avoid this, they retreated south they would have to abandon the line across the Argonne, later to be the jump-off for the greatest battle in our history; Verdun so heroically and determinedly defended by the French in 1916 at the cost of 350,000 casualties; the Saint-Mihiel salient, where the First American Army won its first victory; and most of the Lorraine line held by the French since 1914 and the scene of the first experience at the front of most of our divisions.

In other words, such a break-through meant the beginning of the end, if not the end.

As dawn approached the anxiety of the soldiers of both the attacker and defender increased. Bodies tired from being awake all night, nerves on edge from the physical shock of constant explosions and from the moral one of the constant sight of death and wounding, with the knowledge that any instant might bring the same fate.

At 4:17 A.M. the French and American infantry and artillery sentinels across the Champagne see red rockets go up from the front line. The front line has no defenders in it, only heroic men who have volun-

teered to be left alone scattered along its front. Those who survive the German bombardment before the attack have the duty to send up a red rocket when they see the German infantry come over the top of their front line and advance over No Man's Land. Having done this, they are free to run back through the bombardment to the nearest defenders in the sacrifice islands almost a mile to the rear. As the small detachments occupying these isolated posts are to be sacrificed, to reach one is only jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.

As the red rockets soar above the smoke and dust of the bombardment the infantrymen and artillerymen of the light field guns, who have had deep bomb-proofs available, rush from them and take their battle stations. The light field guns, saved to welcome the German infantry as they come over the top, add their voices and flame to the artillery bombardment. Their shells cover No Man's Land; they keep pace with the German infantry's advance across the empty French first-line trenches, across the mile of ground networked with trenches all empty of defenders, with its dug-outs filled with gas and bombs to destroy those who, flinching from their duty to advance, seek shelter within them.

From prisoners afterward it was learned that the Germans asked each other, "What do these trenches empty of defenders mean?"

To them it was a relief from their surprise and uncertainty finally to bump up against the defenders of

the "sacrifice islands." They thought these were the main infantry defense.

They were not, however, as they were to learn bitterly after they had overcome them through savage attacks and moved on confident that no serious defense was left before them. Then after more empty trenches passed over and through to the ever accompanying bursts of French and American shells, they ran into determined defense by French and American soldiers, a mile and a half to two miles back from the first French trench they had jumped into that morning.

Along with the machine-gun fire from the parts of the line held by Americans, they met accurate long-distance rifle fire. Though the American nation, with the vanishing of the frontier, has ceased to be a nation of riflemen, the American army not only has preserved the traditions of the frontier forefathers, but has insisted upon the careful training of the infantry soldier to use his rifle as his primary weapon. The American private of infantry does not need to be disciplined to understand that there is no reason why an enemy should only have to face machine-gun fire until the short distance away at which a hand grenade can be thrown at him. His common sense tells him that nothing is more effective to kill and wound and to break down an attacking enemy's morale than the deliberate picking out of individuals as targets and shooting them down at five hundred and six hundred yards, and even farther, if they can be seen.

However, despite all the German infantry had been

through—the heavy losses they had suffered from Gouraud's surprise artillery fire while they were moving to their attack positions, the heavy losses from additional artillery fire begun at daylight as they sprang out of their trenches to cross No Man's Land, and from then on, the losses endured in attacking and flowing around or over the sacrifice islands, the losses in the last few hundred yards of their approach—they made a heavy attack upon the main position. On the front of the Ohio infantry, and their French comrades on either side, they attacked seven times.

The acts of heroism which took place would fill several volumes.

After the watchers left in the front-line trench a mile and a half to two miles in front of the position where the defense was to be made—left to send up rockets warning of the German infantry attack!—the garrisons of the sacrifice islands deserve the greatest credit for heroism.

These islands were simply various strong points in the midst of the trenches, approximately half-way between the old front line and the new front line, the line of first real resistance. They were islands because each was cut off from the others, and must stand or fall alone. When the attacking German infantry struck them, it surged around them, and, in most cases, over them, as a large roller coming in from the sea while broken by rocks on its path to the beach surges around and over them.

To break up the German infantry attack, even though submerged by it—just as the rocks break up the advancing wave—thus preventing its striking the main line of defense a united and, perhaps, overwhelming blow, was the very purpose for which these heroic men were put in these positions. They knew they were to sacrifice themselves, and had volunteered to do so.

Lieutenant Vaughn, with twenty-five men, of the 166th Ohio Infantry, occupied one of these positions. None of them was seen again until the return of prisoners after the Armistice, when a few came back to tell of Vaughn, shot through the head, unconscious; the majority killed or wounded by the Germans who surrounded them on every side. The survivors were made prisoners.

Major Basnier, of the 366th French Infantry, in one of these positions, with part of his battalion, held out for eighteen hours. When notified by wireless that his surrender was authorized, during the night he forced his way out with the remnants of his men, at the point of the bayonet, and back a distance of almost a mile to the main position, bringing fourteen German prisoners with him. He was decorated the next day on the battlefield with the Legion of Honor.

In the defense of the main position, many officers and men set inspiring examples of that bravery which, disdaining all personal danger, thinks only of beating the enemy.

Lieutenant Christenson, of Ohio, jumped up on the

parapet, in plain sight of the enemy and fully exposed to his fire. This, in order better to throw grenades. Wounded then, and once more during the day, he refused to go to the rear until so weak he could no longer resist evacuation.

Sergeant O'Neill, of the 165th Infantry, commonly known as the "New York Irish," though wounded by a shell fragment, insisted upon returning to his platoon, after his wounds had been dressed, and threw himself into the hand-to-hand fighting then going on.

Private Christenberry, of the 167th Alabama Infantry, generally spoken of as the "Alabams," though wounded, not only remained at his post, but also rescued a comrade who had been buried when a shell caved in the trench.

Lieutenant Williams, of the Medical Detachment of the Iowa Infantry Regiment, learning that men were constantly wounded by the heavy German artillery fire upon those companies of the regiments which had no trenches, left the dug-out where his first-aid station was established, and for more than two hours dressed the wounds of the men lying in the open.

Private Cummings, of the 149th Field Artillery, who was in a forward artillery observation station in an exposed trench left it to go to the help of Private Sutton, of the same regiment, a telephone linesman badly wounded while repairing a wire. As he reached Sutton he fell by his side, also wounded. His captain, Reddington, who was controlling the fire of his bat-

tery from this station, immediately jumped from the trench and went to the rescue of them both.

Corporal George B. Reid, of the 151st Field Artillery, was seriously wounded by the fire from a low-flying German airplane. However, he stuck by his gun, refusing to be evacuated until fire then being executed was finished.

The Rainbow Division Trench Mortar Battery, made up of men from Baltimore, had been put in front of the main line trenches, so that their projectiles might reach farther into the advancing Germans. Despite heavy losses, they remained not only until the last round had been fired, but until all their mortars had been destroyed or buried by the enemy's fire.

From Rheims almost to the Argonne Forest, everywhere, everybody—French and American—responded to Gouraud's order issued before the battle, in which he said:

"The bombardment will be terrible! You will support it without failure. The assault will be savage, in clouds of dust, smoke, and gas, but your position and your armament are formidable. In your breasts beat the brave and strong hearts of free men! No one will look to the rear. No one will recoil one step. Each will have but one thought—to kill and keep on killing until the enemy has had enough. I, your commanding general, say: you will break the assault and make the day a glorious one!"

By noon the attacks, after bloody losses, had prac-

tically ceased. They were renewed that afternoon, only to fail again. The next morning, once more, the assault was tried and failed.

General Gouraud then issued the following order congratulating the Fourth Army:

"The Germans were ordered to reach the Marne by the evening of the 15th of July.

"You stopped them dead—on the line where you decided to fight and gain the battle.

"You have the right to be proud.

"It is a hard blow for the enemy.

"It is a glorious day for France."

On the front from Rheims southwest to the Marne and thence east along the Marne to near Château-Thierry the Germans fared much better.

Their attack pushed back the Italian, British, and French troops between Rheims and the Marne until by the evening of July 18 the Germans, on a front of five miles just north of the Marne, were within less than six miles of Epernay.

Under the protection of the fire of 500 batteries they crossed to the south bank of the Marne from Fossoy, four miles east of Château-Thierry, to Dormans.

These enemy troops by the night of July 18 had pushed their left within less than six miles of Epernay. Epernay was the principal objective for the attack between Château-Thierry and Rheims, just as Châlons-sur-Marne was for the attack through the Champagne.

By this same evening the center of these troops had gotten four miles southeast of Dormans.

However, the remnants of their extreme left had been driven north of the Marne.

On this extreme left, where stood our Third Regular Infantry Division with units of the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry Division interspersed with the French on its right, the ground is of an entirely different character from that in the Champagne.

Instead of undulating chalky plains cut in every direction by trenches resulting from four years' struggle, is the beautifully hilly country of green woods and poppy-strewn fields through which winds the Marne River.

Except for the brief passing of the armies during the campaign of the first Marne battle, this country had remained untouched by war until nearly four years later, when the second of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff great assaults carried the Germans once more to the banks of the Marne.

The positions of the troops had been occupied only since the first days of June, when the last waves of the great German assault of May had been brought to a stop along this line. Therefore, they only had such trenches as had been dug during this period. Many were so shallow as to be of little value. Consequently the German fire, from shortly after midnight on, killed and wounded many more proportionately here than in the Champagne.

As was the case in the Champagne, however, the

Allied fire brought down on where the German infantry was thought to be advancing to its assault position, prior to the opening up of its own artillery fire, had a murderous effect.

In the Champagne, two German infantry divisions had so suffered from the Franco-American artillery fire prior to the attack that they had to be relieved by two reserve divisions which attacked in their stead.

Since the war, Germans who took part have stated they never saw so many dead of their own infantry as they left behind as they advanced down the north slopes of the Marne Valley to the river.

The first Germans got across in single pontoons at a number of places during the night. A smoke screen put down by the German artillery just south of the river covered the building of a number of pontoon bridges, across which the rest of their infantry came to the attack.

Savage infantry fighting took place in the fields just south of the Marne and along the slopes leading up from it.

The 28th Pennsylvania Division, with some units in reserve and some in the line among the French, took its share of the blow of the German attack. Though it had had no previous combat experience in quiet sectors to prepare it, its men and officers by their conduct in the face of one of the greatest assaults of history, upheld the traditions established by the Pennsylvania troops on the battle-fields of all our previous wars.

On July 16 the 111th Pennsylvania Infantry relieved the 30th Regular Infantry, which had suffered heavy losses since the fighting began on the 15th.

Lieutenant McGuire, of the 109th Infantry, although painfully wounded shortly after his platoon began an attack, refused to be evacuated, but continued with it.

Lieutenant Shenkel, with but seven men, completely surrounded by the enemy, personally led them in fighting their way out by the use of their rifle butts and bayonets, himself killing an opposing German officer.

Captain McLean, of the 110th Infantry, having been sent as a liaison officer with a French command, upon the death or wounding of all the officers of the company with which he found himself, reorganized the remaining men and with them successfully fought his way through the enemy though twice entirely surrounded.

Sergeant Martz gathered together the remnants of his company overrun by the German infantry attack. When all but three others were killed or wounded, he led them in a successful attempt to fight their way through the enemy's lines.

The 3rd Division had its four regiments of infantry in line, the 4th on the left nearest Château-Thierry, the 7th next, then the 30th and the 38th on the right next the French.

The 38th, the 30th, and part of the 7th were on ground the Germans intended to capture and hold to

protect the left flank of their main movement south-east toward Epernay.

Because of the unfaltering determination of the division they not only failed to capture this ground but were driven back north of the Marne.

The Americans took a heavy toll of the Germans with their rifles. A large number of the German dead lying among the wheat on the northern slopes of the Marne were shot neatly through the head.

The infantry platoons first exposed to the enemy's infantry attack distinguished themselves by their determination. Some were wiped out, others suffered heavy losses, but all stood.

Lieutenant Charles Seagraves, 7th Infantry, was twice captured but escaped each time. In doing so he killed a total of five Germans. After his second escape he gathered together 100 men, the remnants of a number of platoons, and successfully occupied and held a gap in the line.

Lieutenant H. P. Marsh, of the 30th Infantry, subsequently killed in action in the Argonne, refused to surrender when his thirty men were surrounded by a larger force of the enemy. Instead he fought his way to where Captain J. W. Woolridge, of the 38th Infantry, had established himself with the remnants of his and other commands in the rock pile near the village of Mezy.

Captain Woolridge though surrounded and outnumbered, used the fire of his rifles so effectively,

coupled with counter-attacks, that he not only held his own but took 300 prisoners. Of his 189 men all but 51 were killed or wounded.

The 38th Infantry to which he belonged occupied a position open to attack from two sides to start with. After several hours it was being attacked on three sides. However, it yielded no ground, thereby earning for itself the name "The Rock of the Marne." In his final report, General Pershing said that this regiment "wrote one of the most brilliant pages in the annals of military history, in preventing the crossing of certain points of its front, while on either side the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward." Its loss in killed and wounded was about forty percent of its combat strength.

Though his right remained turned for several kilometers, General Dickman commanding the 3rd Division, was able to report the morning of the 16th, "On the front of the 3rd Division, there are no Germans south of the Marne except the dead."

On the 17th, the 3rd Division held its position.

Gouraud's success by this time was freeing reserves which were being sent to stop the German advance toward Epernay.

Before noon the 18th came the news that French and American troops had begun with great success an attack on the German right flank and rear from Château-Thierry in the south to opposite Soissons, twenty-five miles to the north.

This coupled with French counter-attacks stopped the Germans from pushing farther towards Epernay between the right of the 3rd Division and Rheims.

The defensive half of the second battle of the Marne was over. For the first time a full-fledged Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack had been stopped.

The "Friedensturm" or offensive, which by its success was to bring a German peace, had failed.

The Germans never attacked again.

The 8th of August, Ludendorff's black day, was still three weeks in the future, thus three weeks after the decisive days of the war, July 15 to 18, inclusive.

The Germans attacked with about 650,000 men, approximately the same number as they used in their first great attack in March.

At the time of the March attack there were 285,000 American troops in France. There were but five combat divisions in the line or in reserve. This was a total of but 140,000 men to reenforce our Allies.

At the time of the German attack on July 15, there were nineteen American combat divisions in the line or in reserve with the army corps troops, making a reenforcement to our Allies of 700,000 combat soldiers.

Those who did not serve in the battle itself freed veteran French divisions from other parts of the line to do so.

Without this reenforcement their strength would have been missing the fateful 15th of July.

This American reenforcement equal to more than the strength of the assaulting force, though not available, because of our unpreparedness, till a year and a quarter after we declared war, came to our Allies at the decisive moment when victory, hitherto inclined to the German side, needed a strong counterbalance to tip the scales the other way.

Chapter IX

THE BATTLE THAT TURNED THE TIDE

MARSHAL HINDENBURG on the evening of July 16, 1918, ordered the German Crown Prince "to stop the German troops' bleeding to death against the Fourth French Army."

This is the German acknowledgment that for the first time since the overwhelming defeat of the Italians in the battle of Caporetto in the fall of 1917 the tide of German victory had been stopped. For the first time since the virtual destruction of the Fifth British Army in March, 1918, a full-fledged Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack had been stopped dead with a bloody repulse.

What was going to happen next?

Did the Germans have enough reserves to strike again?

Did the Allies have enough troops to attack, as General Foch had wished to do for weeks but could not because Marshal Haig commanding the British and General Pétain commanding the French each insisted he needed all his troops for the defensive against the next German attack?

If the Allies finally had enough troops to attack where did they come from?



THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ

July 18 the French and Americans attacked from Soissons in the north to Château-Thierry in the south, opening the second phase of the second battle of the Marne.

The first phase was the defensive battle of July 15-17 from Château-Thierry on the west along the Marne, across it to Rheims, in front of that famous city and thence across the chalk plains of Champagne almost to the Argonne Forest.

Was this the battle which turned the tide against

the Germans, forever robbing them of their last chance of victory?

Recently I went to see Major-General Charles P. Summerall, now chief of staff of our army. His rapid rise in command, during the war, from an artillery brigade to an army corps has put him in history as a great leader of men in battle.

I asked him:

"General, now that many facts formerly hidden have come out during the past ten years, what is your opinion of the relative importance of the second battle of the Marne?"

He answered in a determined manner but with the quiet voice which, I had noticed in France, even the excitement of battle does not cause him to raise:

"The second battle of the Marne was the turning point of the war. The combats of July 15 and 16, much to the surprise of the Germans, stopped their attacks. However, they still had reserves enough left to make another attack and were planning to do so, this time probably against the British.

"The Franco-American attack, begun July 18, was pressed so hard that finally the German reserves intended for this new attack had to be largely used in a vain endeavor to stop it.

"When the battle closed with the beaten Germans retreating across the Aisne and Vesle rivers they had insufficient reserves for another attack left. Thus they were robbed forever of the power of the offensive.


"From then on the Allies could do what the Germans had been doing: attack when and where they pleased."

General Foch for many months had advocated the formation of a "central reserve," or "mass of maneuver." He had started long before imminent defeat as the result of the March attack on the British had caused the Allies finally to agree that one man should command on the western front and to choose him.

By "central reserve" he meant a strong body of troops held together in some central position ready to strike the Germans at their weakest point after they had begun some savage attack and, intent on pushing it, were leaving one flank or another weak.

When they attacked in May and drove down to the Marne, they left such a weak flank. It was their left or western flank. Their left was at Château-Thierry, twenty-five miles south of Soissons. Five miles to the west of Soissons was Fontenoy, the point on the German trench line from which this left had started the successful attack which took it to the Marne, at Château-Thierry. Facing west along the line from Fontenoy to Château-Thierry, twenty-five miles south, there were only eleven German divisions, about 120,000 men.

Ludendorff knew he was weak here. He knew that if the Allies had enough troops they could strike him on this weak flank and by driving it in threaten the



THE ATTACK BEGUN JULY 18, 1918

rear of the Germans between Château-Thierry and Rheims.

He did not believe they had the troops. He thought

the heavy fighting in March and April had so used up the British they could send no help. Also, the preparations he was making for a future attack on the British had convinced them, as he had intended, that they and not the French were the next to be attacked.

Thus, the British would not part with their reserves, but kept them behind their own line. Ludendorff believed that the help the French had sent the British in March and April had used up their reserves. The, from the German point of view, splendid and easy success of the last days of May and first of June, which brought them once more to the Marne, confirmed this view.

He did not believe enough Americans had arrived to make good the British and French lack of troops. Therefore, he took a chance of his weak left flank being attacked, and put all his available troops into the attack of the 15th of July.

However, 700,000 combat American soldiers had arrived in France by July 15. Nearly 90,000 with the French faced the great German assault the 15th and 16th of July. The infantry of six divisions back of the British line gave a reenforcement of 80,000 soldiers from Illinois, New York, the Carolinas, Tennessee, New Jersey, Delaware, the Virginias, and Pennsylvania. Five complete divisions, with a strength of 140,000, made up of regulars and soldiers from Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, New York, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee serving in the line in

Lorraine, had freed that many veteran French troops for service at the critical point of the front. Six divisions, 168,000, were in training.

Our Twenty-sixth Infantry Division, made up of national guardsmen from all the New England states, and our Third Regular Infantry Division were in line near Château-Thierry. The First, Second and Fourth American divisions, all regulars, and the Twenty-eighth Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, were near by. Thus, by the 15th of July, Foch had 170,000 American troops in position to be used as a "mass of maneuver" to strike Ludendorff's weak flank.

From the first days of June, when the German arrival on the Marne presented this opportunity to attack this weak flank, General Foch had wanted to make it. The question was to get enough troops. Marshal Haig, in command of the British, and General Pétain in command of the French army, each feared a heavy German attack. After Haig's bitter experiences in March and April and Pétain's bitter one in May, they did not want to give up any troops for an attack even on a weak spot on the German line. Each wanted all the troops he had and as many Americans as he could get to face the third great German blow. Each was convinced that blow would be against his army and not against the army of the other.

General Pershing promptly saw the opportunity, and believed he had the American troops to smash the German weak flank. On June 23, and again on

July 10, he strongly urged General Foch to permit an American attack.

However, it was not until Gouraud's Fourth Army had stopped the German attack in the Champagne the 15th of July that General Foch found General Pétain's and the British anxiety sufficiently assuaged to obtain the French and British troops he wished to add to the Americans to make his "mass of maneuver" with which to strike the blow.

By the evening of July 16, there was no longer the slightest doubt that Gouraud's Fourth Army had stopped the principal German attack with such bloody losses that it could not be renewed. Therefore, the order was given for the attack to begin July 18, from Fontenoy on the Aisne River, just west of Soissons, in the north, to Château-Thierry on the Marne, in the south. Between Château-Thierry and Rheims an attack was also to be made.

The fiery General Mangin, commanding the Tenth French Army, was to make the main attack. This army stretched from Fontenoy south to the Ourcq River, famous for some of the bloodiest fighting in the first battle of the Marne, and soon to have its waters again stained with blood, much of it American, in this final phase of the second battle of the Marne. To its south, from the Ourcq to the Marne, was half of General Degoutte's Sixth French Army. Of the troops in line for the attack, nearly one-half of Mangin's and more than one-third of Degoutte's were Americans.

General Mangin came of a military family. Two of his brothers were killed in battle, one in French Indo-China, the other in Africa, serving under General Gouraud. Mangin had spent the greater part of his service, prior to the war, fighting in the French African and Asiatic colonies. Like Gouraud, he had been wounded three times in these colonial wars.

He was one of the members of Colonel Marchand's expedition, which, after months of incredible hardships crossed Africa, from west to east, finally reaching Fashoda on the upper Nile. Lord Kitchener, then sirdar of Egypt, fearing that France would claim the territory, rushed to Fashoda with an armed force. While negotiations which threatened to bring war between France and Britain were carried on in London and Paris, the two armed forces at Fashoda, each under its national flag, awaited the decision which would determine whether they were friends or foes.

Mangin decided that the spearhead of his attack would be the army corps made up of the Moroccan Division of the French army, which included the famous Foreign Legion, and our First and Second infantry divisions, made up of regulars. Thus, eighty percent of this corps was American.

The day and night of the 17th were rainy. The First Division, by forced marches and extreme exertion, managed to get its batteries in place during the night of the 17th and 18th. The infantry had been waiting in the Compiègne Wood, later to be the scene of the

signing of the Armistice. In the open, and of course without fires for fear of attracting the attention of the enemy's long-range artillery and aviators, they suffered from the cold and wet. Then came the ten-mile march in the rain, along the muddy, slippery sides of the highways leading to their jump-off position. The center of the roads was occupied, as was our Civil War custom, by the artillery and ammunition trains.

General Summerall, who commanded the division, with his staff, brigade, and regimental commanders, had been on the ground for several days making careful reconnaissances of the battle-field and every possible preparation. The consequence was that despite the blackness of the night, the rain, the worn-out condition of the men and animals from their forced marches and lack of shelter, every unit moved to its place without confusion.

While this was General Summerall's first battle as a division commander, it was far from being his first battle.

Born in Florida, without money or influence he secured an appointment to West Point through a competitive examination. Graduated from that school, he served for years as a lieutenant of artillery under General Graham, one of the iron characters produced by our Civil War.

In the Philippines, and later in the Boxer Campaign in China, he distinguished himself by his personal courage. More than that, he endeared himself to the

infantry by the way in which he used his guns to smash the enemy groups giving the doughboys the most trouble. In the Philippines, this attracted the attention of the then Major of Infantry Bullard. The result was that when Bullard, as a major-general, came to the command of the First Division in France, he asked for Summerall to command his artillery brigade.

After the battle of Cantigny, General Bullard was promoted to command the Third Army Corps, and General Summerall to command the First Division.

The Second Division had a much harder time than the First to get to its jump-off place in time for the attack. After its heavy and successful fighting at Belleau Wood, the division had been billeted in villages near and along the Marne River.

In all armies, men who have been general staff officers too long, forgetting the difficulties which troops have to meet, are inclined to ignore the rights and responsibilities of commanding officers.

Such officers on one of the French higher staffs failed to give the complete information of their intentions to the headquarters of the Second Division. Instead, they successively rushed off the artillery brigade by marching, then the infantry in motor trucks, and finally the kitchens and supply trains by marching. All were sent north, but to destinations the exact positions of which were unknown.

General Harbord commanded the Marine Infantry Brigade at Belleau Wood. This success caused his pro-

motion to the command of the Second Division. He arrived at the headquarters in the midst of these movements.

General Harbord's career is another example of the opportunities which the democracy and fair play of our army offers to those who are capable. He was born on an Illinois farm. His father served throughout the Civil War in an Illinois cavalry regiment. When Harbord was still a young boy, his family moved to a Kansas farm. When he was of sufficient age, young Harbord enlisted as a private in the regular cavalry. An excellent soldier, he studied hard, passed the required examinations, and was commissioned a second lieutenant of cavalry.

Like all our leaders in this war, he saw active service in the Philippine Insurrection. He was one of the regular officers detailed to organize the Philippine Constabulary, that corps which for years, and even yet, has to combat with fanatical Mohammedan chiefs and other disturbers of the peace throughout the Islands. In time, he became its chief.

When we entered the Great War, he was an instructor at our War College. Thus, like all our generals who succeeded, he had that combination of practical experience on the battle-fields and higher military education which is essential in warfare today.

With characteristic energy he jumped into his car, with his chief of staff, and proceeded north to the headquarters of the French army corps in which he

had finally been told his division would serve. Here, he could learn nothing of his scattered division, but he did get the orders for the attack. This was late in the night of the 16th.

He sat up all the rest of the night getting out the orders for the attack. Though he had been assured by the French staff that he need not worry as his troops would arrive in ample time at their positions, he started, without sleep, at daybreak to find the units of his division.

As was too often the case when foreign staffs handled our divisions, the time necessary for the movement had been underestimated. This, because our divisions were from two to two and one-half times as big as the largest French, British, or German ones.

By dint of the greatest effort throughout the day and the whole of the night—again passed without any sleep—the units of the division were moved into place. The machine guns, with their crews, had been dumped by the French motor trucks twelve miles from the jump-off position. However, the animals which had marched overland had been sent to that position. The result was the gun crews carried their heavy machine guns twelve miles, the last few of which were through the pitch-dark forest of Villers-Cotterêts.

Some of the units were in place shortly before the attack began. Others arrived just in time to start, with practically no halt. Some, arriving just too late, even though they had been marching at a double time. See-

ing the barrage move forward ahead of them, they continued their double time until they had caught up to the proper distance to its rear. To this day, the difficulties of this approach march stand out more in the minds of the Second Division than the two days' savage fighting which followed.

The attack was to start at 4:35 A.M. As it was to be a surprise, there was to be no artillery preparatory fire. Thus, along the twenty-five miles of front, from Soissons to Château-Thierry, with the exception of an occasional shot, silence reigned.

A few minutes before the time for the attack, a red rocket suddenly shot up into the air from the German position just in front of our First Division. In answer to the rocket, down came the German artillery defensive barrage, in front of their own infantry, its shells bursting amidst our infantry lying there waiting for the attack. Though Americans were killed and wounded, so perfect was the discipline that not even one rifle shot was fired.

Had the Germans found out about the attack? Or was some lonely man in the front line simply "seeing things," as often happens, and quite naturally, at night?

If the barrage continued and spread to the south, it was the first. If it stopped in a few minutes, the second.

In a few minutes the barrage stopped.

Then, after a short silence, exactly at 4:35 A.M., the hundreds of French and American batteries opened fire with a crash. To the rear of the infantry, the darkness—for dawn had not yet appeared—was lighted by the flare of thousands of gun discharges. To its front were seen the thousands of bursting shells.

The infantry jumped up and followed these bursts as they moved forward forming the rolling barrage.

As the crash of our artillery broke the stillness of the night, red rockets soared up from all along the enemy's line. Before these had burned out, down came the enemy's artillery fire, and with it the tat-tat-tat of the machine guns, which is always brought to the mind of a veteran by the automatic riveters working in great numbers on the iron frame of a new skyscraper.

Except for ravines to go across, the ground in front of our First and Second divisions, and the Moroccan Division between them was gently rolling and covered with waist- to breast-high wheat. There being no trenches, the enemy's machine guns and field artillery were distributed here and there, more or less in checkerboard fashion. The result was that our artillery had great difficulty in locating them. Therefore, from the first our infantry suffered heavy casualties. Both the German machine gunners and the artillerymen stuck by their weapons, firing to the last. Large numbers of them died at their posts.

However, regardless of casualties and resistance, the advance continued.

The 28th Regular Infantry in its advance suffered severely from flanking fire from the Saint-Amand Farm. Though it was out of the First Division's sector, several companies were ordered to take it, and did so by direct assault. The Missy-aux-Bois ravine, deep and wide, leading into the valley of the Aisne to the north, was strongly held by the enemy, with machine guns and artillery. Though suffering losses which almost exterminated some of the attacking companies, and which did destroy the accompanying tanks, the 28th Infantry, on the left of the division, and the 26th Infantry next on its right, persisted until they had conquered the ravine and emerged on the far side.

Private G. S. Caldwell, of the 28th Infantry, when galling enemy's fire had temporarily stopped the men near him, rushed 300 yards to the front and attacked a machine-gun strong point, with a German field gun alongside of it. He killed two of the enemy and captured thirteen others, with the machine gun and the field gun.

The 18th Regular Infantry, on the right of the division, received a heavy fire on its flank from artillery and machine guns in the village of Chaudun. Though outside its sector, the regiment did not hesitate to assault and carry it.

The second day, the third day, and the fourth day, the division, though steadily dwindling from its heavy losses, continued its successful advance.

At the close of the second day, the colonel of the

French Foreign Legion visited the colonel of the 18th Infantry to tell him, "The Foreign Legion considers it not only a privilege but an honor to fight by the side of such gallant troops as the 18th Infantry."

The 16th Infantry, in the right center of the divisional attack, suffered so heavily that on the third day part of the divisional engineers had to be sent to raise its strength for the attack of the next day.

The fourth day, the remnants of the 28th and 26th Infantry, with their brigade commander, Brigadier General B. B. Buck, and his staff, in the first wave assaulted and took Verzy-le-Sec, and the hill upon which it stood. These had been strongly organized by the Germans, because commanding the Soissons-Château-Thierry Highway and the railroad out of Soissons used by the enemy to supply the northern part of his line. At the same time, the greatly reduced 16th and 18th Infantry fought their way to and over the Soissons-Château-Thierry Highway, and on to the heights of Buzancy beyond.

No longer facing east, but facing northeast; astride the Soissons-Château-Thierry Highway, and holding the commanding hills on both sides, the First Division had seized a position which endangered all the German line to its south. During the night of the 21st-22nd, and the day of the 22nd, it not only held its position against strong attacks, but in some places advanced its line. The night of the 22nd it was relieved by a Scotch division, one of four British divi-

sions loaned Foch by Haig in return for the decisive help given by the French during the heavy German attacks against the British in March and April.

Its losses were 234 officers and 7,048 men killed and wounded. In the 16th and 18th Infantry, all the majors had been killed or wounded. In the 26th Infantry, the colonel was killed, and the three majors killed or wounded. The 26th Infantry came out of the fight under the command of a captain who had been in the army less than two years.

Each night the Germans had brought in new divisions to reenforce the remnants of those already there. A total of seven German divisions was vainly used to stop the First Division's advance.

By ten A.M. the first day, the Second Division had fought its way three and one-half miles into the German lines, capturing more than 2,000 prisoners and fifty guns.

The battle had hardly started before Sergeant Louis Cukela, of the Fifth Marines, distinguished himself when the fire from an enemy strong point held up his platoon. He crawled out alone from the flank toward the German lines, in the face of heavy fire. Somehow, he succeeded in getting behind one enemy machine gun. Rushing it, he killed some of the crew with his bayonet and drove the rest off. He seized the German hand grenades lying near the gun and with them bombed out the rest of the strong point, capturing four men and two machine guns.

The solid stone buildings of Beaurepaire Farm, strengthened by the Germans until really a fort, took a heavy toll from the 9th and 23rd Infantry. However, they carried it by hand-to-hand fighting, as they did batteries of German artillery in the wheat fields near by, which fired point-blank into the advancing Americans.

Private Anthony Wendell of the 9th Infantry, seeing the men near him were held up by the fire of an enemy's machine gun, crawled forward alone, attacked the gun, and captured it, killing its crew.

Beginning early in the afternoon and extending well into the night, a savage fight took place around the village of Vierzy. In the end it was carried by assault.

During this attack, Corporal E. F. Phalen, of the 23rd Infantry, voluntarily left the leading wave of his company, and alone rushed a concealed machine gun firing into the right flank of that company. Despite the enemy's fire, he reached the gun position and single-handed killed or captured the entire gun crew.

The division pushed a mile beyond Vierzy, only halting at midnight. This put it more than a mile farther into the German line than any other division which attacked that day.

The next morning, it successfully withstood a number of determined German counter-attacks launched against it to pinch out the bulge which it had made into their line. Later in the day, it drove forward another two miles, despite obstinate German resistance.

This put it in possession of Hill 160, which dominates the Château-Thierry-Soissons Highway, a few hundred yards to the east. That night, it was relieved by the 59th French Colonial Division. It had made a total advance of more than six miles, capturing 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It had lost almost 5,000 men and officers.

Our 4th Division, made up of newly organized regular regiments, took part in the attack of General Degoutte's Sixth French Army. Half of the division was used in the Second French Army Corps and the other half in the Seventh French Army Corps.

Jumping off at 4:35 A.M. on the 18th, they with their French comrades on either side, had penetrated the second night—when they were relieved—a depth of four miles into the German line. While this was their first action, the casualties suffered and the trophies gained in prisoners and guns made the first battle name to be placed on their new regimental standards one of which they can be proud.

When it seemed certain death to do so, Sergeant E. K. Lawless, of the 39th Infantry, volunteered to take a message five hundred yards across an open field, in plain sight of the enemy, and under heavy fire.

Private G. W. Boardman, 59th Infantry, had been hit in the ankle, and was lying in a shell hole under heavy machine-gun fire. Hearing wounded comrades calling for water, he made several trips to a small stream one hundred yards away, each time filling can-

teens and bringing them back to the helplessly wounded near by, whose calls had aroused his pity.

The southern end of the attack was made by the First American Army Corps, under command of General Hunter Liggett.

General Liggett, after graduating from West Point, served as an infantry officer in an Indian campaign, the Spanish-American War, and the Philippine Insurrection. Noted as one of our deepest military students, he later served for years, first as an instructor, and finally as the chief of our Army War College.

This combination of military education and practical experience enabled him to make a record, beginning with this battle, which led to his finishing the war in command of the First American Army of 500,000 men. This was a far larger force than any one American general had commanded in the field in any of our previous wars.

The line of attack for the troops north of the First Corps was one running from the Aisne River in general south until it reached that corps. There it turned in a southeasterly direction until it reached the Marne near Château-Thierry—Château-Thierry being in the German line. North of Château-Thierry is the Etrepilly plateau. The road from Château-Thierry to Soissons climbs the steep southern side of this plateau, and reaching its top heads almost due north for Château-Thierry. The First Corps' front was five miles west of this road at the bottom of the steep southwestern edge of the Etrepilly plateau.

If the Germans lost this plateau, they would have to give up Château-Thierry. Also, their line for some distance to its north would have to fall back to prevent being outflanked from the south.

Belleau Wood, lying at the southwestern base of this plateau, was a good jump-off place for an attack upon it. It was for this reason that during June and the first part of July the Germans fought the Marines so desperately and determinedly to keep them from capturing this wood.

To start the attack, General Liggett had on his left the veteran 167th French Infantry Division. On his right, was the 26th American Infantry Division.

The 26th Division was commanded by Major-General Clarence Edwards, and was made up of New England national guard troops. Coming from one of the oldest parts of the Union, most of its organizations had long histories embracing our past wars.

The 104th Infantry from Massachusetts started its military career in 1663, when existing independent companies were organized into the Hampshire County Regiment. It served in King Philip's War, 1675-76, and other colonial wars prior to our Revolutionary War. It served in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. During the Civil War, it served in the Army of the Potomac from McClellan's Peninsular Campaign in 1862 on to Grant's final campaign culminating at Appomattox in 1865.

In 1898, the regiment was under fire at Santiago, Cuba.

While General Liggett's army corps made gains at the cost of heavy fighting on the 18th, 19th, and 20th, the Etrepilly plateau remained in German hands.

Private George Delboy of the 103rd Infantry, after his platoon had gained its objective, a railway embankment, stood on it to reconnoiter. Immediately a German machine gun only a hundred yards away opened fire upon him. Instead of getting behind the embankment with one jump, he remained standing and calmly opened fire on the machine gun with his rifle. Failing to hit all the gunners, he rushed the gun with his bayonet. When about twenty-five yards away he fell with his right leg almost cut off above the knee by several bullets, and his body pierced by three more. With courage undaunted by his wounds, lying where he was, he fired with his rifle, killing two of the German gun crew and putting the rest to flight.

For a clear picture of the effect of the fighting up to the night of July 20-21, and of the combats which followed, it is necessary to give a general outline of the second battle of the Marne. This battle covered so much ground and involved so many divisions during its nineteen consecutive days of hard fighting, followed by its closing two days' pursuit of the enemy, that only in this way can an understanding be obtained of what the fighting accomplished, and of the part our troops played.

The ground occupied by the Germans before the battle had roughly the shape of a dipper. The handle

began near the Argonne Forest and ran west across the Champagne to Rheims. This handle was twenty-five miles long. The top of the dipper was to the north and ran from Rheims west along the Vesle River to the Aisne River, of which the Vesle is a tributary, thence along the Aisne past Soissons for about five miles to Fontenoy. The top of the dipper was about thirty-five miles across. From Fontenoy the front face of the dipper ran south about twenty-five miles to Hautevesnes just northwest of the famous Belleau Wood.

The bottom of the dipper, which was irregular in its shape, ran from Hautevesnes through Belleau Wood southwest to the Marne River, just west of Château-Thierry. Château-Thierry was in the dipper near the center of its bottom. On reaching the Marne, the bottom ran east along its northern bank for about ten miles, as the crow flies, to Dormans. From Dormans, the back face of the dipper ran northeast to Rheims, nearly twenty miles away.

The battle was in two parts: the first, July 15, 16, and 17, in which the Germans attacked while the Allies were on the defensive; the second, July 18 to August 4, inclusive, during which the Allies attacked. In the first half, the Germans attacked along the handle in the Champagne, across the rear face of the dipper, from Rheims to Dormans on the Marne, and across the eastern part of the bottom, from Dormans to Château-Thierry. Along the handle the Germans were stopped dead. They badly bulged the rear face

and the eastern part of the bottom, except the last five miles nearest Château-Thierry. Here, our 3rd Infantry Division stopped them.

The Franco-American attack, which began July 18, was to smash in the front face of the dipper. If the Germans stayed in the bottom they would be caught. If they didn't want to get caught they would have to get out of the dipper.

The first two days drove in the whole front face of the dipper. By holding hard to the Etrepilly plateau, the Germans had prevented our First Army Corps, despite its persistent attacks, from bulging very far the part of the bottom west of the Marne and Château-Thierry.

However, despite the fresh divisions which they continually fed in, the Germans were unable to stop our 1st and 2nd divisions and the French Moroccan Division from bulging in the north part of the front face so far that the south part of that face and the bottom of the dipper were in danger.

Therefore, the night of July 20-21, while putting in more fresh troops to stop the bulge in the north, they withdrew their line in the south from the Etrepilly plateau, evacuated Château-Thierry and brought their ten divisions south of the Marne to its north bank.

During the 21st, the French and American troops in the south followed up the Germans. The 39th French Division and part of our 3rd Division crossed

the Marne at Château-Thierry. Preparations were made to attack the next day.

In the north, the German line hung on grimly and desperately to the hills south of the Aisne, determined that no further bulge should be made in this part of the dipper. Except for the capture of Verzy-le-Sec and the heights of Buzancy by the 1st Division, they were successful.

The capture of these heights closed the first period of the offensive half of the second battle of the Marne. For the next eleven days all efforts to budge the Germans from their position along these hills failed. On the night of August 1-2, the Germans retired from them, abandoning Soissons and moving to the north of the Aisne River. They did this only because the center of their line for seven miles along the heights of the northern bank of the Ourcq River had been forced back, after five days of savage fighting, by American troops with the French on their left.

This forcing of the Ourcq at the center of the German line endangered it all the way from Soissons to Rheims. The result was that beginning the night of August 1-2, the Germans for two days retired northward until they had crossed the Aisne River along the western part of their line, and the Vesle River along the center and eastern part of the line.

During the 21st, 22nd and 23rd, General Liggett's First American Army Corps vigorously attacked the new German position in the south. The fighting swayed

backward and forward, through the woods and grain-covered fields. The villages of Epieds and Trugny were taken by the 26th Division only to be lost again.

Sergeant Joseph W. Casey, 101st Infantry, after capturing with his platoon two machine-gun nests near Epieds, saw three Germans crawling forward to open fire with automatic rifles on his men. To give them no chance to open fire he dashed forward alone and single-handed killed all three.

Sergeant John J. Clabby, of the same regiment, while advancing with his platoon on some enemy machine-gun nests near Trugny, suddenly saw a German machine gun firing on his right flank. Without hesitancy, and despite its fire on him, he rushed the gun and single-handed killed the gunners and smashed the gun.

In the meanwhile, the 39th French Division had come up from Château-Thierry and joined in the attack to the right of the 26th. The rest of our 3rd Division, made up of regulars, under command of General Dickman, undismayed by the savage fighting of the 15th-17th of July, in which it had suffered heavy losses, continued the crossing of its left infantry brigade through Château-Thierry, while its right forced its way across the Marne and captured Mont-Saint-Père, the left of the new German position.

In the reconnaissance preliminary to this forced crossing, Lieutenant Isham R. Williams, of the 7th Infantry, started across the Marne with a patrol in

a boat. German machine-gun fire sank the boat near the northern bank. Leaving his patrol under cover, Williams swam back to the south bank, despite the enemy's fire, in order to show the detachment left there to fire across the Marne, the positions of the enemy's machine guns. He then again, under fire, swam the Marne back to his patrol on the north bank.

Continuing the attack, the 3rd Division, by the evening of the 23rd, had struggled to a position on top of the hills two miles north of the Marne. This threat to their left, added to the pressure on their front by Liggett's army corps, caused the Germans during the night of the 23rd-24th to retreat from the Epieds position to a new one.

This one, four miles back, was known as the Croix Rouge Farm position.

Just to the east of where our 3rd Division crossed the Marne is a long, high ridge, running north from that river. Covered on the top with the Forest of Ris, it makes a position easily held against attack.

The left or eastern end of the Croix Rouge Farm position rested on this ridge. From there it ran northwest through Le Charmel—a name the 3rd Division will always remember—Croix Rouge Farm—indelibly imprinted in the memories of the 42nd, or Rainbow, Division—and on to the south end of the heights south of Soissons still stubbornly held by the Germans.

From right to left, our 3rd Division, the French 39th Infantry Division, our 26th Division, now reen-

forced by General Weigel's infantry brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania National Guard Division, and the French, on their left, vigorously pursued the Germans. Overcoming the machine-gun nests left behind here and there, by the Germans to delay their advance, they soon, with bloody results, bumped into the Croix Rouge Farm position.

Our 42nd, or Rainbow, Infantry Division (General Menoher) was now commencing to arrive on the battle-field. July 15-17, posted in the center of Gouraud's Fourth French Army, it had done its share in stopping Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's last great attack in the war. Immediately it was certain that attack was stopped, the division was rushed from the Champagne to near Château-Thierry. Many of its troop trains passed through Paris during the daytime. From the doors of their "side-door Pullmans," known in France as "40 and 8," because they will hold 40 men or 8 horses, a splendid view was had of the Eiffel Tower and the towers of Notre Dame and other churches, but that was all.

The 84th Infantry Brigade, arriving first, relieved the 26th Division. This division had relieved the 2nd Division along the Belleau-Wood-Vaux line, July 5-9. When it was relieved it had been in the face of the enemy fourteen days and suffered nearly 5,000 casualties.

While this relief was going on, the 3rd Division by stubborn fighting captured Le Charnel.

Sergeant M. H. Campbell, of the 4th Infantry Band, hearing the cries for first aid from wounded lying in an open field swept by machine-gun fire, ran from one to another putting on their first-aid bandages. He only stopped when, himself wounded, he was unable to continue.

Late in the afternoon of July 26, the whole front of the Croix Rouge position was attacked by the French and Americans.

The Alabama infantry regiment supported by the Iowa one on its right, both of the Rainbow Division, without direct artillery support, by savage infantry fighting broke the enemy's position, capturing Croix Rouge Farm and the woods to each side. The deadliness of the American rifle, helped by machine-gun fire, once more proved its supremacy over infantry relying on machine guns and hand grenades, and using the rifle primarily as a pole to stick a bayonet on.

When close to the enemy, our infantry rushed forward with the bayonet, yelling as they ran. Among the nearly 800 German dead buried, almost 200 had been killed with the bayonet. There was no flinching of the enemy in this fight.

Also, they took their toll from us, the Alabama regiment having forty-seven officers and 650 men killed or wounded. The two battalions of the Iowa regiment engaged lost 500 killed and wounded.

This break through caused the Germans hurriedly to retreat to the Ourcq River. During the pursuit the

55th Infantry Brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania National Guard Division relieved the 39th French Infantry Division.

The Pennsylvanians, distributed among several French divisions south of the Marne River, had had their baptism of fire manfully facing the German attack July 15-17.

Nature had made the Ourcq as if to order for a defensive position. The Germans with the keen eyes of well-trained soldiers had not failed to notice it, even before they found the necessity to use it.

The northern end of the high ridge covered by the Forest of Ris merges into the high ground north of the Ourcq River. This high ground is the watershed between the Vesle River, to its north, and the Marne, to its south. The head-waters of the Ourcq begin where the Forest of Ris ridge runs into this high ground. First running north, the Ourcq makes a long, gentle curve to the east until at the town of Fère-en-Tardenois it straightens out and runs due east.

When the capture of the Croix Rouge Farm position broke the German line, the Germans abandoned the Forest of Ris ridge, and moved back to the watershed. Here, on the high ground just north of the Ourcq, they organized their defense.

Near the head-waters of the Ourcq, and where the Forest of Ris ridge joins the high ground of the watershed, is the village of Ronchères. It was strongly held by the Germans because of its position. More im-

portant yet, its garrison could fire not only on attackers approaching from its front, but also on the flank of troops crossing the Ourcq to attack the hills beyond it.

From Ronchères along the seven miles of the high ground just north of the gently curving Ourcq, were similar natural strong points sticking out from the German main position. The garrison of each not only had a clear field to the front to fire on troops attacking them, but also could fire to the right and left into the flanks of troops attacking the German positions between.

The names of these strong points, sanctified by the American blood freely shed to capture them, are enshrined on the battle honors of the regiments which took them, and indelibly imprinted in the minds of the men who struggled those five hot July and August days to break this last stand of the Germans in the second battle of the Marne.

Here they are: Ronchères, Grimpettes Woods, Hill 188, Cierges, Les Jomblets Wood, Hill 212, Sergy, Meurcy Farm, Bois Cola, Seringes-et-Nesle, and Hill 184.

The American side of the Ourcq consisted of long gentle slopes, leading down to that river. There were few hollows in the ground, or other cover, anywhere within two miles of the river. Therefore, when the Americans moved to the attack they were immediately in sight of the Germans.

Everywhere, in the wheat, in buildings, in the edge

of woods, were the machine guns of the defenders. The long curve of the Ourcq, with the splendid view the Germans had of the American side, gave the opportunity for their artillery to fire not only into the front, but, in many cases, into the flanks of the attacking Americans.

July 28, from in front of Ronchères, on the right, to in front of Seringes-et-Nesle, on the left, the American low-flying aviators kept attacking.

On the right was the 3rd Regular Division. Next, was the 55th Infantry Brigade of the Pennsylvania 28th Division, which had relieved the 39th French Division. Next came the 42nd, or Rainbow, Division, by this time all in line. Its 83rd Infantry Brigade had relieved three French infantry divisions, whose total strength—so war-worn was France from having borne the greater share of the war from its beginning—did not equal that of one American division.

Everywhere the German artillery and infantry fire from the front, and soon, in many cases, from the flank, took its toll. The Americans had no tanks. German low-flying aviators kept attacking.

Here was no trench warfare, where the majority of combatants are unable to see their opponents until close enough to throw grenades; where men fight in deep, narrow trenches and drive each other, in small groups, out of holes in the ground; where the main business of artillery is to break down the protection behind which the enemy lurks; and where generals

can do but little, once the fighting starts, because no human being has the power to get even a reasonably clear picture of what is going on over more than a very limited area.

Here was warfare in the open! Thousands of infantry moving to the attack, across the fields in plain view; the rifle taking its deadly toll at ranges where a grenade is impossible, and where the machine gun finds it no easy matter to locate the individual soldier firing on it, while, at the same time, with its crew offering him a fairly large target; the artillery firing on infantry in the open; the generals able, from what they themselves and their colonels can see, to form a correct opinion of what is going on, and, as a consequence, to take the necessary steps.

Once more was shown the wisdom of General Pershing's insistence, against European objection, that our army be trained for warfare in the open, with the rifle reenforced by the machine gun as the principal weapon of the infantry, instead of for trench warfare, with the infantry using machine guns and grenades as their principal weapons.

On the right, regulars of the 4th and 7th Infantry, of the 3rd Division, attacking on a front of a mile and a quarter, fought their way across the head-waters of the Ourcq, and captured Ronchères. On their left, the Pennsylvanians of the 109th and 110th Infantry, attacking on a mile-and-a-quarter front, fought their way across the Ourcq and several times up the slopes

of the hills beyond, only to have the attack each time suffer heavily from flanking and frontal fire. The remnants, however, held on just across the Ourcq.

Captain John Kennedy of the 110th Infantry went out alone in the face of heavy fire to rescue two of his men lying wounded on the slopes above the Ourcq. The first he got back to our lines. As he reached the second a German sprang at him. The captain grabbed the rifle of the wounded man, killed the German, and then carried back his wounded private.

The enemy's front attacked by the 42nd, or Rainbow, Division, was three and one-quarter miles long. Furthermore, the curve in the Ourcq here was more pronounced. As a consequence, the four infantry regiments in attacking, instead of moving parallel to each other, spread out each from the next as if moving down the spokes of a wheel away from its center toward the rim.

The leading battalion of the Iowa infantry regiment, on the right next the Pennsylvanians, forced its way across the Ourcq, and up the slope of Hill 212 beyond. Here it gained a foothold and stubbornly hung on, despite fire from both flanks as well as their front. The support battalion, swinging to the right, fought its way across the Ourcq to a position where it could protect the leading battalion from flanking attacks from Cierges and Hill 188, from which the Germans had been firing into the rear and right of the leading battalion. Similarly, the reserve battalion fought its

way across the Ourcq to a position on the outskirts of Sergy, from which Germans had been firing into the rear and left of the leading battalion.

The Alabama infantry regiment, attacking more to the north, forced its way across the Ourcq and some distance up the slope on the farther side. Though suffering severely from fire into its right from Sergy, it held the ground that it gained. The New York regiment, to the left of the Alabama one, forced its way across the Ourcq and to the crest of the ridge beyond.

One battalion of Ohio infantry, on the left of the New Yorkers, did the same. After suffering heavy casualties from fire from the front and from both the right and left flanks, these New York and Ohio troops were forced back from the crest, but managed to hold on north of the Ourcq.

On the 29th, the struggle calmed down by the night but, not stopped, burst out with renewed fury. Positions all along the front changed hands several times. By nightfall everywhere the Americans had gained ground. This night the 3rd Division was relieved by the 64th Infantry Brigade of the 32nd Division. When relieved the 3rd Division had seen fifteen days' combat, starting with the last great German attack, which began the morning of July 15. Its losses were more than 6,000 officers and men.

The 30th, like the 29th, was a day of continued savage attacks and counter-attacks, but again when night fell everywhere the Americans had made material gains.

On this night, the 63rd Infantry Brigade of the 32nd Division relieved the Pennsylvania Infantry Brigade. This was the first experience of the 32nd Division in a major combat. It had just come from the line in the Vosges Mountains, where it had had a period of trench warfare in a quiet sector. Made up of national guard troops from Wisconsin and Michigan, its regiments had inherited the proud traditions of the troops of those two states in our Civil War. Among its ranks were men whose fathers or grandfathers were part of the Iron Brigade, which so distinguished itself in the Army of the Potomac. The first day at Gettysburg, rather than yield one inch of ground to the attacking and greatly outnumbering Confederates, it stood fast though more than 70 percent of its men and officers had been killed and wounded.

July 31 and August 1 were repetitions of the three preceding days' savage fighting.

The acts of heroism would fill a volume.

Private John Mecom, of the 125th Michigan Infantry, though severely wounded while advancing with his platoon, not only continued to advance, refusing to go to the rear, but with another soldier attacked and captured a machine-gun nest.

Second Lieutenant J. M. Regan, of the 128th Wisconsin Infantry, mortally wounded while leading his platoon, kept at the head of his men until he collapsed.

Private M. B. M. Beattie, of the Sanitary Detachment of the 126th Michigan Infantry, again and again

left the shelter of his dressing station and crossed an open field covered by enemy machine-gun and artillery fire, in order to give first aid to wounded soldiers.

Private Edward Austin, of the 127th Wisconsin Infantry, went out in advance of our front lines twice and brought back wounded comrades, left there when his platoon had been driven back. He started on a third trip but was killed by machine-gun fire.

Sergeant John H. Wintrobe, of the 168th Iowa Infantry, when all the officers of his company were killed or wounded, and many of the men also killed and wounded, took command of the remnants and with great courage and coolness led them forward under an intense artillery and machine-gun fire.

The 47th Infantry of the 4th Division, which was in reserve, was sent forward to fill the gap between the Iowa and Alabama infantry regiments. Private Leslie C. Dill, of that regiment, though twice wounded while carrying a message, bandaged his wounds under fire and delivered his message.

The platoon commander and platoon sergeant of the platoon of Corporal Sidney E. Manning, of the 167th Alabama Infantry, were killed. Manning took command of his platoon, and though himself severely wounded, led the thirty-five remaining men forward, gaining a foothold in the enemy's position. By this time he had been wounded several more times. All but seven of his men had fallen. However, he stuck, and by the use of his automatic rifle and the encourage-

ment which he gave the remnants of the platoon, held off a body of the enemy several times as numerous. It was only when the platoons on either side had fought their way abreast of him that he finally dragged himself to the rear, suffering from nine wounds in different parts of his body.

Major William J. Donovan, of the 165th New York Infantry, advanced his battalion to an isolated position. Though the Germans persistently attacked him on three sides, he maintained the battalion in its position and, though wounded, refused to be evacuated until hit the second time.

Sergeant Duke Peyton, of the Supply Company of the 166th Ohio Infantry, receiving a call for ammunition, jumped on the wagon of Private Brooks and with him drove a four-mule team at a gallop in broad daylight from the edge of a wood across the open fields in direct view of the enemy. Though continuously under machine-gun fire, they reached the advanced position and delivered their ammunition.

Lieutenant Cornelius E. Lombardi, of the 149th Field Artillery, had charge of the telephone liaison detachment with the assault battalion of the 166th Ohio Infantry. Becoming dissatisfied because his view of Seringes-et-Nesle, then being fired on by his regiment, was somewhat obstructed by a rise in the ground, alone and under a heavy fire, he crawled one hundred yards to the front so as to better observe the results of the fire.

The 32nd Division took the Grimpettes Woods, Hill 188, and the town of Cierges and Les Tomblettes Wood. Since the fighting had begun the 42nd had taken Hill 212, Sergy, assisted by the 47th Regular Infantry, Meurcy Farm, Bois Cola, Seringes-et-Nesle, and Hill 184. To the loss of 1,800 officers and men killed and wounded in the Champagne defensive, they had added 5,500, making a total of 7,300 for the second battle of the Marne. The French on the left of the 42nd had taken Fère-en-Tardenois.

All the positions along the crests of the ridges between these strong points had been taken.

The German position on the Ourcq was conquered!

The remnants of its defenders hastily withdrew during the night of August 1 to the Vesle River, eight miles to the north.

With the center of their line pierced, the Germans to the left, as far as Rheims, fell back to the Vesle. Those to the immediate right of the break-through fell back to the Vesle, while those on the extreme right, south of Soissons, who for eleven days since our 1st Division was taken out, had stubbornly held on to their positions, retired through Soissons to the north of the Aisne.

The dipper was smashed flat. The second battle of the Marne, which had begun July 15 with the Allies everywhere on the defensive, wondering what chance they had to stop the third Hindenburg-Ludendorff assault after the tremendous success of their first one

in March and their second in May, finished with the Germans everywhere on the defensive, facing the Allies inspired by a successful attack.

The tide had been turned!

The Germans never attacked again!

From now on, instead of the Allies waiting and worrying while wondering where the Germans would strike next, the Germans were to wait, wonder, and worry where the Allies would strike next.

The planned attack against the British in the north was called off because the Germans realized they could not attack but must rest on the defensive.

The Germans had fought so determinedly that they had used up all their reserves in their vain attempt to stop the Franco-American attacks.

Thus when the French and English troops attacked August 8 there were no real reserves to be fed in, as there were in the second battle of the Marne.

The German troops yielded easily August 8, first because the second battle of the Marne dashed their hopes of a German victory followed by a German peace, and second because it showed that the American Reenforcement was not a propaganda myth but a constantly and rapidly increasing flood of hundreds of thousands of vigorous young troops as determined in attack as they were eager to fight.

Chapter X

AMERICA'S PART

WHAT was America's part in the Great War? The second battle of the Marne was the turning point of the war. It took from the Germans the initiative, which they had had almost uninterruptedly from shortly after the close of the first battle of the Marne, the summer of 1914, four years before.

From then on, the rôles of the Germans and the Allies were reversed.

From then on, the Germans were on the defensive—wondering where the next blow against them was to be struck, wondering whether they could stop it—as the Allies had been doing prior to this second battle of the Marne.

From then on, the Allies, carefully marshaling their forces, struck blow after blow where they thought they would do the most damage to, and were least expected by, the anxious Germans.

As a result of these constant attacks by the Belgian, French and American armies in a series of battles—all parts of the greatest battle in history, the "battle of France"—the Germans were driven back step by step, until with revolution at home, their em-

peror in flight, their war-weary armies asked for the armistice which brought victory and peace.

Was the part we played a vital one in causing this to happen? What part did our military leader in Europe, General Pershing, his army of 2,000,000 fighting men, our navy, and our government and our people scattered over the broad reaches of this vast country, play in bringing victory, which hovered so long over the standards of the German legions, before finally coming to rest on those of the Allies?

Major-General James G. Harbord was the first chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Force. The time he held this position was the anxious year of preparation for the arrival in France of, and the building up of, the American Expeditionary Force. This was the year during which the attitude of the Allies changed from reasonable confidence to despair. As a consequence General Harbord knew the facts back of the situation at that time.

At the end of this time, as the result of persistent entreaty on his part, General Pershing finally reluctantly consented to relieve him as chief of staff and gave him a command at the front. He commanded the Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood. He commanded the Second Division in the Soissons fight during the second battle of the Marne. He showed the same ability as a leader of men under fire on European battle-fields as that which he had previously displayed on Philippine ones in winning his high standing in our army.

Recently, I asked him if he would sum up for me the effect on the final stages of the war of the arrival of the American reenforcement, which reached a total of 1,000,000 officers and soldiers in July and 2,000,000 in October, 1918.

In the decisive way which characterizes him, the general said:

"Our first nine months in Europe showed us the Germans were more than holding their own. They were preparing an attack which the Allies were afraid they might not succeed in stopping. They thus had the initiative, or were on the offensive, while the Allies were on the defensive.

"This superiority on their part was due to two things. First, they had a single man in command, Marshal Hindenburg, with an able lieutenant, Ludendorff. Second, when Russia dropped out of the war, the transfer of the German troops from the Russian front to France gave Hindenburg the superiority of means, that is the reserves, necessary to attack.

"The first great blow struck by Hindenburg, that of March 20, 1918, by its disastrous results finally persuaded the Allies to put one man in command. The man chosen was the brilliant General Foch.

"General Foch had long seen the necessity for, and advocated the formation of, a central reserve, to be used to counter-attack the Germans in their weakest spot, once they were well launched in a full-fledged attack.

"Subsequent events proved the then General Foch to be correct in his plans.

"However, he could not have carried them out except for two things.

"The first was the constantly increasing strength of the American forces, which gave him the superiority of means, or reserves, essential.

"The second was General Pershing's clear idea, from the beginning, that only by refusing to allow American troops to be used as replacements in the Allied armies could he prevent their strength from being dissipated in the poor strategy which obtained up to the time of General Foch's appointment to supreme command.

"Had he not insisted upon this, the strength of the first million would not have been available to give General Foch the superiority of means, which was the decisive factor in the second battle of the Marne, the turning point of the war.

"The constant addition in American strength, which finally brought it to 2,000,000, meant a corresponding increase in General Foch's superiority of means, and, therefore, in the results which he could produce."

The final year of the war divides itself into four distinct phases.

The first was the period in which the Allies waited for Hindenburg and Ludendorff to begin their offensive.

The second, from March 20 to July 18, was one in which the three great blows of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, planned to bring German victory, were struck.

The third, from July 18 to September 1, was one in which the Allies, by a series of offensives, drove back the Germans, but without expecting to obtain victory before the summer of 1919.

The fourth was from September 1 to the Armistice, November 11, in which, as the result of much greater successes than they had expected in the third period, Marshal Foch decided that victory could be quickly obtained by a great final combined effort, using to the uttermost all the available forces of the Allies.

The first phase was from January 1 to March 20. This was a period of anxiety on the part of the Allies as to where Hindenburg and Ludendorff would strike, with the German army reenforced by the masses brought from the Russian front. However, despite this anxiety, they failed to take the steps necessary to prepare an adequate defense against the expected blow. They did not create the central reserve, long advocated by General Foch, much less did they put one man in command of their armies.

The second period was from March 20 to July 18. In it anxiety turned almost to black despair. The first of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff great blows, begun on March 20 against the British, created such a desperate situation that finally the Allies agreed to put one

man in command, the then General Foch. In May, came the second great Hindenburg-Ludendorff blow, this time against the French.

General Foch in command knew what he wanted to do, but he did not have the means. In other words, he did not have the troops to form a central reserve with which to strike the Germans at the very moment when, flushed with victory, their guard was down, and their weak right flank, stretching from Château-Thierry on the Marne to near Soissons on the Aisne, was open to successful attack.

On July 15, came the third of the great, smashing blows of Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

Could the troops in front of it hold?

Would General Foch have his central reserve, with which to strike the flank of this third great step of the Germans on their road to victory?

The third period was from July 18 to September 1. In this period the Allies, having for the first time stopped a full-fledged Hindenburg-Ludendorff assault, took the offensive and kept it. However, they did not yet envision victory before probably the summer of 1919. The absolute stopping of the attacking Germans by Gouraud's army on the dusty chalk plains of Champagne, the 15th of July, so far removed the danger of a great German success, despite the continued advance of their troops southeast of Rheims and south of the Marne, that it freed for other use a considerable number of reserves.

Thus, for the first time, General Foch had the means to form his reserve, and strike the blow on the German flank which he had long planned. His blow on their weak right flank, from Soissons on the north to Château-Thierry, twenty-five miles south, begun July 18, was so successful from the beginning that by July 24 he assembled at his headquarters at Bombon General Haig, commanding the British forces, General Pétain, commanding the French forces, and General Pershing, commanding the American ones.

General Foch had become convinced that at last he had the superiority of means—that is, more combat troops than the Germans—and that, therefore, the time had come for the Allies to pass from the defensive to the offensive.

Marshal Haig had been unwilling to contribute more than a few divisions to the general reserve prior to July 15, because he expected that the third Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack would be against him instead of against the French as it was. His fear was not without justification, because when Hindenburg gave the order on July 16 to stop the German troops from bleeding to death against General Gouraud's defensive campaign, he intended to make a fourth attack, this time against the British under Marshal Haig. In fact, the orders had been given to start the preparations.

However, General Foch's counter-attack, beginning July 18, had been so vigorously pushed that the Ger-

mans in their endeavor to stop it not only had used up all the reserves of the German Crown Prince, commanding the army attacked, but also had drawn upon the reserves of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, who was preparing to attack the British. They had drawn so heavily upon the reserves of the Crown Prince of Bavaria that his attack on the British had to be called off.

General Foch not only had obtained information of this from captured German documents, but also had learned that the Germans were finding it difficult to replace their killed, wounded, and prisoners lost in the second battle of the Marne.

On the Allied side, the Belgian and British armies, having done no fighting for two months, were fresh. What was more important, was that America's first million soldiers, who had arrived in France by this time, were being added to at the rate of a quarter-million, or more, a month. Therefore, he told the assembled commanders-in-chief:

"The Allied Armies have arrived at the turning of the road: In the midst of battle, they have again seized the initiative; their forces permit them to hold it; the principles of war command them to take it.

"The moment has come to quit the general defensive imposed by numerical inferiority, and to pass to the offensive."¹

The program he laid out was an offensive, a contin-

¹ *Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre*, Tome VII, Premier Volume, p. 112. (Published by Ministère de la Guerre, Etat-Major de l'Armée—Service Historique.)

uation of the counter-attack begun July 18, then still going on, to free the railway from Paris along the Marne east, the cutting of which by the second German offensive in May had seriously interfered with the movement of troops and supplies of the French and American troops just east of Paris;

A second offensive to free the railroad from Paris to Amiens, the cutting of which by the first great German offensive in March had seriously interfered with the movement of troops and supplies for the French and British armies north of Paris;

A third offensive to wipe out the Saint-Mihiel salient, which, made by German attacks the fall of 1914, had ever since seriously interfered with the movement of troops and supplies in the region of Verdun and in northern Lorraine;

A fourth offensive to drive back the Germans from Amiens north to the Belgian frontier, where their first offensive in 1918 had put them in a position seriously interfering with the communications of the Belgian, French, and British troops in the north with the main Allied forces to the south.

He told the assembled commanders-in-chief that it was not yet possible to foresee just where these offensives would lead the Allied forces; that they, at least, should prepare the way for a further offensive in the fall of sufficient importance to increase the advantages of the Allies, and not give to the Germans a chance to recover.

At the same time he asked each of them to send him a report, showing in detail the strength of their forces by January 1, 1919, and again by April 1, 1919.

In other words, he planned a series of offensives reaching well into 1919.

The fourth period, that from September 26 to the Armistice, was the final and decisive stage of the decisive "battle of France." In it the forces of the Allies were used in unremitting attacks for the purpose of bringing the German army to the point where its leaders, believing the situation hopeless, would demand, as they did, an armistice.

By the end of August, the various offensives outlined by Marshal Foch to Marshal Haig, General Pétain, and General Pershing at Bombon in July, had succeeded so well that Marshal Foch decided the time had come to prepare a final series of offensives which would be decisive. The orders were given, the offensive began September 26 and continued until the Armistice, November 11.

The more the lapse of time brings out the hidden facts of the war, the more their relationship to each other is examined, the more evident it is that from July 15 to July 18, inclusive, was the decisive point of the war.

The 15th of July on the chalk plains of Champagne, widely and deeply scarred by four years of warfare, a Hindenburg-Ludendorff attack was stopped, for the first time.

The question then was, could Hindenburg and Ludendorff continue to attack?

Would they have a sufficient superiority of means, that is, sufficient reserves, to keep up their offensives?

That they believed they had is shown by the fact that the offensive southeast of Rheims and across the Marne River, begun July 15 and steadily progressing, was ordered continued, while at the same time an offensive against the British in the north was ordered and prepared.

The question for the then General Foch was, did he have the superiority of means, or the reserves, to take advantage of the situation and attack the Germans?

He had not had them to meet a similar situation in May and June, when after their second successful attack, this time against the French in May, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were preparing for their third assault.

This time he had them. He had them because more than 700,000 American combat troops were in France. Some were immediately under his hand, ready to strike when he gave the order. Others under Marshal Haig's command had freed British divisions to be given to Foch. Others, under General Pétain, had freed French divisions for the use of General Foch.

Thus, for the first time he had the superiority of means, essential to permit him to make an attack of the kind which he had so clearly envisioned for many months as essential if the Germans were to be stopped.

This attack, begun July 18 and pushed unceasingly, caused the Germans to use up the reserves with which they had intended further offensives, and thus took from them that superiority of means essential to carrying them out. This attack, which produced this decisive result of putting the Germans on the defensive by using up their superiority of means essential for the offensive, or, in other words, their reserve, was largely carried forward by additional American divisions engaging in the combat. At the same time, the steady stream of American troops arriving in France permitted an equally steady relief of veteran French divisions from other parts of the line, freeing them for combat at decisive points.

The steady increase of the million American troops already in France by constantly arriving hundreds of thousands as steadily increased Marshal Foch's superiority of means for the attacks ordered at the Bombon conference July 24.

One of these attacks was wholly carried out by the First American Army, composed of more than half a million Americans and 100,000 French, which attacked and wiped out the Saint-Mihiel salient September 12 to 15.

This constant increase in the superiority of means for the offensive, due to the constantly increasing American force in France, enabled Marshal Foch to advance the final decisive offensive, originally expected sometime in 1919, to the fall of 1918.

In this last decisive attack, the First American Army, the total strength of which was more than 1,000,000 Americans, by its determined and steady drive through the Argonne, played a decisive part in bringing about the Armistice of November 11.

On that day, the American troops in France, including the First Army in the Argonne and the Second Army to its right in the Woëvre, totaled 2,000,000.

There can be no doubt that without the American reenforcement, which reached 1,000,000 in the fateful month of July, and 2,000,000 the historical month of November, the brilliant Marshal Foch would not have had that superiority of means which enabled him, first, to rob Hindenburg and Ludendorff of the initiative; second, by unceasing attacks to allow them no chance to recover, and third, to bring the war to a successful conclusion in the fall of 1918.

Had General Pershing permitted our men to be used as replacements for the Allies, the greater part of our first million would have been scattered in their armies. As a consequence of the poor strategy which prevailed prior to Marshal Foch's appointment as commander-in-chief, this strength would have been largely used up, because fed piece by piece into the furnace of war in a succession of small offensives, instead of being saved to be used unitedly in decisive blows under the sound strategy of Marshal Foch.

Had General Pershing not seen as clearly as did General Ludendorff on the other side—though each

arrived at the conclusion as the result of his own deductions—that tactics based on open warfare were essential to the carrying out of strategical plans for victory, the American reenforcement would not have been properly trained to meet the job which was theirs.

Had General Pershing not possessed that great determination of character, the characteristic of great generals, he could not have, despite his clearness of tactical and strategical vision, carried forward, day after day—like Grant in the Wilderness and afterward—despite heavy losses, despite local defeats here and there, the offensive through the Argonne, not only the greatest battle in American military history, but a decisive factor in bringing about the Armistice.

As brilliant as were the plans of Marshal Foch; as clear as was the strategical and tactical vision of General Pershing; as determined as were the characters of both, the accomplishment of the American reenforcement of 2,000,000 would have fallen far below its actual performance, had not the men and officers who composed it fought with the utmost courage, heart, and determination.

Those who belittle the American effort should not forget that the American soldier did not have constantly before him the evidences of the heel of the invader planted in his homeland, as did the French; that he had not believed for a period of years before the war that the enemy's growing commerce and mercantile marine threatened not only the world suprem-

acy but the very heart, even, of his country, as had the British; that he never did believe that a Germany, exhausted by years of fighting—even if victorious—could find, or spare, even if she could find, the sea and land forces necessary to cross the broad Atlantic and successfully invade his nation of 105,000,000 people.

Yet he fought as determinedly as the Briton or the Frenchman. He did so because, while not trouble seekers, our people have deeply seated warlike qualities which quickly come to the surface when war comes.

The majority of the early settlers of this country were of necessity a warlike people, or they could not have maintained themselves along the narrow strip of the Atlantic Coast which was first settled. Had we not been a warlike and determined people, we could not have steadily pushed our way 3,000 miles across this vast continent, driving all opposition before us and securing it to our uses.

Our history shows that our general lack of preparedness for war is not due to an unwillingness to fight, but to a belief, founded on experience, that when the time comes, our hard-headedness, coupled with our warlike qualities, will enable us to succeed. The fact that after each such experience we have either forgotten or ignored the relatively high price paid for success, as the result of our failure to prepare ahead of time for war, in no way alters this.

Despite this general lack of preparedness, there has always been a small group of citizens who, either as

professional soldiers in the regular forces or as civilian soldiers in the military organizations voluntarily maintained by the different states, have kept alive the traditions of the best of our military history, and the practical knowledge of the military methods of the day.

The Military Academy at West Point, the foundation of which was secured by George Washington, and the numerous military schools maintained by the different states, or by private corporations, have furnished fountainheads of military knowledge from which quietly, without attracting any particular attention, year after year, have been graduated men educated to be officers.

The appearance in each of our wars of long lists of officers killed and wounded who were graduates of these institutions proves that the seeds of military knowledge planted in the brains, and loyalty to their country planted in the hearts, of thousands of young men, students each year in these schools, never fail to blossom in the time of their country's need. This even though many years have elapsed.

The national guard, another proof of our warlike qualities, could not exist except for this military enthusiasm of numerous civilians. It has offered to many that opportunity for experience which has given a basic knowledge, in many cases soon turned in war into successful leadership.

Each of our wars has produced men, without pre-

vious military education, whose natural military adaptability, coupled with the war experience gained, has enabled them to climb to high military rank. In some cases they have done so in the same war; more often in the next one.

Generals Miles, MacArthur, Chaffee, Young, and a long list of others—whom every veteran of the Civil War or of the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection will remember—are typical.

Each of our wars has brought to the surface of public attention military leaders who the test of history shows do not suffer by comparison with those of similar rank of other nations.

The last war brought to the top General Pershing as commander-in-chief, Generals Liggett and Bullard as army commanders; Summerall, Harbord, Dickman, Hines, Wright, Read, Muir, Menoher, Cronkhite, Haan, Bell, McGlachlin, and several score others, who successfully commanded army corps and infantry divisions in the face of the enemy.

Our Civil War of 1861-65 is a proof of the warlike qualities of our people and their determination to fight to the last rather than abandon a principle believed in. No nation ever passed more successfully through a greater test.

It is only since our accomplishments in the Great War that a number of European military students have discovered our Civil War. They are surprised to find that it was the beginning of warfare as known today

because it was the first modern war in which the people on both sides devoted not only the whole of their man-power but also their material resources to the waging of war.

What Europe has been going through since the Great War we went through for many, many years after the Civil War. The South was wrecked. The towns and farmhouses destroyed had to be rebuilt. The agricultural and commercial systems, besides having to recover from almost complete exhaustion, had to be reorganized. The American merchant marine, one of the mainstays of northern prosperity, and then a close second to Great Britain's, had been wiped off the seas. Credit was exhausted and money of little value.

The country was full of wounded men. Hardly a family but mourned its dead left on one of the bloody battle-fields scattered from Pennsylvania to Georgia and from Virginia to Texas.

Our navy, by its destroyers and sub-chasers, and above all by the new ideas and methods which it brought to bear, decisively reenforced the British anti-submarine campaign at a time when the German undersea boats were getting the upper hand.

This, plus the ships produced by our unexampled shipbuilding program, so restored the balance of available tonnage, that enough ships besides our own could be obtained throughout the world, but primarily from

Britain, to get half of our army of 4,000,000 to Europe.

Thus largely because of American effort the German plan to use the submarines to prevent an American army from landing in Europe failed.

War declared, there was no hesitancy on the part of our government to accept it, in its fullest sense.

Immediate plans were made, and their execution begun, which would make the whole man-power of the United States, and all its material resources, available to the maximum extent in the minimum period of time.

In other words, the whole weight of the nation was thrown into the war. There was no waste of time or effort through partial efforts, which could not bring about decisive results.

The draft law made available the whole man-power of the country. A building program, to make good our lack of ships to carry a large force to Europe and maintain it there, was immediately put under way. It was done on a larger scale than the world has ever before planned, much less seen. Industrial mobilization was started without delay. It was done on a scale large enough to keep up the supplies we were already furnishing the Allies, and at the same time to provide for the increase in our army, navy, and shipping.

There was no question of "business as usual"; no hanging back for any reason.

From the day we entered the war, until its conclusion, the strong hand of President Wilson, and that of his secretary of war, Mr. Baker, were behind the generals in the field, commanding the army in Europe, and the generals at home bringing the new forces of our army into existence. Neither amateur civilian strategy, nor that based on political consideration rather than military, was permitted. Attempts to undermine General Pershing in Europe, and General March, the chief of staff at home, because they insisted, in spite of great pressure, on sticking to the policies they considered essential for winning the war, were coldly rebuffed.

There was no spectacle in this country of a national house divided against itself—the military *vs.* the political; the soldier *vs.* the statesman.

We did no bargaining. We asked neither payment nor favors in return for what we did. We paid for the transport of our troops in British ships at the time when Great Britain most needed help on French battlefields. We paid for everything we used or took in the vast preparations for, and movement of, our army through European ports to the front.

Neither prior to our entry nor during the war did we make any secret treaties promising us territory when the war was won, as did each of the Allies.

At the peace table we took no indemnity—no territory.

It is true we were not adequately prepared when we entered the war.

While it is desirable, as a rule, to avoid comparisons, sometimes they are the only yardstick by which the just measure of a situation can be obtained.

Of the Great Powers actually participating in the war, Great Britain and ourselves were the only two which were not continental European ones but were separated from the Continent by a body of water.

Therefore the first national defense question which each had to consider was that of the navy.

Britain entered the war with the largest navy on the face of the earth. Ours, while smaller, was as strong in proportion to our overseas responsibilities as Britain's.

Shortly after war broke out Britain began to violate our rights at sea. Later the Germans did the same, but to a much greater extent. As a consequence, in 1916, our Congress voted the appropriations for the construction, beginning immediately, of warships of all classes, which, when completed, would have made us the first naval power. Certainly there is no evidence here of a failure to prepare.

We were not prepared on land when we entered the war. No more was Britain when she entered.

The excuse often advanced for her unpreparedness on land is that no nation has ever maintained both an adequate army and an adequate navy. It happens that this is not in accordance with the facts, because in the

period preceding the Great War, Germany, France, Italy, Japan—and Russia, until the Russo-Japanese War robbed her of her navy—maintained both.

However, if the maintenance of a large navy is an adequate excuse for failure to be prepared on land, it applies to this country as well as to Britain.

Britain, while not on the continent of Europe, had been of it from the beginning of her history. Her diplomats for centuries had participated in every European controversy. Her fleet had played a strong part in every general European war. It was always present at the critical point in the constantly recurring crises, when the near breakdown of diplomacy made war imminent. Her troops throughout hundreds of years had again and again fought on the Continent.

What was taking place on the Continent, how it affected Great Britain, was a familiar and constant subject of discussion in her Parliament and also in her press.

The twenty miles of water of the English Channel separated her from the continent of Europe, but not her people from their fellow Europeans.

From the earliest days of our government, our diplomacy has been directed to keeping out of European affairs. It is only when Europe has attempted to interfere in the affairs of the Americas that we have become interested; and then only to keep her from spreading to this hemisphere her own quarrels, jealousies, and rivalries.

Our navy had never participated in a general European war. Outside of single ship encounters by daring American captains in our wars with Britain, and our attack on the Algerian pirate stronghold at Tripoli, our navy had seen no combat in or near European waters.

Our troops had never been in or near Europe.

European affairs, unfortunately for our own good, were only too seldom discussed in our houses of Congress. They were almost ignored by our press.

The Atlantic Ocean, so long and difficult and dangerous a barrier to cross, gave the opportunity to the Europeans who came here to do what they wished: to found a nation different from those in Europe. That new nation was developed for more than 125 years prior to our entry into the war. It is true that many European ideas and institutions were used in its development. However, others were entirely excluded. Also many new ones entirely American came into existence.

The result was not a piece of Europe, separated from it by a twenty-mile-wide water ditch, but a new country—America, separated, in many ways, by as vast a gulf as the deep and broad Atlantic.

The Great War was not a surprise to Europe.

It was to America.

The whole political and military history of Europe, for nearly ten years preceding the war, had been based on preparations for the day when it would break out.

The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand at Serejevo was not the cause of the war. It was merely the incident which touched off an event for which the causes had long existed. Two preceding crises—one over Morocco and another over the Balkans—just missed having the same effect.

For many years prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, British foreign policy had been primarily directed to keeping Russia off the route from England through the Mediterranean to India, and away from the northwestern frontier of that great peninsula with its hundreds of millions of inhabitants.

Allied with Turkey, she fought the Crimean War of 1854-56 for this purpose. She backed Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, in continuance of her persistent policy to weaken Russia. The Japanese destroyed in battle virtually the whole Russian navy, thus removing that threat from Britain's sea lane to India. However, Russia's continued advance into Persia so alarmed Britain that there was talk of war.

Nevertheless, shortly after, in 1907, Britain and Russia patched up their quarrels. German plans for the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, and German intimacy with Turkey, considered a threat to both, brought them together.

In the same way, Britain and France patched up their differences. They had been hereditary enemies and had fought each other since that distant time when the various peoples inhabiting what is today France

were beginning to call themselves Frenchmen, and those living in what is today England were commencing to call themselves Englishmen.

The reasons were simple.

France, greatly outnumbered by Germany, feared another Franco-Prussian War, in which she would be overwhelmed by German's superior weight. She had formed an alliance with Russia to counteract this. However, the Russians were a long way off. An understanding with Britain would overcome this.

Britain's policy had always been to maintain a navy equal in strength to the combined strength of the two next Powers. However, the rapid growth of the German navy brought her to the point where she no longer could afford to continue this policy.

Part of her fleet had been kept in home waters to watch the German fleet, and France's Atlantic fleet. Part had been kept in the Mediterranean to watch the French Mediterranean fleet and the Italian fleet. Italy was allied with Germany. When the time came that Britain could not maintain her double navy standard, she had to alter this arrangement if her home fleet was to be strong enough to meet the German fleet with chances of success.

An arrangement with France would do so. It was made. France concentrated the whole of her fleet in the Mediterranean. This checkmated Italy's naval strength and freed the British Mediterranean fleet for use as a reenforcement to Britain's home fleet.

Gladstone once said in the British Parliament, "The preservation of Belgium's neutrality is required by British policy as well as morality."

From the time Britain had swept the Dutch navy from the English Channel and the North Sea, and made them her own, her policy on the continent of Europe had been largely directed to keeping any great Power from occupying Belgium and Holland. This because such occupancy would allow the building of powerful naval bases on these waters, which could be used for operations, first, against Britain's sea power, and, second, for the invasion of Britain.

For many years, France was the great danger. Many a British soldier shed his blood on the soil of the Low Countries to keep the French out. In 1870, at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, Britain secured from Prussia a treaty lasting until after the war, embodying a promise not to pass through Belgium while invading France.

For many years prior to the outbreak of the Great War, the fact that the next time Germany invaded France the right wing of her army would pass through Belgium was openly discussed. This not only among military people, but also in the parliaments and by the press of the different countries.

Thus, the French fear of being overwhelmed by German numbers, and the British fear of the growing strength of the German fleet and of her army's entering Belgium, brought these two countries together.

America had no alliances or agreements with any European Power. None of our national policies or interests was threatened, as far as we could see.

Even Japan, an Asiatic Power, half-way around the world, and much farther away from Europe than ourselves, was more involved in, and much better acquainted with, European international political affairs than were we. She had an alliance with one European Power—England—and was steadily participating in European councils.

Thus when the war broke out in August, 1914, the average American had no idea what it was all about, nor any feeling in the matter.

This was in marked contrast to the mass of Europeans, who had been aching to get at each other's throats for a period of years. Also, they had been preparing to do so.

Nevertheless, we have been accused of being slow to make up our minds finally to enter.

The Belgian atrocities, interference with our sea-borne commerce, and, finally, the fight of democracy against autocracy, were the reasons given why we should have entered sooner.

If true, the Belgian atrocities were bad. However, even Lord Roberts, than whom there was never a more patriotic Briton, had hesitated to believe them. In fact, he had warned his countrymen to remember the unfounded charges of British atrocities during the Boer War in South Africa, and go slow in crediting the

Belgian ones. Our troops had been accused about the same time, with equal injustice, of atrocities in the Philippines.

The first, and longest, interference with our sea-borne commerce was by the British. Some of it had the appearance of being based more on a desire to interfere with a rival's trade than on keeping needed supplies from reaching a blockaded enemy. In any case, methods were used which from the earliest days of our independence we had never previously tolerated.

It was some time before the issue of democracy *vs.* autocracy emerged clearly from the mass of propaganda with which this country was flooded.

Even then, there were many who wanted to be certain that the Tsar of Russia was fighting for democracy. Less than ten years before, the country's sympathy had gone to Japan in her struggle with Russia, because convinced that Russia's armies were fighting in response to the will of an autocrat and not that of a people.

The very propaganda which flooded the country caused many to hesitate. This for the reason that it frequently seemed to be directed more to robbing American citizens of their birthright than to informing us as to the object for which the combatants were fighting.

This because too much of it was based on racial and religious hatreds, the twin curses of Europe, which a

large part of our ancestry came to this country to escape.

This propaganda reached the unjust, and therefore dangerous, point where there was a constantly increasing tendency to judge a man's Americanism on the basis of the blood and religion of his ancestors, and not, regardless of these, on his own willingness, as demonstrated by his own acts, to support the Constitution of the United States both in peace and in war.

Despite this atrocious situation, the evil effects of which are still only too often apparent, our people did not hesitate, when once convinced that Germany intended to continue sinking our ships at sea, and that the Allies were really fighting for democracy.

The whole-hearted way in which they supported the Executive's demand for universal conscription, as the only efficient way of quickly putting the whole manhood of the nation under arms; the way in which, regardless of age or sex or personal interest, the whole nation threw itself into the war, shows our people to be loyal to the backbone, and always ready to go to war to support the principles in which they believe.

Let those Europeans and Americans who have scoffed at the part this country played in the Great War, ask themselves: should the time come when China as well as Japan is a great military Power; and should we have war with one, and the other joined in—would the Londoner and the Parisian, the Leicestershire man, the Northampton man, the Champenois,

and the Savoyard send their sons as quickly to die in battle in the Sierra Nevadas in far-off California as the New Yorker, the San Franciscan, the Illinoisan, the Kansan, and the Texan sent theirs to die in battle along the Somme and the Marne?

Epilogue

IN a quiet part of Tokyo, Japan, reached through narrow streets between high yellow bamboo fences over the tops of which hangs the graceful green foliage of the trees inside, is a modest house.

It is that of the great Admiral Togo, the only living admiral who has won a decisive victory at sea.

In his sitting-room, which is modest—as is everything surrounding the admiral, who is the soul of modesty despite his great achievement and the still enduring gratitude and plaudits of his fellow-countrymen—is a model of the Mikasa.

The Mikasa was his flagship during the Russo-Japanese War. She carried his flag and person on that memorable May day in 1905, when the fate of the Japanese army fighting in Manchuria hung on Admiral Togo's ability to whip Rojestvensky's stronger Russian fleet.

If he failed, that army, comprising the manhood of Japan, was cut off from home; from its source of supply of every kind.

If he failed, an elated Russia would draw freely on her as yet but partially used exhausted military strength to so increase her army in Manchuria that it could crush that of Japan.

Admiral Togo did not fail. He won a great victory. He captured Rojestvensky, and sank or captured all his warships, with the exception of a few which, taking advantage of their speed, the confusion and darkness, escaped.

The Mikasa is to Admiral Togo the outward and visible sign of those soul-trying days and hours of the Russo-Japanese War, which no soldier or sailor, no matter how much fighting he has seen, who has not borne the tense anxieties imposed by the responsibilities of high command can fully appreciate.

The Mikasa was listed by the Washington Arms Conference to be scrapped.

America, out of admiration for Admiral Togo, agreed to make an exception.

The Mikasa still floats today. She is a shrine continuously visited by crowds of patriotic Japanese.

To those Americans who come to pay their respects—and what soldier or sailor would not?—Admiral Togo shows the model of his Mikasa, and expresses his appreciation of America's courtesy to him.

Three years ago, while I was paying my respects, the admiral asked me to tell him of the latest improvements in the Arlington National Cemetery on the Virginia hills just across the Potomac from Washington, and overlooking it.

He told how, should he again have the opportunity to visit America, he wished before anything else to visit Arlington. He spoke of the profound impression

made on him by this city of American military dead, soldier and sailor, who have carried their country's flag in battles to maintain the principles for which it stands—from the wind-swept, dusty plains of North China and the palm-dotted Philippine Islands in Asia to the historic Marne, Meuse and Moselle rivers in Europe; and in the Americas between, from the snow-covered and bitterly cold country of our northern border to the desolate high plateau of central Mexico and the tropical isles and shores of the Caribbean Sea in the south.

He concluded by stating that no country which took such loving care of its military dead, which so respected and honored them in their last sleep, need fear that the materialism so evident throughout the world today would undermine the really great things in its character.

The unknown soldier and his comrades of the Great War, whose relatives wished them brought home to rest in the soil of the country which gave them birth, and for which they died, are the latest recruits to these glorious legions of American dead.

The unknown soldier—who? Whoever he is, undoubtedly he was typical in his sentiments of his 4,000,000 comrades. Perhaps a boy just entering manhood, from a Middle West farm, born and brought up a thousand miles from the nearest salt water; who never saw the Atlantic until packed into an overcrowded transport; to whom Europe was only a map

on a single page of his school geography, a place which George Washington had told us to keep away from; a boy who thrilled to the call to arms and went to fight for—his country.

His parents as they sit on the porch of their farmhouse in the evening, looking over the nodding brown and golden sunflowers, at the blood-red sun setting through an endless vista of tall green corn, know that they gave their son for—their country.

America asked for nothing material when she entered the war. She took nothing material at the peace table.

She fought for a principle: "Government of the people, by the people, for the people."

By this attitude her dead in Arlington and those in far-off France, who still rest on the battle-field, earned as their epitaph Christ's saying:

"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

THE END

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